




# Global Peace Index 2024

○ Results & Trends

○ Economic Impact

○ War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

○ Societal Analysis





## **Quantifying Peace and its Benefits**

The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.

IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New York, Brussels, The Hague, Mexico City and Nairobi. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

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# Executive Summary

This is the 18<sup>th</sup> edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness, covering 99.7 per cent of the world's population. Produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world's leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies.

The GPI uses 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of *Societal Safety and Security*; the extent of *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict*; and the degree of *Militarisation*. This year it introduces a new measure of global military capability that incorporates military sophistication, technology, and battle readiness into a single measure.

The report finds that many of the conditions that precede major conflicts are higher than they have been since the end of the Second World War. There are currently 56 active conflicts, the most since the end of Second World War, and with fewer conflicts being resolved, either militarily or through peace agreements. The number of conflicts that ended in a decisive victory fell from 49 per cent in the 1970s to nine per cent in the 2010s, while conflicts that ended through peace agreements fell from 23 per cent to four per cent over the same period.

Conflicts are also becoming more internationalised, with 92 countries now engaged in a conflict beyond their borders, the most since the inception of the GPI in 2008, complicating negotiation processes for a lasting peace and prolonging conflicts. The internationalisation of conflict is driven by increased great power competition and the rise of middle level powers, who are becoming more active in their regions. Although the measures of militarisation had been improving for the first 16 years of the GPI, the trend has now reversed and in 2024 militarisation deteriorated in 108 countries.

The combination of these factors means that the likelihood of another major conflict is higher than at any time since the inception of the GPI.

This year's results found that the average level of global peacefulness deteriorated by 0.56 per cent. This is the 12<sup>th</sup> deterioration in peacefulness in the last 16 years, with 65 countries improving and 97 deteriorating in peacefulness. This is the highest number of countries to deteriorate in peacefulness in a single year since the inception of the index.

Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the world, a position it has held since 2008. It is joined at the top of the

index by Ireland, Austria, New Zealand, and Singapore. All of these countries other than Singapore were also ranked among the ten most peaceful countries in the first year of the index.

Yemen is the least peaceful country in the world in the 2024 GPI, followed by Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. This is the first year that Yemen has been ranked as the least peaceful country in the world, with the country having fallen 24 places in the rankings since the inception of the index.

The gap between the most and least peaceful countries in the world is now wider than it has been at any point in the last 16 years. Compared to 2008, the 25 most peaceful countries were one per cent more peaceful in 2024, while the 25 least peaceful countries were 7.5 per cent less peaceful.

The conflict in Gaza has had a very strong impact on global peacefulness, with Israel and Palestine having the first and fourth largest deteriorations in peacefulness respectively. Ecuador, Gabon, and Haiti were the other countries with the largest deteriorations in peacefulness.

El Salvador had the largest improvement on the index, due to very significant improvements in the *homicide rate* indicator and citizens' improved perceptions of safety over the past few years. The United Arab Emirates, Nicaragua, and Greece also recorded significant improvements in peacefulness.

Europe is the most peaceful region in the world and is home to eight of the ten most peaceful countries. It has been the most peaceful region every year since the start of the GPI. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained the world's least peaceful region.

North America recorded the largest average deterioration of all the regions, with significant falls in peacefulness in both Canada and the US. However, despite this deterioration it remains the third most peaceful region globally, behind Europe and Asia-Pacific.

Of the 23 indicators in the GPI, eight recorded improvements, 13 deteriorated, and two recorded no change. The *Militarisation* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains both deteriorated, while the *Safety and Security* domain recorded a slight improvement.

The largest year-on-year deteriorations occurred on the *UN peacekeeping funding*, *military expenditure (% of GDP)*, *deaths from external conflict*, and *external conflicts fought* indicators. The deterioration on the *military expenditure (% of GDP)* reflects the deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain more broadly.

There were substantial improvements for many *Safety and Security* indicators, including *violent demonstrations*, *terrorism impact* and the *homicide rate*. Several countries in the Central America and Caribbean region recorded very large reductions in the number of homicides, though the region still had the highest average homicide rate of any region.

The world has become less peaceful over the past 16 years, with the average country score deteriorating by 4.5 per cent since the inception of the index in 2008. Of the 163 countries in the GPI, 95 recorded deteriorations, while 66 recorded improvements and two recorded no change. Seventeen of the 23 GPI indicators deteriorated between 2008 and 2023 while seven improved.

Two of the three GPI domains deteriorated since 2008, with *Ongoing Conflict* deteriorating by 19.1 per cent and *Safety and Security* deteriorating by 1.7 per cent. *Militarisation* was the only domain to improve, although this trend has begun to reverse over the past four years. Some of the largest indicator deteriorations were for *external conflicts fought*, *internal conflicts fought*, *number of refugees and IDPs*, and *violent demonstrations*.

The 2024 GPI looks at how warfare and violent conflict is changing in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There has been a significant rise in both conflicts and battle deaths in the past two decades, with battle deaths reaching a thirty-year high in 2022.

Regional conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the Gaza conflict illustrate the devastating human cost and the complexity of modern warfare. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has seen over 2,000 fatalities per month for almost every month in the past two years, while neither side is making significant gains. The Gaza conflict has resulted in over 35,000 deaths since October 2023, resulting in a severe humanitarian crisis. These conflicts are examples of 'forever wars', where prolonged violence becomes seemingly endless without clear resolutions, exacerbated by external military support, asymmetric warfare, and geopolitical rivalries.

War in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is changing as a result of two key trends: changes in military technology and increasing geopolitical competition. Non-state groups can now engage more effectively with larger states using technologies like drones and improvised explosive devices. The use of drones has surged, with non-state groups increasing drone attacks by over 1,400 per cent since 2018. This shift has made conflicts more complex and harder to resolve.

Geopolitical shifts further complicate global conflict management. The transition from a unipolar world dominated by the United States to a multipolar one has intensified competition and prolonged conflicts. Traditional powers like the US and the EU are stretched thin, limiting their ability to manage global tensions effectively.

Meanwhile, emerging powers such as China, Russia, and regional middle powers are increasingly vying for influence in conflict-affected areas around the world.

The report also introduces a new machine learning methodology developed by IEP to assess military capability more accurately by accounting for technological differences in military assets. This method evaluates military strength by considering both the quantity and quality of platforms, as well as battle experience and combat readiness, across four weapon categories: fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, naval assets, and armoured vehicles.

Using this method, global military capability has increased by ten per cent since 2014, despite a decline in military personnel. Among the major military powers, China has seen the most significant increase in military capability, while France and Russia have experienced slight contractions.

The economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2023 was \$19.1 trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This figure is equivalent to 13.5 per cent of the world's economic activity (gross world product) or \$2,380 per person. Military and internal security expenditure accounts for over 74 per cent of the total economic impact of violence, with the economic impact of military spending alone accounting for \$8.4 trillion in the past year.

Many countries have experienced enormous falls in GDP as a result of violent conflict during that time. Ukraine's economy shrank by an estimated 30 per cent in 2022 as a consequence of the Russian invasion, while some estimates

suggest that the Syrian civil war led to a drop of 85 per cent of GDP.

The key to building peacefulness in times of conflict and uncertainty is Positive Peace. It can also be used to forecast future falls in peacefulness, with accuracy rates of up to 80 per cent. Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures* that create and sustain peaceful societies.

IEP has developed the Halo approach for capturing problems systemically and informing effective policies for building Positive Peace. The Halo approach has been designed as a set of 28 building blocks for the analysis of societal systems and the design of resilience building programs. This allows for an adaptive approach that can be uniquely tailored based on many dependencies, including the size of the societal system and the sophistication required in the analysis.

“  
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# Key Findings

## Section 1: Results

- The average level of country peacefulness deteriorated by 0.56 per cent in the 2024 Global Peace Index. This is the fifth consecutive year that global peacefulness has deteriorated.
- In the past year 65 countries recorded an improvement, while 97 countries recorded a deterioration in peacefulness. This is the most countries to deteriorate in a single year since the inception of the index.
- Peacefulness improved slightly on average on the *Safety and Security* domain but deteriorated on both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Militarisation* domains.
- The conflict in Gaza and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine were the primary drivers of the fall in peacefulness.
- There were four indicators with average deteriorations of over three per cent: *UN peacekeeping funding*, *military expenditure (% of GDP)*, *deaths from internal conflict*, and *external conflicts fought*.
- North America recorded the largest regional deterioration in peacefulness, with both Canada and the US recording large falls in peacefulness. This deterioration was driven by increases in *violent crime* and *perceptions of criminality*.
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remains the least peaceful. It is home to four of the ten least peaceful countries in the world, including the two least peaceful, Sudan and Yemen.
- Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world and is home to seven of the ten most peaceful countries. However, it deteriorated in peacefulness over the past year, and recorded its largest year on year deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain since the beginning of the GPI in 2008.
- Of the 23 GPI indicators, eight recorded an improvement, 13 recorded a deterioration, and two recorded no change over the past year. The largest deterioration was on *UN peacekeeping funding*, while the biggest improvement was on the *violent demonstrations* indicator.
- One hundred countries are at least partially involved in some form of external conflict in the past five years, up from 59 in 2008. In most cases countries were offering support to an existing government against an internal armed rebel or terrorist group.
- *Military expenditure (% of GDP)* recorded the largest yearly deterioration since the inception of the GPI. 86 countries increased their relative military expenditure, compared to just 50 where it decreased.

## Section 2: Trends

- The world has become less stable in the past 17 years with substantial increases in political instability, number of conflicts, deaths from conflicts and violent demonstrations.
- However, the increase in global violence has been accompanied by a stronger commitment to UN peacekeeping operations which recorded the biggest improvement of all GPI indicators.
- Two of the GPI domains deteriorated since 2008, with *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* deteriorating by 19 per cent and 1.7 per cent respectively. Only the *Militarisation* domain improved, with peacefulness increasing on that domain by 3.4 per cent.
- The trends on the *Militarisation* domain reveal an interesting paradox: Although conflict is now much more common than 17 years ago, most countries have become less militarised.
- However, since 2019 the trend has reversed with the *Militarisation* domain deteriorating slightly over the past five years.
- The improvement in the *Militarisation* domain was driven by improvements in *UN peacekeeping funding* and the *armed services personnel rate* while deteriorations were recorded in *military expenditure (% of GDP)* and *weapons imports*.
- When taking into account advances in military technology, overall military capability has increased by ten per cent globally since 2014.
- Under the new military capability scoring system, the US has a major strategic advantage with three times the capabilities of its nearest rival China, closely followed by Russia, and then France.
- *External conflicts fought* and *internal conflicts fought* had the largest deteriorations. This reflects not only the spread of conflict around the world, but the increasing involvement of external actors in civil conflicts.
- Since 2008, all regions have recorded a deterioration in their scores on the *external conflicts fought* indicator. Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the most severe deterioration of 134 per cent, followed by South Asia at 115 per cent, and MENA at 105 per cent.
- *Deaths from internal conflict* increased by over 475 per cent in the past 17 years, with over half the countries in the GPI recording at least one conflict death in 2023.
- 'Peace inequality' continues to grow. The gap between the most and least peaceful countries is now larger than at any time during the history of the index.
- Over 95 million people are now either refugees or have been internally displaced because of violent conflict. There are now 16 countries where more than five per cent of the population has been forcibly displaced.
- There has been a shift away from large, infantry-based armed forces to a greater reliance on more sophisticated weaponry. Between 2008 and 2024, 112 countries reduced their *armed services personnel rate*.
- *Perceptions of criminality* improved in 96 countries, with El Salvador recording the biggest improvement, and Syria recording the largest deterioration.

### Section 3: The Economic Impact of Violence

- The global economic impact of violence was \$19.1 trillion in 2023, equivalent to 13.5 per cent of global GDP, or \$2,380 per person.
- The 2023 result represented an increase of 0.83 per cent – or \$158 billion – from the previous year, largely driven by a 20 per cent increase in GDP losses from conflict.
- The largest increases in the economic impact of violence occurred in Palestine and Israel, where the total impact increased by 63 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.
- Ukraine, Afghanistan, and North Korea incurred the highest relative economic cost of violence in 2023, equivalent to 68.6, 53.2, and 41.6 per cent of GDP, respectively.
- In the ten countries most affected by violence, the economic cost of violence averaged 37.4 per cent of GDP in 2023, compared to just 2.9 per cent for the ten least affected countries.
- Expenditure on peacebuilding and peacekeeping was \$49.6 billion in 2023, less than 0.6 per cent of total military spending in PPP terms.
- The largest increase in the economic costing model occurred in the armed conflict domain, which increased by 184 per cent since 2008.
- Despite its high economic cost relative to GDP, Ukraine experienced a near 24 per cent decrease in its economic impact of violence from the previous year, as the first year of the conflict with Russia had a greater impact on its GDP. Sudan, Timor-Leste, Angola, and Ethiopia respectively experienced 32.8, 21.3, 19.1 and 18.8 per cent decreases in their economic impact from the previous year.
- Military and internal security expenditure accounts for over 74 per cent of the total economic impact of violence. Military expenditure alone accounts for 44 per cent of the model at \$8.4 trillion.
- Conflict deaths, GDP losses, refugees and IDPs, and terrorism have increased by at least 100 per cent in the last 15 years. Conflict deaths had the highest increase at 482 per cent.

### Section 4: War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

- Battle deaths reached a 30 year high in 2022, with the number of active conflicts now higher than at any point since the end of World War II.
- In 2022 there were 56 conflicts involving at least one state.
- The number of conflicts resulting in a decisive victory to either side has fallen from 49 per cent in the 1970s to less than nine per cent in the 2010s.
- The number of conflicts that end through a peace agreement has also fallen significantly, from just under 23 per cent in the 1970s to just over four per cent in the 2010s.
- Negative sentiment between Israelis and Palestinians has been steadily rising since 2007.
- There have been more than 2,000 fatalities in the Russia-Ukraine conflict almost every month for the past two years.
- Conflict is becoming more widespread, with more countries than ever involved in conflicts outside their own borders. Ninety-two countries were involved in an external conflict in 2022. This is the most since the inception of the index in 2008.
- The nature of these conflicts has changed over time. Conflicts are now more likely to involve multiple internal and external actors.
- The increase in the number of smaller conflicts, as well as the increasing number of internal and external actors involved, is making it harder to successfully end these conflicts.
- Technology and the rise of asymmetric warfare is making it much easier for smaller non-state groups, as well as smaller or less powerful states, to engage in conflict with larger states or governments.
- The use of drones by non-state groups has surged in the past five years, and the number of drone strikes has increased by over a thousand per cent since 2018.
- The economic impact of war is severe. For example, in Syria GDP dropped by 85 per cent, from \$252 billion in 2010 to \$8.9 billion in 2020.

The average level of country peacefulness deteriorated by 0.56 per cent in the 2024 Global Peace Index. This is the fifth consecutive year that global peacefulness has deteriorated.

100

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Improvements

65

Deteriorations

97

North America recorded the largest regional deterioration in peacefulness, with both Canada and the US recording large falls in peacefulness. This deterioration was driven by increases in violent crime and perceptions of criminality.

In the past year 65 countries recorded an improvement, while 97 countries recorded a deterioration in peacefulness. This is the most countries to deteriorate in a single year since the inception of the index.

Improvements

8 ↑

Deteriorations

13 ↓



The conflict in Gaza and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine were the primary drivers of the fall in peacefulness.

Of the 23 GPI indicators, eight recorded an improvement, 13 recorded a deterioration, and two recorded no change over the past year. The largest deterioration was on UN peacekeeping funding, while the biggest improvement was on the violent demonstrations indicator.

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
86 Increased 50 Decreased

Military expenditure (% of GDP) recorded the largest yearly deterioration since the inception of the GPI. 86 countries increased their relative military expenditure, compared to just 50 where it decreased.



# 1 Results






# 2024 GLOBAL PEACE INDEX

A snapshot of the global state of peace

## THE STATE OF PEACE



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
1	Iceland	1.112	↔	29	Qatar	1.656	↓ 9	57	Zambia	1.948	↑ 2
2	Ireland	1.303	↔	30	Latvia	1.661	↓ 3	58	Costa Rica	1.95	↓ 5
3	Austria	1.313	↑ 1	31	Lithuania	1.672	↑ 6	59	Kazakhstan	1.954	↑ 19
4	New Zealand	1.323	↓ 1	32	Poland	1.678	↓ 3	60	Uzbekistan	1.957	↑ 15
5	Singapore	1.339	↑ 3	33	Italy	1.692	↔	61	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.961	↓ 5
6	Switzerland	1.35	↑ 3	34	United Kingdom	1.703	↓ 2	62	Namibia	1.972	↑ 1
7	Portugal	1.372	↓ 1	35	Montenegro	1.746	↑ 5	63	Moldova	1.976	↓ 2
8	Denmark	1.382	↓ 3	36	Romania	1.755	↓ 1	64	Chile	1.978	↓ 10
9	Slovenia	1.395	↓ 2	37	Oman	1.761	↑ 4	65	Tanzania	1.987	↑ 11
10	Malaysia	1.427	↑ 2	38	North Macedonia	1.764	↓ 2	66	Sierra Leone	1.993	↓ 23
11	Canada	1.449	↓ 1	39	Sweden	1.782	↓ 5	67	Jordan	1.998	↓ 9
12	Czechia	1.459	↓ 1	40	Greece	1.793	↑ 17	68	Bolivia	2.009	↓ 2
13	Finland	1.474	↑ 2	41	Vietnam	1.802	↓ 3	69	Liberia	2.025	↓ 5
14	Hungary	1.502	↑ 4	42	Albania	1.809	↓ 3	70	Cambodia	2.028	↓ 6
15	Croatia	1.504	↑ 1	43	Taiwan	1.818	↓ 1	71	Tajikistan	2.035	↑ 19
16	Belgium	1.51	↓ 2	44	Madagascar	1.838	↑ 2	72	Angola	2.043	↑ 19
17	Japan	1.525	↓ 4	45	Mongolia	1.845	↔	=73	Paraguay	2.044	↓ 4
18	Netherlands	1.527	↑ 1	46	South Korea	1.848	↑ 6	=73	Tunisia	2.044	↑ 6
19	Australia	1.536	↑ 2	47	Argentina	1.855	↑ 2	75	Thailand	2.048	↑ 11
20	Germany	1.542	↓ 4	48	Indonesia	1.857	↓ 4	76	Armenia	2.052	↓ 2
21	Bhutan	1.564	↑ 3	49	Laos	1.861	↑ 1	77	Kyrgyz Republic	2.053	↑ 18
22	Mauritius	1.577	↔	50	Botswana	1.863	↓ 3	78	Morocco	2.054	↑ 14
23	Spain	1.597	↑ 7	51	Timor-Leste	1.882	↓ 3	79	Malawi	2.063	↓ 12
24	Estonia	1.615	↑ 3	52	Uruguay	1.893	↑ 3	80	Nepal	2.069	↓ 12
25	Kuwait	1.622	↑ 1	53	United Arab Emirates	1.897	↑ 31	81	Bahrain	2.072	↑ 16
26	Bulgaria	1.629	↑ 5	54	Serbia	1.93	↑ 8	=82	The Gambia	2.079	↓ 13
27	Slovakia	1.634	↓ 2	55	Ghana	1.938	↓ 5	=82	Turkmenistan	2.079	↓ 2
28	Norway	1.638	↓ 5	56	Kosovo	1.945	↑ 3				



**Improvements**

**65**

countries recorded improvements in peacefulness

**Deteriorations**

**97**

countries recorded a deterioration in peacefulness

**Overall Average Change (%)**

**-0.56**

The average level of country peacefulness deteriorated by 0.56 per cent in the 2024 Global Peace Index.

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
84	Senegal	2.084	↓ 15	112	Belarus	2.291	↑ 3	=140	Pakistan	2.783	↑ 2
85	Guinea-Bissau	2.085	↓ 12	113	Nicaragua	2.295	↑ 12	=140	Niger	2.792	↓ 6
86	France	2.088	↓ 14	114	Benin	2.306	↓ 1	142	Venezuela	2.821	↑ 3
87	Trinidad and Tobago	2.092	↓ 10	115	Papua New Guinea	2.315	↓ 10	143	Haiti	2.827	↓ 9
=88	China	2.101	↓ 6	116	India	2.319	↑ 5	144	Ethiopia	2.845	↑ 5
=88	Cyprus	2.101	↓ 5	117	Guatemala	2.332	↔	145	Palestine	2.872	↓ 9
90	Algeria	2.111	↓ 2	118	Gabon	2.372	↓ 18	146	Colombia	2.887	↔
91	Jamaica	2.119	↑ 2	119	Djibouti	2.374	↓ 8	147	Nigeria	2.907	↔
92	Rwanda	2.12	↑ 4	120	Togo	2.381	↓ 2	148	Myanmar	2.943	↑ 6
93	Bangladesh	2.126	↓ 8	121	Zimbabwe	2.396	↓ 1	149	Burkina Faso	2.969	↓ 1
94	Equatorial Guinea	2.132	↓ 14	122	Kenya	2.409	↓ 3	150	Central African Republic	3.009	↑ 1
95	Mauritania	2.136	↓ 6	123	Honduras	2.415	↑ 1	151	Iraq	3.045	↑ 2
96	Panama	2.14	↓ 9	124	Guinea	2.423	↑ 2	152	North Korea	3.055	↓ 2
97	Dominican Republic	2.157	↑ 5	125	Lesotho	2.461	↓ 3	153	Somalia	3.091	↑ 2
98	Cuba	2.16	↔	126	Uganda	2.477	↓ 3	154	Mali	3.095	↓ 2
99	Peru	2.179	↑ 5	127	South Africa	2.507	↑ 2	155	Israel	3.115	↓ 11
=100	Georgia	2.195	↓ 6	128	Libya	2.528	↑ 4	156	Syria	3.173	↑ 2
=100	Sri Lanka	2.195	↓ 1	129	Burundi	2.567	↓ 2	157	Russia	3.249	↑ 2
102	Saudi Arabia	2.206	↑ 5	130	Ecuador	2.572	↓ 16	158	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.264	↑ 4
103	Eswatini	2.209	↑ 3	131	Brazil	2.589	↔	159	Ukraine	3.28	↓ 3
104	Philippines	2.21	↑ 4	132	United States of America	2.622	↓ 2	160	Afghanistan	3.294	↔
105	Egypt	2.212	↑ 4	133	Iran	2.682	↑ 10	161	South Sudan	3.324	↑ 2
106	Azerbaijan	2.248	↓ 3	134	Lebanon	2.693	↓ 1	162	Sudan	3.327	↓ 5
=107	El Salvador	2.25	↑ 21	135	Chad	2.704	↑ 5	163	Yemen	3.397	↓ 2
=107	Mozambique	2.25	↑ 3	136	Eritrea	2.748	↑ 5				
109	Côte d'Ivoire	2.255	↓ 9	137	Cameroon	2.773	↑ 1				
110	Republic of the Congo	2.261	↑ 6	138	Mexico	2.778	↓ 1				
111	Guyana	2.286	↑ 1	139	Türkiye	2.78	↔				

# Results

The 2024 GPI finds that the world became less peaceful for the 12<sup>th</sup> time in the last 16 years, with the average level of country peacefulness deteriorating by 0.56 per cent over the prior year. Figure 1.1 shows the change in the average levels of peacefulness for each of the GPI domains, as well as the percentage of countries that improved or deteriorated. In total, peacefulness improved in 65 countries and deteriorated in 97.

The *Militarisation* domain recorded the largest deterioration, with the average score on the domain deteriorating by 1.7 per cent. This was the largest year on year deterioration for *Militarisation* since the inception of the index. Of the 163 GPI countries, 108 recorded deteriorations on this domain. The main driver of increasing *Militarisation* was rising military spending, with 86 countries increasing *military expenditure (% of GDP)*. The biggest deteriorations on this domain occurred in Ukraine, Myanmar, and North Macedonia. Ukraine has the largest increase in *military expenditure (% of GDP)*. Every single indicator on the *Militarisation* domain deteriorated on average.

The *Ongoing Conflict* domain also recorded a significant deterioration over the past year. While most attention has been focused on the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, ongoing conflict remains widespread across the globe, with 85 countries recording a deterioration from the 2023 to the 2024 GPI. Every indicator on the domain other than *intensity of internal conflict* recorded a deterioration, with the largest occurring on the *deaths from internal conflict* and *internal conflicts fought* indicators.


The *Safety and Security* domain was the only one of the three GPI domains to record an improvement over the past year. There were 81 countries that recorded improvements on the domain, compared to 77 that recorded deteriorations. *Violent demonstrations* had the biggest improvement, followed by *terrorism impact* and *violent crime*. Although *terrorism impact* improved there were more terrorism deaths overall, highlighting that terrorism is becoming more concentrated. The biggest improvements in *violent demonstrations* were in Kazakhstan, Iran, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Figure 1.2 shows the average percentage change for each indicator from the 2023 to the 2024 GPI. Thirteen of the 23 GPI indicators deteriorated on average, with eight improving and two remaining unchanged. The largest average deterioration was on the *UN peacekeeping funding* indicator, while the *violent demonstrations* indicator had the largest improvement.

FIGURE 1.1

## Year-on-year change in GPI score by domain, 2024

Safety and Security was the only domain that recorded an improvement on the 2024 GPI.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 1.2

### Percentage change in score by indicator, 2023–2024

Thirteen of the 23 GPI indicators recorded a deterioration over the past year.



Source: IEP

The surge in conflict across the globe led to a deterioration on the *deaths from internal conflict* indicator. Although the total number of deaths fell due to a large decrease in conflict deaths in Ethiopia, the number of conflict deaths increased in 2023 in 57 countries. While the impact of conflict was largest in Ukraine and Palestine, intense conflict has become increasingly widespread. There were 15 countries with over 1,000 internal conflict deaths in 2023, and a further 19 countries that recorded over 100 deaths in the last year.

The largest deterioration year on year was for *UN peacekeeping funding*. Ninety-three countries deteriorated compared to 58 that improved.

The deterioration on the *external conflicts fought* indicator reflects the increase in external actors becoming involved in internal conflicts. The United States, Russia, Iran and France are amongst the countries with the highest scores. There were 67 countries with scores that deteriorated on this indicator, with five of the ten largest deteriorations occurring in countries in sub-Saharan Africa. There are 100 countries that were at least partially involved in some form of external conflict in the past five years, up from 59 in 2008. In most cases countries were offering support to an existing government in its conflict with an internal armed rebel or terrorist group.

*Violent demonstrations* had the largest average improvement of any indicator. There were 64 countries that recorded an improvement on the indicator, compared to 60 which recorded a deterioration. However, *violent demonstrations* are still common globally, with 152 countries recording at least one violent demonstration over the past year. The average score for the indicator is also considerably higher than it was 15 years ago.

Although the total number of deaths from terrorism increased over the past year, the *terrorism impact* indicator recorded an improvement on average. This reflects the continued intensification of terrorism in a small number of hotspots around the globe, most notably in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa. While fewer countries recorded either incidents or deaths from terrorism, those countries with the highest level of terrorist activity recorded a deterioration in *terrorism impact* over the past year.

Average *military expenditure (% of GDP)* deteriorated across the world, as more and more countries began to act on promises to increase military spending. This year was the largest deterioration since the inception of the GPI. There were 86 countries where relative *military expenditure* increased, compared to just 50 where it decreased over the past year. Much of this increase has occurred as a result of the conflict in Ukraine, with 23 countries in Europe spending relatively more on their militaries in 2023, and a number of others pledging to increase spending in the coming years.



# Five Most & Least Peaceful Countries by Domain

TABLE 1.1

## Safety and Security domain

Rank	Country	2024 Score	Score change	Rank change	Rank	Country	2024 Score	Score change	Rank change
1	Singapore	1.213	-0.06	↑ 2	163	South Sudan	3.903	0	↔
2	Iceland	1.238	0.032	↓ 1	162	Yemen	3.878	0.101	↓ 3
3	Norway	1.267	-0.01	↑ 1	161	Afghanistan	3.794	0.011	↓ 1
4	Switzerland	1.303	-0.001	↑ 2	160	Colombia	3.755	0.011	↓ 2
5	Finland	1.308	-0.021	↑ 2	159	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.737	-0.062	↑ 3

TABLE 1.2

## Ongoing Conflict domain

Rank	Country	2024 Score	Score change	Rank change	Rank	Country	2024 Score	Score change	Rank change
1	Iceland	1.000	0.000	↔	163	Sudan	4.345	0.401	↓ 4
1	Mauritius	1.000	0.000	↔	162	Ukraine	4.22	0.073	↓ 1
1	Malaysia	1.000	0.000	↔	161	Syria	4.117	0.041	↓ 1
1	Singapore	1.000	0.000	↔	160	Democratic Republic of the Congo	4.07	-0.086	↑ 3
1	Uruguay	1.005	0.000	↔	159	Burkina Faso	3.959	0.294	↓ 4

TABLE 1.3

## Militarisation domain

Rank	Country	2024 Score	Score change	Rank change	Rank	Country	2024 Score	Score change	Rank change
1	Iceland	1.022	0.007	↔	163	Israel	3.773	-0.005	↔
2	Portugal	1.224	-0.011	↑ 2	162	North Korea	3.146	0.146	↓ 2
3	Malaysia	1.229	0.028	↓ 1	161	United States of America	3.142	0.061	↔
4	Bhutan	1.234	-0.022	↑ 3	160	Russia	3.09	-0.163	↑ 2
5	Slovenia	1.256	0.026	↓ 2	159	Ukraine	3.009	0.602	↓ 5

# Regional Overview

Eight of the nine regions in the world deteriorated in peacefulness in the past year. Russia and Eurasia was the only region to improve on average over the past year, although both Russia and Ukraine deteriorated in peacefulness.


North America recorded the largest average deterioration of all the regions, with significant falls in peacefulness in both Canada and the US. Figure 1.3 shows the overall score for each region

on the 2024 GPI, as well as the change in score from the 2023 to the 2024 GPI.

FIGURE 1.3

## Regional GPI results, 2024

Every region other than Russia and Eurasia recorded a deterioration in peacefulness.



Source: IEP

## ASIA-PACIFIC

TABLE 1.4

### Asia-Pacific

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	New Zealand	1.323	0.026	4
2	Singapore	1.339	-0.021	5
3	Malaysia	1.427	-0.039	10
4	Japan	1.525	0.051	17
5	Australia	1.536	-0.045	19
6	Vietnam	1.802	0.057	41
7	Taiwan	1.818	0.011	43
8	Mongolia	1.845	0.004	45
9	South Korea	1.848	-0.021	46
10	Indonesia	1.857	0.019	48
11	Laos	1.861	-0.001	49
12	Timor-Leste	1.882	0.028	51
13	Cambodia	2.028	0.042	71
14	Thailand	2.048	-0.05	76
15	China	2.101	0.029	89
16	Philippines	2.21	-0.042	104
17	Papua New Guinea	2.315	0.094	115
18	Myanmar	2.943	-0.145	148
19	North Korea	3.055	0.045	152
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>1.935</b>	<b>0.002</b>	

The Asia-Pacific region recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, with the overall score deteriorating by 0.1 per cent. However, it remains the second most peaceful region in the world, a position it has held since 2017. The decline in peacefulness was driven by a 2.4 per cent deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain and a 1.6 per cent increase in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain. The *Safety and Security* domain was the only domain to improve, due to substantial improvement on the *violent demonstrations* and *homicide rate* indicators. Overall, 11 out of 19 countries recorded deteriorations, with only eight countries improving.

New Zealand is the most peaceful country in the region and is ranked fourth globally on the 2024 GPI. It recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness over the past year, owing to a deterioration on both the *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* indicators, as well as a rise in *military expenditure (% of GDP)*. In recent years, New Zealand's Defence Force (NZDF) has faced problems relating to the retention of personnel and the state of its partially outdated navy and air force.<sup>1</sup> In order to remedy these issues, the budget for the NZDF has been increased, leading to a deterioration in the *Militarisation* domain.<sup>2</sup> The *Ongoing Conflict* domain remained unchanged, while the *Safety and Security* domain marginally improved, due to a reduction in the *terrorism impact* indicator.

North Korea has been the least peaceful country in the region since the inception of the GPI. It recorded the fourth worst

deterioration within the region in the past year, driven by an increase in the *Militarisation* domain. North Korea is one of the most highly militarised countries in the world, with the highest possible score on the *nuclear and heavy weapons, military expenditure (% of GDP)*, and *armed services personnel rate* indicators.

Myanmar is the second least peaceful country in the Asia-Pacific region. However, although the level of conflict in the country remains high, it dropped sufficiently over the past year for Myanmar to have recorded the largest increase in peacefulness in the region. The largest improvement occurred on the *Safety and Security* domain, with significant improvements recorded on the *homicide rate* and *perceptions of criminality* indicators. The *homicide rate* spiked in 2021 as a result of the military coup, rising to over 28 per 100,000 people, with some conflict-related deaths being recorded as homicides. The rate has now returned to pre-coup levels. Just over half of the population in Myanmar reported that they did not feel safe walking alone in their cities or neighbourhoods, compared to 67 per cent in the prior year. However, despite the improvement in *Safety and Security*, the level of *Ongoing Conflict* remains high, with over 3,000 deaths from internal conflict recorded in 2023.

Papua New Guinea recorded the worst deterioration in the region. All three domains deteriorated, driven by changes in the *intensity of internal conflict*, *Political Terror Scale*, and *weapons imports* indicators. The *intensity of internal conflict* deteriorated because of intensified tribal violence in the country's highland regions over the past year in disputes over territory and land ownership. An armed ambush in February 2024 led to over 50 deaths, adding to an escalatory trend that has been of concern to the UN since mid-2022. Despite the worsening security situation, there have been some improvements in *political instability*, resulting from the large parliamentary majority for the new government. The ruling party's leadership of 21 of the 33 cabinet portfolios will also help speed up new policy initiatives in the country.

Japan recorded its worst deterioration since the inception of the GPI, dropping four places to now be ranked at 17<sup>th</sup>. The country recorded deteriorations in all indicators within the *Militarisation* domain.

## CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

Peacefulness in Central America and the Caribbean deteriorated slightly in the 2024 GPI, with an average deterioration in score of 0.17 per cent. Of the 12 countries in the region, five countries improved and seven deteriorated compared to the previous year. The overall fall in peacefulness was largely driven by large deteriorations in *external conflicts fought* and *internal conflicts fought*, as well as in the *Political Terror Scale*, as several countries in the region grappled with the ongoing impact of high levels of organised crime and civil unrest. However, there were some notable improvements, with El Salvador and Nicaragua recording the first and third highest improvements in peacefulness globally.

Despite experiencing a slight deterioration in score, Costa Rica remains the most peaceful country in the region, and is ranked 58<sup>th</sup> overall in the 2024 GPI. The largest deteriorations occurred on the *violent demonstrations*, *violent crime*, and *homicide rate* indicators. Costa Rica suffered a surge of violent crime in 2023,



TABLE 1.5

## Central America &amp; The Caribbean

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Costa Rica	1.95	0.065	58
2	Trinidad and Tobago	2.092	0.035	88
3	Jamaica	2.119	-0.007	91
4	Panama	2.14	0.04	96
5	Dominican Republic	2.157	-0.016	97
6	Cuba	2.16	0.013	98
7	El Salvador	2.25	-0.219	107
8	Nicaragua	2.295	-0.151	113
9	Guatemala	2.332	0.037	117
10	Honduras	2.415	-0.026	123
11	Mexico	2.778	0.086	138
12	Haiti	2.827	0.186	143
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.293</b>	<b>0.004</b>	

with the homicide rate rising by more than 35 per cent as a result of shifts in drug-trafficking patterns throughout the country. Despite government agreement on the urgency of addressing organised crime and reducing violence, political in-fighting has delayed the implementation of policies aimed at addressing the issue. However, there have been improvements in political instability on a broader level, with the government successfully boosting economic growth.

Haiti recorded the biggest deterioration in peacefulness in the region and the fifth largest deterioration globally and is now the least peaceful country in the region for the first time. The country experienced deteriorations in all three domains, driven by significant increases in *violent crime*, *violent demonstrations*, and the *homicide rate*. Haiti has been in a state of crisis since 2021, when the previous president Jovenel Moïse was assassinated. Rates of violent crime have soared amidst rampant gang activity. It is estimated that violent criminal groups have gained control of over 90 per cent of the capital city Port-au-Prince, and over half of the country.

El Salvador recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in the region. The improvement in El Salvador stands as a marked contrast to the ongoing insecurity in Haiti, with the country recording the largest improvement in peacefulness of any country globally. The largest improvements occurred on the *deaths from internal conflict*, *violent demonstrations*, *homicide rate*, and *violent crime* indicators. During a declared state of emergency the government arrested and detained over 60,000 gang members and suspected gang members, which led to one of the largest ever recorded reductions in the *homicide rate*. The fall in the *homicide rate* has led to a significant improvement in *perceptions of criminality*, with just 11 per cent of people recording that they did not feel safe in their neighbourhood or city, compared to 70 per cent in 2017. However, while the actions of the government have increased stability and reduced violence in the short term, they have been controversial. El Salvador now has the highest *incarceration rate* of any country in the world, with over one per cent of the total population being incarcerated as of early 2024.

## EUROPE

TABLE 1.6

## Europe

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Iceland	1.112	0.017	1
2	Ireland	1.303	0.008	2
3	Austria	1.313	0.014	3
4	Switzerland	1.35	-0.018	6
5	Portugal	1.372	0.018	7
6	Denmark	1.382	0.037	8
7	Slovenia	1.395	0.036	9
8	Czechia	1.459	0.048	12
9	Finland	1.474	-0.01	13
10	Hungary	1.502	-0.026	14
11	Croatia	1.504	0.011	15
11	Belgium	1.51	0.029	16
13	Netherlands	1.527	-0.011	18
14	Germany	1.542	0.049	20
15	Spain	1.597	-0.073	23
16	Estonia	1.615	-0.025	24
17	Bulgaria	1.629	-0.056	26
18	Slovakia	1.634	0.022	27
19	Norway	1.638	0.044	28
20	Latvia	1.661	0.021	30
21	Lithuania	1.672	-0.069	31
22	Poland	1.678	0.026	32
23	Italy	1.692	-0.012	33
24	United Kingdom	1.703	0.004	34
25	Montenegro	1.746	-0.056	35
26	Romania	1.755	0.047	36
27	North Macedonia	1.764	0.043	38
28	Sweden	1.782	0.076	39
29	Greece	1.793	-0.145	40
30	Albania	1.809	0.014	42
31	Serbia	1.93	-0.041	54
31	Kosovo	1.945	-0.009	56
33	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.961	0.028	61
34	France	2.088	0.052	86
35	Cyprus	2.101	0.025	88
36	Türkiye	2.78	0.019	139
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>1.659</b>	<b>0.004</b>	

Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world in the 2024 GPI, and is home to seven of the ten most peaceful countries. However, it recorded a deterioration in peacefulness of 0.24 per cent over the past year. Of the 36 countries in the region, 13 improved and 23 deteriorated in peacefulness. The primary driver of this fall in peacefulness was a deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has led to many European countries reassessing their level of military spending and general combat readiness, with

30 of the 39 European countries recording a deterioration on this domain over the past year. The *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains both improved slightly.

Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the region and the world in the 2024 GPI. However, it deteriorated by 1.55 per cent in its overall score over the past year, because of a small spike in the number of violent demonstrations. Despite this increase, Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the world by a considerable margin, with the gap in peacefulness between the first two countries on the 2024 GPI being the same size as the gap between second and 15<sup>th</sup> ranked countries.

Türkiye is the least peaceful country in Europe on the 2024 GPI, a position it has held since the inception of the index. Overall peacefulness in Türkiye deteriorated by 0.69 per cent over the past year, with Türkiye now having its least peaceful overall score since 2008. Türkiye has becoming increasingly militarised over the past few years, with both the *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* indicators deteriorating over the past year, along with the *military expenditure (% of GDP)* indicator. Türkiye is now one of the largest 'middle power' weapons exporters in the world, and now exports unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to many countries, including in the conflict-prone Central Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa.

Greece recorded the largest improvement in the region and the fourth largest improvement in peacefulness globally leading to an improvement in the rankings of 17 places to 40<sup>th</sup> overall. The country's score improved by 7.48 per cent, largely driven by improvements in the *intensity of internal conflict* as well as improvements in *neighbouring countries relations*. In 2023 there was a significant thaw in Greece-Türkiye relations, which has been institutionalised in the form of a "positive agenda", intended to promote economic, trade and investment co-operation. The positive agenda includes 29 areas of cooperation and has led to a significant reduction in bilateral tensions and improvements regarding trade facilitation, connectivity, tourism flows and investment ties. The improved relations with Türkiye also led to an improvement on the *political instability* indicator.

Sweden experienced the largest deterioration in peacefulness in Europe and is now ranked 39<sup>th</sup> overall, a fall of 22 places since the index began in 2008. Sweden recorded its lowest level of peacefulness since the inception of the index, driven by deteriorations on the *Militarisation* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains. The significant deterioration in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain was driven by a steep increase in *deaths from internal conflict*. These deaths are a result of spreading gang violence in Sweden.<sup>3</sup> The deterioration in *Militarisation* was driven by increases in the *weapons imports and exports*, *military expenditure (% of GDP)*, and *nuclear and heavy weapons* indicators, all of which have deteriorated in response to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

## MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

TABLE 1.7

### Middle East & North Africa

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Kuwait	1.622	0.009	25
2	Qatar	1.656	0.093	29
3	Oman	1.761	-0.044	37
4	United Arab Emirates	1.897	-0.186	53
5	Jordan	1.998	0.058	67
6	Tunisia	2.044	-0.025	74
7	Morocco	2.054	-0.067	79
8	Bahrain	2.072	-0.071	82
9	Algeria	2.11	0.008	90
10	Saudi Arabia	2.206	-0.03	102
11	Egypt	2.212	-0.057	105
12	Libya	2.528	-0.077	128
13	Iran	2.682	-0.129	133
14	Lebanon	2.693	0.086	134
15	Palestine	2.872	0.195	145
16	Iraq	3.045	-0.012	151
17	Israel	3.115	0.297	155
18	Syria	3.173	-0.029	157
19	Sudan	3.327	0.134	162
20	Yemen	3.397	0.075	163
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.423</b>	<b>0.011</b>	

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the least peaceful region for the ninth consecutive year. It recorded a small deterioration in peacefulness over the past year after several years of improvements, with the average GPI score deteriorating by 0.25 per cent. Four of the ten least peaceful countries on the 2024 GPI are in the MENA region.

The largest fall in peacefulness occurred on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, which deteriorated by 1.6 per cent. There were deteriorations on the *deaths from internal conflict*, *deaths from external conflict*, and *neighbouring countries relations* indicators, driven by the conflicts in Gaza and Sudan and the associated increase in regional unrest. Tensions in the region remain extremely high as of early 2024. The *Militarisation* domain recorded a small improvement, although there was a significant deterioration on the *military expenditure (% of GDP)*. The MENA region has higher average *military expenditure* than any other region.

The most notable falls in peacefulness in the region occurred because of the October 7<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack in Israel, and the subsequent retaliatory military action by Israel in Gaza. Latest estimates suggest that over 35,000 people have been killed in the conflict, although the true number is likely to be far higher. The conflict has also thrown the entire Middle East region into crisis, with Syria, Iran, Lebanon and Yemen becoming involved. The risk of open warfare remains high.

Kuwait is the most peaceful country in the MENA region, and the 25<sup>th</sup> most peaceful country overall. It is one of only three countries in the region that is ranked amongst the 50 most

peaceful countries in the world. Kuwait has high levels of peacefulness on both the *Safety and Security* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains. It has the best *perceptions of criminality* score of any country in the world. Just one per cent of Kuwaitis reported feeling afraid of walking alone in their neighbourhood or city at night.

Yemen is the least peaceful country in the region and the least peaceful country overall on the 2024 GPI. This is the first time that it has been ranked at the bottom of the index. Peacefulness in Yemen fell over the past year, owing to deteriorations on the *violent demonstrations*, *political instability*, and *neighbouring countries relations* indicators. Yemen's internal *political instability* has worsened in the past year due to deteriorating living conditions and rising social unrest.

The internal strife in Yemen has been further exacerbated by regional tensions stemming from the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The Houthis' missile and drone assaults against Israeli targets intensified instability in the region by threatening critical maritime routes through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. In response to these attacks the US and UK have intensified their military involvement in Yemen by launching missile, drone, and airstrikes against the group's sites in northern Yemen since January 2024. This escalation represents a significant externalisation of Yemen's civil conflict.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in the region, with improvements seen across all three GPI domains. The primary driver of the improvement in peacefulness was a move towards better *neighbouring countries relations*. Since 2021 the UAE has improved more places than any other country, improving by 31 places to be ranked 53<sup>rd</sup> in the 2024 GPI. The UAE improved its diplomatic relations and commercial ties with Iran and Türkiye and has strengthened diplomatic relations more broadly across the region and into South Asia. Internally, the UAE has very low *perceptions of criminality*, and both its *Political Terror Scale* score and *terrorism impact* score improved over the past year.

Although much of the attention in the region has been focused on the conflict in Gaza, there was also a significant deterioration in peacefulness in Sudan. Conflict erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) after a plan to dissolve the RSF and integrate it with the army was proposed. The armed conflict has led to the displacement of millions of people. There have been reports of violent clashes and targeted attacks against civilians, with the RSF reported to have massacred 15,000 people in West Darfur in June 2023 with some estimates placing the total number of people killed at 150,000 since the war began<sup>2</sup>. The increasing civil unrest and lawlessness has meant that humanitarian agencies and multilateral organisations are unable to safely operate in most locations, including in the capital city Khartoum.

## NORTH AMERICA

TABLE 1.8

### North America

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Canada	1.449	0.04	11
2	United States of America	2.622	0.057	132
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.035	0.048	

North America recorded the largest deterioration of any region in the 2024 GPI, with the average level of peacefulness in the region dropping by just under five per cent. However, despite this deterioration it remains the third most peaceful region globally, behind Europe and Asia-Pacific. The North American region comprises only two countries, Canada, and the United States, which make its average level of peacefulness prone to larger year on year changes than other regions. There is a considerable disparity in peacefulness between the two countries in the region, with Canada ranked as the 11<sup>th</sup> most peaceful country, and the US as the 132<sup>nd</sup> most peaceful country in the world.

North America deteriorated on all three GPI domains over the past year, with the largest deterioration occurring on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain. Four of the 23 GPI indicators improved, while eight deteriorated and the rest experienced no change. The largest deteriorations occurred on *perceptions of criminality*, *violent crime*, and *deaths from internal conflict* indicators.

The United States recorded the largest fall in peacefulness in the region, with its overall score deteriorating by 5.7 per cent. The primary driver of the deterioration was an increase in the number of politically motivated attacks and mass shootings, which resulted in 22 deaths in 2023, with associated deteriorations in the *deaths from internal conflict* and *terrorism impact* indicators. *UN Peacekeeping Funding* was the indicator with the second largest deterioration. However, the overall number of terrorist attacks is now considerably lower than five years ago. The United States also has a *homicide rate* which is twice as high as the global average, although it did record an improvement over the past year.

Overall peacefulness deteriorated in Canada for the first time since 2020, with deteriorations across all three domains. Canada is now ranked outside of the ten most peaceful countries in the world, with its *Safety and Security* domain score having deteriorated significantly since 2008. The *violent crime* indicator had the most significant deterioration in the past year, with many provinces in Canada now experiencing gang-related violence. The *homicide rate* has deteriorated every year for the past four years and is now at a 30 year high. However, despite these deteriorations Canada remains one of the more peaceful countries in the world, with some of the highest levels of peacefulness on both the *Militarisation* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains.

## RUSSIA & EURASIA

TABLE 1.9

### Russia & Eurasia

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Kazakhstan	1.954	-0.108	59
2	Uzbekistan	1.957	-0.088	60
3	Moldova	1.976	0.017	63
4	Tajikistan	2.035	-0.075	71
5	Armenia	2.052	0.008	76
6	Kyrgyz Republic	2.053	-0.081	77
7	Turkmenistan	2.079	0.008	82
8	Georgia	2.195	0.062	100
9	Azerbaijan	2.248	0.061	106
10	Belarus	2.291	0.001	112
11	Russia	3.249	0.009	157
12	Ukraine	3.28	0.115	159
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.281</b>	<b>-0.006</b>	

The Russia and Eurasia region experienced the largest improvement of any region in the 2024 GPI, with the average level of peacefulness in the region improving by 0.6 per cent. It was the only region which improved in peacefulness in the last year. However, overall levels of peacefulness in the region remain very low, driven by the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Four of 12 countries in the region recorded improvements in peacefulness in 2024, with eight recording deteriorations.

The dominant issue in the region remains the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which led to deteriorations in peacefulness in both countries. The latest figures suggest that there were over 83,000 deaths from internal conflict in Ukraine alone in the past year, meaning that over half of all conflict deaths in 2023 occurred in this one conflict. Ukraine also recorded a significant deterioration on the *refugees and IDPs* indicator. The continued outflow of young people out of Ukraine is having a significant impact on the country's ability to conscript new recruits. It is estimated that nearly 30 per cent of the population are either refugees or internally displaced, with that number rising to almost 60 per cent for young men and women. There has also been a sharp deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain in Ukraine, with deteriorations recorded on the *armed forces personnel*, *military expenditure (% of GDP)* and *nuclear and heavy weapons* indicators. With no immediate end to the conflict in sight, it is likely that Ukraine will remain one of the least peaceful countries in the world for the foreseeable future.

Russia's overall level of peacefulness deteriorated by 0.28 per cent over the past year. It is now ranked 157<sup>th</sup> on the GPI, making it the seventh least peaceful country in the world in 2024. Russia is also ranked 162<sup>nd</sup> on the *Militarisation* domain, making it the second most militarised country, behind only Israel. Russia also recorded deteriorations on both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains, with notable deteriorations on the *Political Terror Scale*, *violent demonstrations*, and *terrorism impact* indicators. In March 2024 a severe terrorist attack occurred at Crocus City Hall in

Moscow, Russia, resulting in at least 115 fatalities, including three children. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. Russian authorities arrested 11 individuals related to this incident.

Kazakhstan, the most peaceful country in the region, also recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in the region. Its overall score improved by 10.8 per cent, leading to a rise in the rankings from 78<sup>th</sup> to 59<sup>th</sup>. Kazakhstan recorded improvements on all domains, with the most significant improvements recorded on the *violent demonstrations*, *intensity of internal conflict*, *nuclear and heavy weapons*, and *weapons imports* indicators. The fall in the number of demonstrations reflects a fall in conflict risks and internal grievances over the past year. However, many of the socio-economic factors and grievances that drove unrest in 2022 remain unresolved, and the country's deterioration on the *Political Terror Scale* indicator suggests that these conflict issues might resurface in the near future.

## SOUTH AMERICA

TABLE 1.10

### South America

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Argentina	1.855	-0.002	47
2	Uruguay	1.893	0.000	52
3	Chile	1.978	0.091	64
4	Bolivia	2.009	0.014	68
5	Paraguay	2.044	0.014	74
6	Peru	2.179	-0.033	99
7	Guyana	2.286	0.009	111
8	Ecuador	2.572	0.283	130
9	Brazil	2.589	0.015	131
10	Venezuela	2.821	-0.022	142
11	Colombia	2.887	0.022	146
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.283</b>	<b>0.036</b>	

South America experienced the second largest fall in peacefulness on the 2024 GPI, with the average level of peacefulness deteriorating by 3.6 per cent. South America is now the fifth most peaceful region globally. Seven of the 11 countries in the region recorded deteriorations, with three recording improvements, and one no change. Argentina is the only South American country that is ranked amongst the 50 most peaceful countries in the world. The fall in peacefulness in the region was driven by deteriorations on the *Safety and Security* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains, with the largest changes occurring on the *homicide rate*, *Political Terror Scale*, and *intensity of internal conflict* indicators.

Argentina is the most peaceful country in South America and recorded a small improvement in peacefulness over the past year, with its overall score improving by 0.2 per cent. The peaceful transfer of power following the election of new president Javier Milei in October 2023 led to an improvement on the *political instability* indicator, despite pre-election

concerns. Argentina also recorded a fall in its *homicide rate* and a lower *terrorism impact*, although *perceptions of criminality* deteriorated over the past year.

Colombia remains the least peaceful country in South America for the fourth consecutive year. Although the *Militarisation* domain improved there was a significant deterioration in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, which led to an overall fall in peacefulness of 2.2 per cent. An increase in attacks by splinter militias, mainly ex-FARC members, have led to deteriorations on both the *terrorism impact* and *deaths from internal conflict*. Colombia was the only country to record a terrorism death in 2023 in South America. In addition, there were 781 internal conflict deaths. Clashes between the government and dissident rebel groups have led to a significant deterioration in the level of *Ongoing Conflict*, as the new government has struggled to fully implement the peace agreement that was reached in 2016.

Peru recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in the region and is now ranked in the 100 most peaceful countries for the first time since 2020. In 2024, Peru improved on eight indicators, deteriorated on three, and showed no change in ten. The largest improvement occurred on the *Militarisation* domain, where five of the six indicators improved. The largest improvements occurred on the *UN peacekeeping funding*, *nuclear and heavy weapons*, and *weapons imports* indicators.

Ecuador recorded the largest deterioration in the region, and the second largest deterioration globally. The deterioration in Ecuador was driven by a substantial increase in drug-related and gang-related violence, leading to deteriorations on the *homicide rate*, *Political Terror Scale*, *intensity of internal conflict*, and *internal conflicts fought* indicators. Latest estimates suggest that Ecuador's *homicide rate* might now be as high as 45 per 100,000 people, and over 70 per cent of Ecuadorians reported not feeling safe in their own cities or neighbourhoods at night. The surge in violence has led to a crackdown from the Ecuadorian government, with the new president Daniel Noboa officially classifying 22 gangs as terrorist organisations.<sup>2</sup>

## SOUTH ASIA

TABLE 1.11

### South Asia

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Bhutan	1.564	-0.042	21
2	Nepal	2.069	0.051	81
3	Bangladesh	2.126	0.033	93
4	Sri Lanka	2.195	0.029	100
5	India	2.319	-0.039	116
6	Pakistan	2.783	-0.025	140
7	Afghanistan	3.294	0.007	160
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.336	0.002	

South Asia is the third least peaceful region on the 2024 GPI, ahead of only MENA and sub-Saharan Africa. It experienced a small fall in peacefulness over the past year, with four of the seven countries in the region recording deteriorations in overall

score. The primary driver of the fall in peacefulness was a deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain, with payments for *UN peacekeeping funding* falling, and *military expenditure (% of GDP)* increasing on average since 2012. However, both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains recorded improvements on average.

Bhutan is the most peaceful country in the South Asia region, a position it has held since 2011. It is now ranked just outside the 20 most peaceful countries in the world. It also recorded the largest increase in peacefulness in the region over the past year, with its overall score improving by 2.6 per cent. It improved on both the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains, although there was a slight deterioration on the *Ongoing Conflict Domain*. Bhutan's score on the *Political Terror Scale* improved, and it now has the best possible score on this indicator. However, the *police rate* in Bhutan is higher than in countries with similar levels of peace, with almost 600 police or internal security officers per 100,000 people.

Afghanistan is the least peaceful country in the South Asia region. After having one of the largest improvements in peacefulness last year, Afghanistan recorded a deterioration on the 2024 GPI, with deteriorations on both the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains. The governing Taliban increased the size of the military, which led to a deterioration on the *armed forces rate*, while there were also smaller deteriorations on the *perceptions of criminality* and *violent demonstrations* indicators. However, while Afghanistan remains one of the least peaceful countries in the world, several indicators have shown significant improvements in recent years. The number of *deaths from internal conflict* has fallen from over 18,000 in 2017 to less than 350 in 2023, and Afghanistan is no longer the country with the highest *terrorism impact*.

Nepal recorded the largest fall in peacefulness of any country in the region, with its overall score deteriorating by 2.5 per cent. It recorded deteriorations on the *external conflicts fought*, *UN peacekeeping funding*, and *perceptions of criminality* indicators. An estimated 39 per cent of Nepalese people say they do not feel safe when walking alone in their neighbourhood or city at night. However, despite these deteriorations they were some improvements, with *deaths from internal conflict* falling to zero, and both *weapons imports* and the *armed forces rate* also recording improvements.

India is the largest country in the South Asia region. Its overall level of peacefulness improved by 1.6 per cent over the past year, and it now more peaceful than at any time since the inception of the index. The *intensity of internal conflict* in India improved, owing to a fall in the intensity of several small conflicts in India's border regions. There were also improvements on the *perceptions of criminality* and *terrorism impact* indicators. However, despite these improvements in peacefulness, India faces several ongoing security challenges. *Neighbouring countries relations* remain a concern, with Indian troops having clashed with Chinese troops in the border region of Arunachal Pradesh in late 2022.

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

TABLE 1.12

### Sub-Saharan Africa

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Mauritius	1.577	-0.009	22
2	Madagascar	1.838	-0.008	44
3	Botswana	1.863	0.012	50
4	Ghana	1.938	0.076	55
5	Zambia	1.948	-0.006	57
6	Namibia	1.972	-0.008	62
7	Tanzania	1.987	-0.068	65
8	Sierra Leone	1.993	0.17	66
9	Liberia	2.025	0.039	69
10	Angola	2.043	-0.076	73
11	Malawi	2.063	0.061	80
12	The Gambia	2.079	0.049	83
13	Senegal	2.084	0.054	85
14	Guinea-Bissau	2.085	0.048	86
14	Rwanda	2.12	-0.02	92
16	Equatorial Guinea	2.132	0.061	94
17	Mauritania	2.136	0.03	95
18	Eswatini	2.209	-0.026	103
19	Mozambique	2.25	-0.02	107
20	Côte d'Ivoire	2.255	0.086	109
21	Republic of the Congo	2.261	-0.032	110
22	Benin	2.306	0.028	114
23	Gabon	2.372	0.203	118
24	Djibouti	2.374	0.099	119
25	Togo	2.381	0.066	120
26	Zimbabwe	2.396	0.043	121
27	Kenya	2.409	0.078	122
28	Guinea	2.423	-0.039	124
29	Lesotho	2.461	0.093	125
30	Uganda	2.477	0.037	126
31	South Africa	2.507	0.016	127
32	Burundi	2.567	0.102	129
33	Chad	2.704	-0.071	135
34	Eritrea	2.748	-0.035	136
35	Cameroon	2.773	0.039	137
36	Niger	2.792	0.118	141
37	Ethiopia	2.845	-0.098	144
38	Nigeria	2.907	0.029	147
39	Burkina Faso	2.969	0.082	149
40	Central African Republic	3.009	-0.026	150
41	Somalia	3.091	-0.023	153
42	Mali	3.095	0.042	154
43	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.264	-0.084	158
44	South Sudan	3.324	-0.032	161
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.388</b>	<b>0.025</b>	

Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a fall in peacefulness on the 2024 GPI, with the average score in the region deteriorating by 0.89 per cent over the past year. Sub-Saharan Africa is the second least peaceful region behind the Middle East and North Africa, with three of the ten least peaceful countries in the world found in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa faces several security crises, most notably the increase in political unrest and terrorism in the Central Sahel region. Burkina Faso has the highest *terrorism impact* of any country in the world, and five of the ten countries with the highest *terrorism impact* are in sub-Saharan Africa.

There were deteriorations in peacefulness in sub-Saharan Africa across all three GPI domains, with the largest occurring on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain. Conflicts in the region continued to spill across national borders, reflected by a deterioration on the *external conflicts fought* indicator. In the past five years 36 of the 44 countries in the region have had some level of involvement in at least one external conflict.


Mauritius is the most peaceful country in sub-Saharan Africa for the 17<sup>th</sup> consecutive year. It has the highest levels of peace in the region across all three GPI domains. Mauritius recorded a small improvement in peacefulness over the past year, owing to improvements on the *Safety and Security* domain. The *violent demonstrations* and *homicide rate* indicators both recorded significant improvements. Mauritius is also the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that has not been involved in any internal or external conflicts over the past five years.

South Sudan is the least peaceful country in the region, despite a small improvement in peacefulness over the past year. The number of *deaths from internal conflict* fell by 73 per cent, from 723 deaths in 2022 to 199 in 2023. However, although the country recorded improvements on both the *Militarisation* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains, the security situation remains fraught. The ongoing crisis in Sudan has also significantly impacted South Sudan, complicating the return of refugees and potentially impacting South Sudan's economy by disrupting oil exports.<sup>3</sup>

Ethiopia recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in the region, because of the Tigray ceasefire agreement that resulted in a large fall in the number of *deaths from internal conflict*. There were just under conflict 2,300 deaths in 2023, down from over 100,000 in 2022, when Ethiopia was the country with the highest number of conflict deaths. However, despite the fall in the intensity of conflict, the security situation in the country remains fragile. Although a ceasefire agreement was signed in late 2022, there were reports of mass killings by multiple parties across several different regions in 2023. A state of emergency was declared in the Amhara region with the federal government intensifying its military presence and employing curfews, mass detentions, and militarised patrols.


Gabon recorded the largest deterioration in peacefulness in sub-Saharan Africa, and the third largest deterioration of any country. Both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Militarisation* domains recorded significant deteriorations. The fall in peacefulness was driven by increasing internal unrest which culminated in a military coup in August 2023 that overturned the results of the presidential election. The coup ended the 56-year rule of the Bongo family. The international community, including the African Union and the United Nations condemned the coup and called for a peaceful resolution and a return to constitutional governance.

# Improvements & Deteriorations





## Five Largest Improvements in Peace


<b>El Salvador</b>	<b>Rank: 107</b>
	CHANGE IN SCORE 2023–24: <b>-0.219</b>
	CHANGE IN RANK 2023–24: <b>↗ 21</b>

El Salvador experienced the largest improvement in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, with its score improving by 8.87 per cent. El Salvador is now ranked 107<sup>th</sup> on the GPI and is at its most peaceful since 2008. This is the country’s first improvement in peacefulness in four years. Eight indicators improved, five deteriorated, and ten recorded no change.

The primary driver of the increase in peacefulness in El Salvador was the crackdown on gang-related violence instigated by President Nayib Bukele, who declared a state of emergency in March 2022. This allowed the government to arrest and detain any gang-related suspects in an attempt to shut down violence related to organised crime.

Although these policies remain controversial, they have been effective in reducing violence, with large improvements recorded on both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains. The number of *deaths from internal conflict* fell to zero, with concurrent reductions in the *political instability*, *violent demonstrations*, and *violent crime* indicators. There was also a very large fall in the *homicide rate*. After peaking at 107 deaths per 100,000 people in 2017, the rate fell rapidly over the next few years, down to 38 in 2021. Following the crackdown, they continued to fall to less than eight per 100,000 in 2023, with provisional data suggesting that the rate has continued falling into 2024.

However, whilst the emergency measures taken by President Bukele have reduced violence, they have been criticised for their scope, with some observers suggesting that many people have been incarcerated unjustly. There was a significant increase in the *incarceration rate*, which is now the highest in the world. Latest estimates suggest that over one per cent of the entire population is now incarcerated.

<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	<b>Rank: 53</b>
	CHANGE IN SCORE 2023–24: <b>-0.186</b>
	CHANGE IN RANK 2023–24: <b>↗ 31</b>


The United Arab Emirates (UAE) recorded the second largest improvement in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, moving up 31 places to 53<sup>rd</sup>. Its overall score improved by just under nine per cent, with improvements on ten indicators, deteriorations on two, and 11 recording no change. All three GPI domains

recorded improvements over the past year.

The largest improvement was seen on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, driven by improvements in *deaths from internal conflict* and *neighbouring countries relations*. The UAE has made considerable strides in improving relations with key regional rivals in recent years. It has increased diplomatic and commercial links with Iran and Türkiye, and used its financial strength to improve relations across the broader region and in East Africa and South Asia.

The UAE also recorded a significant improvement on the *Militarisation* domain, with all indicators in this domain, other than *military expenditure (% of GDP)*, recording an improvement. The UAE’s *weapons exports* indicator improved by just over 20 per cent, with *weapons imports* improving by just over seven per cent.

There was also a smaller improvement in the *Safety and Security* domain, as both the *terrorism impact* and *Political Terror Scale* scores improved. *Perceptions of criminality* are also very low in the UAE, with just ten per cent of the population reporting that they do not feel safe walking alone at night in their city or neighborhood, compared to the global average of just under 35 per cent.

<b>Nicaragua</b>	<b>Rank: 113</b>
	CHANGE IN SCORE 2023–24: <b>-0.151</b>
	CHANGE IN RANK 2023–24: <b>↗ 12</b>


Nicaragua recorded the third largest improvement in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, with its overall score improving by six per cent. It moved up 12 places in the rankings and is now ranked 113<sup>th</sup>. The increase in peacefulness was driven by improvements in the *Safety and Security* domain, which improved by 9.7 per cent. The largest improvements occurred on the *political instability*, *violent crime*, and *violent demonstrations* indicators.

Nicaragua’s *political instability* has continued to improve since 2023 despite US sanctions on government figures and associates in Nicaragua. The Ortega government’s control over civil society, law enforcement, and the judiciary has reduced the risks of social unrest, with the government’s clean sweep of municipal elections in late 2022 also contributing to a rise in *political stability*.

The improvement in *political instability* has also had flow-on effects on other security areas, with both *violent crime* and *violent demonstrations* improving over the past year. Open opposition to the Ortega government has reduced. Although *violent crime* remains high by global standards, it is lower than in many other countries in Central and South America.

Despite improvements on a number of indicators, Nicaragua still faces many security challenges. Its score on the *Political Terror Scale* has deteriorated steadily over the past two decades, with concerns being raised about the treatment of political dissidents and journalists. The number of people seeking asylum in other countries has also increased dramatically, leading to a deterioration on the *refugees and IDPs* indicator.






Greece recorded the fourth largest improvement in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, rising 17 places to 40<sup>th</sup>. The largest improvement occurred on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, with a smaller improvement on the *Safety and Security* domain. There was a slight deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain owing to increases in both *weapons imports* and *weapons exports*. The United States continues to export older surplus weapons to Greece, under the condition that Greece exports some of its own weapons to Ukraine.<sup>4</sup>

The *intensity of internal conflict* indicator recorded the largest improvement. Greece has had a history of violent clashes between left-wing and right-wing political factions. However, the 2023 re-election of a majority New Democracy government for a second consecutive term indicates greater levels of public satisfaction with the political class and reduced levels of polarisation. There are still strong internal divides on key issues, but these have become less prominent than they were a decade ago.

Greece also recorded improvements on both the *political instability* and *neighbouring countries relations* indicators, with the political situation now being considered highly stable. *Neighbouring countries relations* improved owing to reduced tensions with Türkiye. A clear example of these reduced tensions was the swift response by the Greek government with aid after the devastating earthquake in Türkiye in February 2023. The relationship between the two countries was also improved because of new initiatives designed to promote economic growth, trade and investment co-operation. This agenda has led to a significant reduction in bilateral tensions and improvements regarding trade facilitation, connectivity, and tourism flows. Plans were also made for actions to build trust between the countries' militaries, aiming to peacefully resolve long-standing disputes and disagreements.



Myanmar recorded the fifth largest improvement in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, with its overall score improving by 14.5 per cent. However, it remains one of the least peaceful countries in the world and is ranked 148<sup>th</sup> overall on the GPI. Myanmar recorded an improvement on the *Safety and Security* domain, however it deteriorated on both the *Militarisation and Ongoing Conflict* domains.


Although Myanmar remains in a state of serious armed conflict some indicators did improve. *Perceptions of criminality* improved over the past year, with 54 per cent of the population

stating that they did not feel safe in their neighbourhood or city, compared to 67 per cent in the prior year. There has also been a substantial drop in the *homicide rate*, and smaller improvements on the *terrorism impact*, *armed services personnel rate*, and *weapons imports* indicators. The *homicide rate* rose dramatically in 2021 as a result of the military coup, with many of the deaths associated with the ensuing conflict being classified as homicide. The *homicide rate* has since returned to its pre-coup levels, leading to a large improvement in score on this indicator, even as the overall level of conflict in the country remains high.

*Ongoing Conflict* remains a significant concern. There were over 3,000 deaths from internal conflict in 2023, which is the highest yearly total since the 2021 military coup. Militias have access to small arms and other weapons, leading to a deterioration on the *access to small arms* indicator, and Myanmar still has a high level of *political instability*. Myanmar has high levels of internal repression and human rights violations, as measured by the *Political Terror Scale*. Open conflict has escalated in Myanmar since October 2023, with estimates that armed groups control nearly 40 per cent of the country's territory, affecting business continuity, education, and other services.




## Five Largest Deteriorations in Peace

<b>Israel</b>	<b>Rank: 155</b>
	CHANGE IN SCORE 2023–24: <b>0.297</b>
	CHANGE IN RANK 2023–24: <b>↓ 11</b>

Israel experienced the largest deterioration in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, falling 11 places in the rankings to 155<sup>th</sup>, its lowest ranking since the inception of the index. Israel's overall score deteriorated by 10.5 per cent. This is the third consecutive year that peacefulness has deteriorated in Israel. The primary driver of the fall in peacefulness was the Hamas-led terrorist attacks on October 7<sup>th</sup> 2023 and the subsequent retaliatory military action in Gaza.

Israel's score on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain deteriorated by over 31 per cent, with significant deteriorations recorded on the *deaths from external conflict*, *deaths from internal conflict*, and *neighbouring countries relations* indicators. The conflict in Gaza now threatens to spill over into other neighbouring countries, with Israel-linked targets being attacked in Lebanon, Syria, and the Red Sea, and Iran conducting reprisal strikes in April 2024 in response to an Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate building in Syria.

Israel also recorded a significant deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain, driven by the *terrorism impact* indicator deteriorating because of the October 7<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack. The Hamas-led attack resulted in just under 1,200 casualties and was the largest single terrorist attack since the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York. Tensions over judicial reforms and the war in Gaza also resulted in a deterioration on the *violent demonstrations* indicator, which deteriorated by 15 per cent. The number of Israelis who felt safe in their neighbourhood or city also fell sharply, with just under 30 per cent of respondents reporting that they did not feel safe, compared to just 17 per cent in the prior year.


<b>Ecuador</b>	<b>Rank: 130</b>
	CHANGE IN SCORE 2024–24: <b>0.283</b>
	CHANGE IN RANK 2024–24: <b>↓ 16</b>

Ecuador recorded the second largest deterioration in the 2024 GPI. Its overall score deteriorated by 12.36 per cent, resulting in a drop of 16 places to 130<sup>th</sup> in the overall index. The *Ongoing Conflict* domain recorded the largest deterioration of the three domains with internal conflicts fought and intensity of internal conflict both deteriorating significantly. There was also a

significant deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain because of the homicide rate nearly doubling over the past year. Ecuador's homicide rate of just under 27 per 100,000 people is the sixth highest in the world.

The primary driver of the deterioration in peacefulness in Ecuador was an increase in drug-related violence, with several drug gangs moving to consolidate their drug-trafficking operations. Ecuador has become an increasingly important location for drug cartels, both as a major transit route for drugs that are destined for the US, and as a logistical hub for criminal cartels. This increased importance has led to a significant increase in *violent crime* and corruption. Much of the violence is related to conflict between gangs, though attempts by the government to push back on criminal activity have led to a spill-over of violence into the civilian population.

The increased level of organised crime and cartel activity has also had an impact on *political instability*, culminating with the assassination of the presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio in August 2023. However, new president Daniel Noboa has signalled a strong intent to tackle organised crime, with the implementation of a comprehensive security plan called 'Phoenix' and a proposed referendum targeting the security crisis.


<b>Gabon</b>	<b>Rank: 118</b>
	CHANGE IN SCORE 2023–24: <b>0.203</b>
	CHANGE IN RANK 2023–24: <b>↓ 18</b>

Gabon recorded the third largest deterioration of any country on the 2024 GPI, with its overall score deteriorating by 9.4 per cent. Gabon fell 18 places in the rankings to 118<sup>th</sup> overall, and now has its lowest levels of peacefulness since the inception of the index. The fall in peacefulness in Gabon was driven by deteriorations on the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Militarisation* domains, which deteriorated by 27.4 per cent and 6.8 per cent respectively.

The primary driver of the deterioration in peacefulness in Gabon was the successful military coup of August 2023 and the associated internal security crisis. The coup led to the dissolution of Gabon's state institutions and the suspension of the constitution. It also resulted in the overturning of the results of the August 26<sup>th</sup> presidential election, in which the long-standing incumbent, Ali Bongo Ondimba, secured a third term. Gabon's coup took place against the backdrop of widespread public discontent with dynastic politics and entrenched corruption under the former ruling party, the Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG). As a result of the coup and the associated civil unrest, there were significant deteriorations on the *political instability* and *intensity of internal conflict* indicators.

The coup and its consequences also negatively affected neighbouring country relations, as both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States suspended Gabon's membership. Although economic sanctions


have not been applied, the suspensions reflect an attempt to exert diplomatic pressure on the military junta to push for a quick transition back to civilian rule. In October 2023 the US also removed Gabon from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a US initiative to provide non-reciprocal trade preferences to eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa.



Palestine experienced the fourth largest deterioration in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, dropping nine places to 145<sup>th</sup>. Its overall score deteriorated by 7.28 per cent, with all three domains deteriorating over the past year. Although this was the largest year on year deterioration in peacefulness in Palestine, the security climate had been getting worse for the past three years, with the country recording one of the largest deteriorations in peacefulness of any country over the past decade.

The primary driver of Palestine's fall in peacefulness was the conflict in Gaza, with the *Ongoing Conflict* domain deteriorating by just under 24 per cent. It is estimated that over 17,000 Palestinians were killed in the Gaza conflict in 2023, with the latest data indicating that this number had increased to over 33,000 as of April 2024 with some estimates placing the number much higher at over 100,000.

The conflict between Israel and Palestine escalated dramatically in 2023 after the October 7<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks and subsequent military invasion of Gaza. However, tensions had been rising since 2020. Instances of settler-related conflict, mob violence and communal violence all increased significantly in the past few years. IEP analysis of media sentiment data also found that diplomatic tensions between Israel and Palestine have also been at historically high levels for the past five years.



Haiti recorded the fifth largest deterioration in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI, falling nine places to 143<sup>rd</sup>, its lowest rank since the inception of the index. This is the second consecutive year in which Haiti has had one of the five largest deteriorations, with its overall score deteriorating by just over seven per cent. Haiti's fall in peacefulness was driven by deteriorations on all domains, with the largest occurring in the *Safety and Security* domain.

*Violent crime* rose dramatically in Haiti in 2023, owing to the ongoing security crisis that was sparked by the assassination of

president Jovenel Moise in 2021. This event created a power vacuum, contributing to ongoing governance challenges and exacerbating political turmoil. The country has not held elections since then, resulting in a governance crisis characterised by the absence of a functioning parliament and extended rule by decree, further destabilising the political framework.

Violent criminal groups now control nearly half the country, and over 90 per cent of the capital city Port-au-Prince. *Violent demonstrations, violent crime, and the homicide rate* have all deteriorated sharply over the past year. Gang violence in the capital in early 2024 has resulted in the closing of 15 schools, with at least 290,000 children being deprived of school meals due to these closures. Many medical facilities have also now been closed for months due to the extreme levels of violence, with reports of gangs occupying hospitals and other medical facilities.<sup>5</sup>

The international response to the crisis has been mixed, with calls for foreign intervention to stabilise the situation countered by significant local opposition to external interference. The United Nations and other international bodies have stressed the need for a Haitian-led solution to the political crisis, although tangible progress has been slow.

The world has become less stable in the past 17 years with substantial increases in political instability, number of conflicts, deaths from conflicts and violent demonstrations.



Two of the GPI domains deteriorated since 2008, with *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* deteriorating by 19 per cent and 1.7 per cent respectively. Only the *Militarisation* domain improved, with peacefulness increasing on that domain by 3.4 per cent.

The trends on the *Militarisation* domain reveal an interesting paradox: Although conflict is now much more common than 17 years ago, most countries have become less militarised.

However, since 2019 the trend has reversed with the *Militarisation* domain deteriorating slightly over the past five years.



When taking into account advances in military technology, overall military capability has increased by ten per cent globally since 2014.

Under the new military capability scoring system, the US has a major strategic advantage with three times the capabilities of its nearest rival China, closely followed by Russia, and then France.


There has been a shift away from large, infantry-based armed forces to a greater reliance on more sophisticated weaponry. Between 2008 and 2024, 112 countries reduced their armed services personnel rate.

Deaths from internal conflict increased by over 475 per cent in the past 17 years, with over half the countries in the GPI recording at least one conflict death in 2023.

95 million

Over 95 million people are now either refugees or have been internally displaced because of violent conflict. There are now 16 countries where more than five per cent of the population has been forcibly displaced.

Since 2008, all regions have recorded a deterioration in their scores on the *external conflicts fought* indicator. sub-Saharan Africa experienced the most severe deterioration of 134 per cent, followed by South Asia at 115 per cent, and MENA at 105 per cent.



Peacefulness improved slightly on average on the *Safety and Security* domain but deteriorated on both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Militarisation* domains.

Perceptions of criminality improved in 96 countries, with El Salvador recording the biggest improvement, and Syria recording the largest deterioration.



*External conflicts fought* and *internal conflicts fought* had the largest deteriorations. This reflects not only the spread of conflict around the world, but the increasing involvement of external actors in civil conflicts.

# 2 Trends



# GPI Trends

The world is considerably less peaceful now than it was in 2008, with the average level of country peacefulness deteriorating by 4.5 per cent between 2008 and 2024. Over that same period, 95 countries have become less peaceful, compared to 66 that have improved.


Figure 2.1 highlights the overall trend in peacefulness from 2008 to 2024, as well as the year-on-year percentage change in score. Peacefulness has declined year-on-year for 12 of the last 16 years. The deterioration in peacefulness since 2008 was largely concentrated in four regions: MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and Central America and the Caribbean.

The gap in peace between the most and least peaceful countries in the world has widened considerably since 2013, as shown in Figure 2.2. This is known as the peace inequality gap. While the 25 most peaceful countries in 2024 were almost one per cent more peaceful than the 25 most peaceful countries in 2008, the 25 least peaceful nations were over 7.5 per cent less peaceful than the 25 least peaceful countries in the first year of the index.

FIGURE 2.2

## Indexed trend in peace for the most and least peaceful countries, 2008–2024

The gap between the most and least peaceful countries in the world is wider than ever.




Source: IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.1

## GPI overall trend and year-on-year percentage change, 2008–2023

Peacefulness has declined year-on-year for 12 of the last 16 years.



Source: IEP

# Domain Trends

The GPI measures peacefulness across three domains: *Safety and Security*, *Ongoing Conflict*, and *Militarisation*. Figure 2.3 highlights the indexed trend across these three domains over the past 16 years.

While the world has become less peaceful since 2008, there have been some notable improvements in peace. The average country score on the *Militarisation* domain has improved by 3.4 per cent since 2008. The largest improvements in this domain were in *UN peacekeeping funding*, and the *armed services personnel rate*. However, the other two GPI domains recorded deteriorations over the same period. The *Safety and Security* domain deteriorated by 1.7 per cent, and the *Ongoing Conflict* domain also deteriorated by almost 20 per cent.

The *Militarisation* domain improved even as *Ongoing Conflict* deteriorated. However, there are two distinct trends covering the last 16 years. The first trend saw an improvement in the domain up to 2019 and then a reversal of the trend, with *Militarisation* deteriorating through to the 2024 GPI. In the past year, every indicator in the domain deteriorated.


Given the growing significance of militarisation, IEP has developed a new methodology for examining military capability in more detail. It takes into account the level of military sophistication and technological advancement, as well as the total number of heavy weapons. This new approach is explored in more detail in the last part of the trends section of this report.

Figure 2.4 shows the average percentage change in score for each indicator from the 2008 to the 2024 GPI. Of the 23 GPI indicators, 16 recorded deteriorations with the remaining seven recording improvements over this period.

FIGURE 2.3

## Indexed trend in peace by GPI domain, 2008–2024

Militarisation was the only domain to record an improvement over the past 16 years.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.4

## Percentage change by GPI indicator, 2008–2024

Both internal conflicts fought and external conflicts fought deteriorated by over 40 per cent.



Source: IEP

The largest deteriorations were recorded on the *external conflicts fought* and *internal conflicts fought* indicators, which deteriorated by 58 per cent and 42.6 per cent respectively. This change reflects that the number of active conflicts around the world has surged, with a concurrent increase in involvement by external actors. This dynamic is explored in more detail in section four.

The *violent demonstrations* indicator deteriorated by just over 30 per cent, while *deaths from internal conflict* deteriorated by just under 20 per cent. There were six indicators in total that recorded a deterioration of over ten per cent.

Of the seven indicators that improved, only *UN peacekeeping funding* had an improvement of over 20 per cent. The *armed services personnel rate* and *homicide rate* were the only other indicators that improved by more than five per cent.

## SAFETY AND SECURITY

The *Safety and Security* domain deteriorated by 1.7 per cent between 2008 and 2024. Of the 11 indicators in this domain, eight deteriorated and three improved. The largest deterioration occurred in the *violent demonstrations* indicator, with 111 countries and five regions recording deteriorations on this indicator over the past 16 years. Average scores on this indicator have deteriorated by 31.2 per cent globally. Figure 2.5 highlights the trend from 2008 to 2024 for three key *Safety and Security* indicators.

The *refugees and IDPs* indicator has deteriorated in the GPI every year since 2019, with the total number of forcibly displaced people increasing to over 95.5 million by mid-2023.<sup>1</sup> This number includes *refugees and IDPs* as a result of the war in Ukraine, but excludes those people classified as ‘others of concern’ and ‘returnees’ by the UNHCR. The war in Ukraine has resulted in nearly 6.5 million refugees as of March 2024<sup>2</sup>, while the war in Gaza has led to almost 75 per cent of the population being internally displaced.

As of mid-2023, over half of all refugees under UNHCR’s mandate came from just three countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. However, the extent of displacement is greatest in Syria, where the impact and aftermath of the Syrian civil war has led to 56.7 per cent of the entire population being either internally displaced or refugees.

The *homicide rate* indicator had the largest improvement in the *Safety and Security* domain, with 112 countries recording reductions in their homicide rates since 2008. The average *homicide rate* across all GPI countries fell from 7.7 to 6.0 per 100,000 over the past 16 years. There are now 37 countries globally that have a *homicide rate* of less than one per 100,000, and 63 with a rate of less than two per 100,000. Between 2008 and 2024, the homicide rate improved in all regions except for Central America and the Caribbean, North America, and South America. However, in recent years several countries in Central America have recorded large improvement in their homicide rates, most notably El Salvador.

The improvement on the *homicide rate* indicator was strongly correlated with the improvement in the *perceptions of criminality* indicator, which measures whether people feel safe walking alone at night in their city or neighbourhood. The overall correlation between movements in the *homicide rate* and *perceptions of criminality* indicator was one of the largest correlations between changes in pairs of indicators on the GPI.


There were 96 countries that improved on the *perceptions of criminality* indicator between the 2008 and 2024 GPI, while 59 countries recorded a deterioration. The largest improvement occurred in El Salvador, where the percentage of people who felt unsafe fell from 53 per cent to just 11 per cent. The largest deterioration occurred in Syria, where the percentage of people who felt unsafe rose from 12 per cent to 58 per cent.

The *terrorism impact* indicator improved by an average of 4.8 per cent between 2008 and 2024. The number of deaths from terrorism peaked in 2016 at almost 11,000, with most occurring in the MENA region. However, while the global number of

FIGURE 2.5

### Trends in key Safety and Security indicators, 2008–2024

Although homicide rates and the impact of terrorism have fallen in recent years, the number of refugees and internally displaced people continues to rise.



Source: UNODC; UNHCR; Dragonfly TerrorismTracker



deaths from terrorism has fallen since 2016, the epicentre of terrorism has shifted out of MENA and into sub-Saharan Africa, most notably in the central Sahel region. The Sahel region accounted for more terrorism deaths in 2023 than both South Asia and MENA combined. Sub-Saharan Africa is also the only region that has recorded an increase in deaths from terrorism since 2018.

## ONGOING CONFLICT

*Ongoing Conflict* experienced the largest fall in peacefulness of the three GPI domains, deteriorating 19 per cent between 2008 and 2024. Every indicator within the domain deteriorated over this period, with the largest deterioration being *external conflicts fought* at 58 per cent.

Figure 2.6 shows the trends for three key *Ongoing Conflict* indicators from 2008 to 2024: the total number of conflict related deaths, the average score for the *external conflicts fought* indicator and the average score on the *intensity of internal conflict* indicator.

The total number of *deaths from internal conflict* increased by 475 per cent between 2007 and 2023. There were over 162,000 deaths last year, the second highest number recorded in the last since 2008. The highest number occurred in 2022 when almost 238,000 people were killed in conflict, with over 100,000 people killed in Ethiopia alone in that year. The increase in *deaths from internal conflict* has been widespread, with 57 countries having a higher number of conflict deaths in 2023 compared to 2008. Over half the countries in the GPI recorded at least one death from conflict in the past year.

*External conflicts fought* had the largest deterioration of any indicator on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain. There were 87 country deteriorations, 30 improvements, and 44 with no change since 2008. Of the 163 countries, 127 were involved in at

least one external conflict since the inception of the index. This trend reflects the growing number of internationalised intrastate conflicts, in which external actors are involved in civil conflicts between governments and rebel groups. The support generally goes to governments, often in the form of a coalition of countries conducting peacekeeping operations or providing operational support.

Since 2008, all regions have recorded a deterioration in their scores on the *external conflicts fought* indicator. Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the most severe deterioration at 134 per cent, followed by South Asia at 115 per cent, and MENA at 105 per cent. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the most countries engaged in external conflicts, with 36 of 43 countries in the region in 2023, a significant increase from just seven in 2008.


The deterioration on the *external conflicts fought* indicator reflects the increase in external actors becoming involved in internal conflicts. In 2022 there were 92 countries who were at least partially involved in some form of external conflict, up from 59 in 2008. Of those 100, three were acting alone in an external conflict, 33 were involved in a small coalition, and 84 were involved in a large coalition of ten or more countries. In the majority of conflicts, countries were offering support to an existing government in its conflict with an internal armed rebel or terrorist group.

The *intensity of internal conflict* indicator is a measure of the level of internal organised violence and civil unrest within a country. This indicator has deteriorated 11 per cent since 2008, with 51 countries recording deteriorations, and 21 countries improving. There are now 78 countries with a score of three or higher, indicating at least an explicit threat of violence, compared to just 58 in 2008.

FIGURE 2.6

### Trends in key Ongoing Conflict indicators, 2008–2024

Every indicator on the Ongoing Conflict domain has deteriorated since 2008.



Source: UCDP; EIU; IEP Calculations

## MILITARISATION

The average score on the *Militarisation* domain improved by 3.3 per cent between 2008 and 2024. It is the only GPI domain to record an improvement during this period, with 106 countries improving and 55 deteriorating. Figure 2.7 shows the trend for the average *armed services personnel rate*, *military expenditure (% of GDP)*, and the average *weapons imports* indicator score.

The GPI domain trends shown in Figure 2.3 reveals an interesting paradox. Although the world has become much less peaceful and the level of *Ongoing Conflict* has surged, the average level of *Militarisation* improved, despite this trend beginning to reverse since 2019. Even as the number of active conflicts around the world surged, and conflict deaths increased by over 475 per cent, the average *armed forces personnel rate* fell from almost 500 per 100,000 people, to less than 430 per 100,000 people.

Four of the six indicators on the *Militarisation* domain improved, with only the *weapons imports* and the *military expenditure (% of GDP)* indicators recording a deterioration. The largest proportional improvements between 2008 and 2024 occurred on the *UN peacekeeping funding* indicator, where 114 countries improved, and the *armed services personnel rate*, where 112 countries improved.

The global average *armed service personnel rate* declined from 493 per 100,000 population in 2008 to 428 per 100,000 population by 2024. The improvement in the *armed services personnel rate* and *military expenditure (% of GDP)* since 2008 was particularly notable in the five countries with the largest total military spending: the United States, China, India, Russia,

and the United Kingdom. Of those countries, all except Russia recorded reductions in both *military expenditure (% of GDP)* and *armed services personnel rate*.


The *weapons imports* indicator continued to deteriorate in the past year, resulting in a deterioration of more than 60 per cent over the last 16 years. The number of countries that recorded no *weapons imports* fell from 27 in 2008, to only 12 in 2024. Six of the ten countries with the largest per capita *weapons imports* are from the MENA region.

*Weapons exports* remain highly concentrated, with 99 countries registering no exports at all in the last year. Several highly peaceful countries performed poorly on this indicator, with France, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland all being ranked amongst the ten highest weapons exporters per capita. Eight of the ten largest exporters on a per capita basis are Western democracies. However, by total export value, just five countries account for over 75 per cent of total *weapons exports*: the US, France, Russia, China, and Germany, with the US alone accounting for over 40 per cent.

FIGURE 2.7

### Indexed trends in key Militarisation indicators, 2008–2024

The armed services personnel rate improved in 112 countries.



Source: UCDP; EIU; IEP Calculations

# Long-term Trends in Military Capability

The improvement on the *Militarisation* domain has not been constant across every indicator, as shown in Figure 2.8. The largest improvement was recorded on the *armed services personnel rate*, which improved for 112 of the 163 GPI countries.

By contrast, *weapons imports* deteriorated by almost four per cent, with 89 countries increasing their *weapons imports* per capita. The other indicators on the *Militarisation* domain did not change significantly between 2008 and 2024, although total global military expenditure increased considerably over the period, and the *nuclear and heavy weapons* indicator saw consistent deterioration from 2015 onwards.

The trends in Figure 2.8 are indicative of the changing nature of military capability around the world. There has been a clear shift away from personnel and towards new forms of high-tech military equipment and sophisticated weaponry. Longer-term data going back to 1995 suggests that this shift predates the GPI by several decades.

Total global military expenditure has almost doubled over the past quarter of a century. When measured in constant 2017 USD dollars, military expenditure increased from just over one trillion dollars in 1995, to just under two trillion dollars in 2021. This represents a real increase of 87.6 per cent in 26 years.

The total number of armed forces personnel in the world fell from over 30 million in 1995, to under 28 million in 2021. The majority of this decrease occurred in Russia, China, and the US,


although most countries in the world recorded a decrease over this period. The only major military power to record a substantial increase in the size of its armed forces over this period was India, which increased its number of troops by over 40 per cent.

These trends also hold when looking at per capita measures of military expenditure and armed forces. Figure 2.9 shows the trends in the global armed forces rate, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and military expenditure per capita from 1995 to 2022. Over this period there was a substantial and sustained fall in the number of *armed services personnel* per 100,000 people. The level of military expenditure relative to total economic activity declined slightly, but global military expenditure per capita increased significantly, increasing 37 per cent between 1995 and 2022.

FIGURE 2.8

## Indexed trend in Militarisation indicators, 2008–2024

The armed services personnel rate has improved consistently.



Source: IISS Military Balance; SIPRI Arms Transfer Database; IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.9

**Global armed forces, military expenditure (% GDP), and military expenditure per capita, 1995–2022**



Source: SIPRI; World Bank; IEP Calculations

There thus appears to have been a decoupling between the size of a country’s armed forces, and the amount spent on its military over the past three decades. One explanation for this change is that there has been a shift away from a reliance on troop numbers, towards more investment in advanced military technology, and a subsequent increase in defence spending efficiency.

The integration of advanced technology into military operations has substantially increased armed forces capacity. Advanced weaponry, sophisticated communication systems, and unmanned drones have significantly reduced the need for infantry. As a result, more developed nations have been able to allocate more resources to research, development, and the procurement of cutting-edge military assets. This shift in focus from a large personnel-driven force to a technologically driven one has led to a strategic realignment, enabling militaries to maintain or even enhance their defensive capabilities while streamlining recruitment efforts.

One area that can serve as a proxy for measuring military sophistication is the growth in the number of military satellites. These satellites play a vital role in various military and intelligence operations, providing capabilities such as communication, reconnaissance, surveillance, and navigation. China’s growth in this area over the past decade has been the largest of any country. China has expanded its military satellite capabilities, highlighting its commitment to advancing its space-based assets for national defence purposes.


Another area that showcases the use of more sophisticated military technology is the growth of unarmed aerial vehicles (UAV), commonly known as drones. The growth in the use of drones over the past decade indicates an increasing reliance on unmanned systems for reconnaissance, surveillance, and combat purposes, showcasing a shift towards more sophisticated and autonomous military capabilities. The trend may also imply a potential shift in traditional military strategies towards remote warfare and asymmetric warfare, with UAVs set to play a pivotal role in future military operations and security strategies worldwide.

Figure 2.10 shows the indexed trend in the global level of military satellites, UAVs, and artillery over the past decade. The total level of artillery has declined slightly since 2014.<sup>1</sup> However, there has been a large increase in the number UAVs, and very large relative increase in the number of military satellites.

FIGURE 2.10

**Indexed change in weapons categories, 2014–2022**

Investment in drones and satellites has risen significantly over the past decade.



Source: IISS Military Balance; IEP Calculations

More economically developed nations have been harnessing their technological advancements for military purposes, investing heavily in research and acquisition of state-of-the-art equipment. These developments have allowed them to optimise military operations, reducing the reliance on infantry, and ensuring higher efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The shift towards technology-driven warfare is also evident in the increasing prevalence of cyber warfare and intelligence-based operations, further exemplifying the changing nature of modern military strategy.

The integration of better machinery and automation into military operations has led to enhanced precision and increased strategic flexibility. Drones and other unmanned vehicles, for instance, can undertake reconnaissance and surveillance missions without putting human lives at risk, while precision-guided munitions can accurately target specific enemy assets. These advancements not only make the military more efficient but also improve its ability to respond rapidly to emerging threats.

## MEASURING MILITARY CAPABILITY

Another way to measure the shift towards a reliance on more technologically sophisticated advanced weapons systems is to measure a country's total military capability. IEP has developed a new machine learning methodology to assess military capability which adjusts for the technological differences of different generations and classes of military assets. This new dataset allows for total military capability to be more accurately measured.

When assessing military strength, the conventional focus tends to be on the quantity of military platforms, such as fighter jets and frigates. However, this approach overlooks the quality and capability of military assets. Not all fighter jets are equal in terms of technological advancements. For example, a modern F-35 aircraft has stealth capabilities, highly advanced radar technology, and superior data sharing and data processing power compared to older fourth generation fighter jets, such as the Su-27 or F-16. This same principle applies for other military assets as well.

Therefore, it becomes crucial to consider the disparities in technologies and the overall quality of military assets when evaluating a country's military capability. IEP has taken into account both the quality and quantity of military platforms, as well as battle experience and combat readiness, to calculate the capabilities of the major military nations.

The current version of the military capabilities dataset applies IEP's new methodology to four weapons categories: fixed wing aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, navel assets, and armoured vehicles. The total military capability of a country is calculated by summing the capability score across the four categories, with data available from 2014 to 2022.

Figure 2.11 shows that between 2014 and 2022, global military capability increased by almost ten per cent. This contrasts strongly with the declining trends in military personnel. It suggests that despite the reduction in the size of armed forces and the relative level of military spending, armed forces have become more capable, as weapon systems have become more technologically advanced and lethal.

Figure 2.11 also shows the trend in overall military capability for the six largest military powers. Of these six countries, China has experienced the most significant increase in its overall military capability since 2014. Conversely, France and Russia recorded a small contraction in their overall military capability over the same period.


Overall military capability has increased by ten per cent globally since 2014. Under the scoring system, the US has a major strategic advantage with three times the capabilities of its nearest rival China. China is closely followed by Russia, and then there is a substantial drop to France and the UK.

The trends in armed forces rate, military spending, weapons systems, and overall military capability strongly suggest that the decoupling between military expansion and personnel recruitment can be primarily attributed to the increased efficiency of defence spending through advancements in technology and better machinery. This enables modern armies to operate more effectively and maintain robust defensive capabilities.

FIGURE 2.11

### Indexed change in military capability, global total and selected countries, 2014–2023

In relative terms, China's military capability has increased more than any other global superpower since 2014.




Source: IISS Military Balance; IEP Calculations

The difference between standard approaches which only measure inventory versus IEP's new methodology which captures differences in capability is shown in Figure 2.12. This chart shows the indexed change in fixed-wing aircraft capability versus the change in total aircraft quantity since 2014. It shows that the total number of fixed-wing combat aircraft actually declined slightly over the last decade. However, as older fighter jets were replaced with newer generation combat aircraft with more advanced weapons systems, the total military capability of fixed-wing aircraft advanced significantly, with IEP estimating that capability increased by over 15 per cent since 2014.

FIGURE 2.12

### Indexed change in fixed-wing capability vs total fixed-wing aircraft

While the total number of combat aircraft has barely changed, aircraft combat capacity has increased.



Source: IISS Military Balance; IEP Calculations

**\$2,380** → 

The global economic impact of violence was \$19.1 trillion in 2023, equivalent to 13.5 per cent of global GDP, or \$2,380 per person.

The 2023 result represented an increase of 0.83 per cent – or \$158 billion – from the previous year, largely driven by a 20 per cent increase in GDP losses from conflict.

The largest increases in the economic impact of violence occurred in Palestine and Israel, where the total impact increased by 63 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.



Sudan, Timor-Leste, Angola, and Ethiopia respectively experienced 32.8, 21.3, 19.1 and 18.8 per cent decrease in their economic impact from the previous year.

**24%** ↓

Despite its high economic cost relative to GDP, Ukraine experienced a near 24 per cent decrease in its economic impact of violence from the previous year, as the first year of the conflict with Russia had a greater impact on its GDP.

**\$49.6 billion**

Expenditure on peacebuilding and peacekeeping was \$49.6 billion in 2023, less than 0.6 per cent of total military spending in PPP terms.



In the ten countries most affected by violence, the economic cost of violence averaged 37.4 per cent of GDP in 2023.

**184%** ↑

The largest increase in the economic costing model occurred in the armed conflict domain, which increased by 184 per cent since 2008.

Ukraine, Afghanistan and North Korea incurred the highest relative economic cost of violence in 2023, equivalent to 68.6, 53.2, and 41.6 per cent of GDP, respectively.


**Ukraine**  
**68.6%**  
of GDP

**Afghanistan**  
**53.2%**  
of GDP

**North Korea**  
**41.6%**  
of GDP

**74%**

Military and internal security expenditure accounts for over 74 per cent of the total economic impact of violence.



Military expenditure accounts for 44 per cent of the model at \$8.4 trillion.

# 3 Economic Impact of Violence







# The Economic Impact of Violence

In 2023, the impact of violence on the global economy amounted to \$19.1 trillion, in US dollars in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This is equivalent to 13.5 per cent of global GDP, or \$2,380 per person. The total economic impact of violence increased by 0.83 per cent over the past year.

The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effect related to containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence. The economic impact of violence provides an empirical basis to better understand the economic benefits resulting from improvements in peace.

Violence and the fear of violence create significant economic disruptions. Violent incidents generate costs in the form of property damage, physical injury, or psychological trauma. Fear of violence also alters economic behaviour, primarily by reducing the propensity to invest and consume. Expenditure on preventing, containing, and dealing with the consequences of violence diverts public and private resources away from more productive activities and towards protective measures. Violence generates economic losses in the form of productivity shortfalls, foregone earnings, and distorted expenditure.

The total economic impact of violence has three components that represent different ways in which violence impacts economic activity: direct costs, indirect costs, and a multiplier effect.

The direct costs of violence include the immediate consequences to the victims, perpetrators, and public systems, including health, judicial, and public safety. The indirect cost refers to longer-term costs, such as lost productivity resulting from the physical and psychological effects and the impact of violence on the perception of safety and security in society. The multiplier effect represents the economic benefits that would be generated by the diversion of expenditure away from sunk costs, such as incarceration spending, and into more productive alternatives.

The economic impact of violence includes many indicators contained in the GPI, such as military expenditure, conflict deaths and homicides. However, the model also includes costs that are not incorporated into the GPI, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) expenditure on refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), losses from conflict, suicide, and internal security expenditure.



## The Value of Peace in 2023


The economic impact of violence was \$19.1 trillion in 2023. This was a 0.83 per cent increase from the previous year, owing largely to an increase in GDP losses from conflict, as well as increases in military expenditure. Figure 3.1 displays the breakdown of the total economic impact of violence by category for 2023.

The single largest component was global military expenditure, which totalled \$8.4 trillion, or 44 per cent of the total economic impact. Note that this is an economic measure of military expenditure that includes a multiplier effect, as well as spending on veterans' affairs and other related costs. For this reason, it differs from other estimates of global military expenditure.

FIGURE 3.1

### Composition of the global economic impact of violence, 2023

Military and internal security expenditure accounts for over 74 per cent of the total economic impact of violence.



Source: IEP Calculations

Internal security expenditure was the second largest component, comprising 30 per cent of the global economic impact of violence, at \$5.4 trillion. It includes spending on the police and the judicial system as well as the costs associated with incarceration.

Table 3.1 gives a more detailed breakdown of the total economic impact of violence, as well as the change in the impact from 2022 to 2023.

Globally, the economic impact of military expenditure increased by 1.4 per cent in 2023, equivalent to \$116.3 billion. There has been a large increase in military expenditure over the past few years, with many European countries committing to spending more in the near future years, due in large part to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Expenditure on private security decreased by 0.2 per cent to \$1.3 trillion. Private security is the third largest category in the model and comprises 6.9 per cent of the total.

Homicide is the fourth largest component in the model, comprising seven per cent of the global economic impact of violence, at \$1.1 trillion. The economic impact of homicide fell by just under one per cent, equivalent to \$10 billion, from the

previous year. Homicide has been one of the few categories to show a sustained improvement over the past 15 years.

The economic impact of suicide increased by 1.3 per cent to \$727 billion in 2023, representing 3.8 per cent of the global total. Suicide is defined by the WHO as self-inflicted violence resulting in death.

The economic impact of violent crime increased by 1.7 per cent in 2023, or \$9 billion. Violent crime comprises violent assault and sexual violence and makes up 2.9 per cent of the total economic impact of violence.

## TRENDS IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

The overall impact of violence in real terms is 7.4 per cent higher in 2023 when compared to 2008, as shown in Figure 3.2. Substantial improvements were recorded between 2010 and 2012, after which the impact has steadily risen. Since 2008, 89 countries recorded deterioration in their economic impact of violence, while 74 had improvements. The average deterioration was 53 per cent, while the average improvement was 20 per cent.

TABLE 3.1

### Change in global economic impact of violence, billions of PPP 2023 US dollars, 2022–2023


The total economic impact of violence increased by 0.83 per cent from 2022 to 2023.

Indicator or Cost Component	2023				2022	Change (2022 to 2023)	
	Direct Cost	Indirect Cost	Multiplier	Total Economic Impact	Total Economic Impact	Total Change	% Change
Military expenditure	4,245	0	4,245	8,490	8,374	116	1.4
Internal security expenditure	2,707	0	2,707	5,414	5,424	-10	-0.2
Private security	655	0	655	1,310	1,314	-4	-0.3
Homicide	99	942	99	1,140	1,150	-10	-0.9
Suicide	1	725	1	727	718	9	1.3
Violent crime	46	453	46	545	536	9	1.7
Refugees and IDPs	4	499	4	507	506	1	0.2
GDP losses	0	305	0	305	254	51	20.1
Incarceration	67	0	67	134	132	2	1.5
Fear	0	76	0	76	70	6	8.6
Conflict deaths	27	0	27	54	64	-10	-15.6
Peacebuilding	13	0	13	26	34	-8	-23.5
Peacekeeping	12	0	12	24	12	12	100
Small arms	11	0	11	22	24	-2	-8.3
Terrorism	2	16	2	20	8	12	150
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,035</b>	<b>3,016</b>	<b>8,035</b>	<b>19,086</b>	<b>18,928</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>0.8</b>

FIGURE 3.2

**Trends in the global economic impact of violence, 2008–2023**

The economic impact of violence has increased year on year for 10 of the past 15 years.



Source: IEP Calculations

Table 3.2 shows a breakdown of the change in the economic impact of violence between 2008 and 2023 by category. There was a 9 per cent increase in the total economic impact of violence over this period. Costs associated with conflict deaths and GDP losses from conflict rose most significantly, with both more than doubling.

TABLE 3.2


**Change in global economic impact of violence, billions of PPP 2023 US dollars, 2008–2023**

Since 2008, total impact of violence has risen by nine per cent.

Indicator	Total Economic Impact		Change (2008–2023)	
	2008	2023	Billions	% Change
Conflict deaths	9.3	54.1	44.8	482
GDP losses	89.2	304.9	215.7	242
Refugees and IDPs	187.6	506.8	319.2	170
Terrorism	9.1	18.9	9.8	108
Peacekeeping	19.5	24.5	5	26
Military expenditure	7,569.8	8,490.1	920.3	12
Suicide	646.4	726.9	80.5	12
Fear	68.7	76.2	7.5	11
Internal security expenditure	5,157.9	5,413.2	255.3	5
Homicide	1,101.6	1,139.7	38.1	3
Incarceration	130.4	134.4	4	3
Small arms	23.7	22.6	-1.1	-5
Violent crime	585.1	545.2	-39.9	-7
Peacebuilding	29.6	25.1	-4.5	-15
Private security	1,612.1	1,310.7	-301.4	-19
<b>Total</b>	<b>17,240</b>	<b>18,793.3</b>	<b>1,553.3</b>	<b>9</b>

FIGURE 3.3  
**Indexed trend in economic impact by domain, 2008–2023**

The economic impact of armed conflict has almost tripled since 2008.



Source: IEP Calculations

### ECONOMIC IMPACT BY DOMAIN

The relative long-term trends in the economic impact of violence differ among the three domains of violence. Figure 3.3 shows the indexed changes in the three domains since 2008. The total economic impact of violence increased across all three domains. The *Armed Conflict* domain has substantially deteriorated since 2013, while *Violence Containment* and *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence* only had small relative increases.

#### Armed Conflict


The economic impact of *Armed Conflict* on the global economy in 2023 amounted to \$907.5 billion. The *Armed Conflict* domain includes the costs associated with violence caused by larger groups such as countries, militia groups, and terrorist organisations.

This collective violence includes armed conflict within and between states, including militias and drug cartels, violent political repression, genocide, and terrorism. The domain also includes the costs associated with the consequences of managing armed conflict, such as UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding funding. The economic impact of *Armed Conflict* is highest across three regions: sub-Saharan Africa, MENA, and South America.

Figure 3.4 shows the composition of the economic impact of *Armed Conflict* in 2023. Refugees and IDPs is the largest component, accounting for approximately 56 per cent of the economic impact of *Armed Conflict*, followed by the GDP losses from conflict at 34 per cent.

FIGURE 3.4  
**Composition of the Armed Conflict domain, 2023**

Conflict-related displacement accounts for over half of the global economic impact of Armed Conflict.



Source: IEP Calculations

#### Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence


The economic impact of *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence* aggregates homicide, violent and sexual assault, suicide and fear of violence and incarceration costs. In 2023, the economic impact of *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence* on the global economy amounted to \$2.6 trillion, a 0.66 per cent increase from the prior year.

Figure 3.5 shows the composition of the economic impact of the *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence* domain. Homicide accounts for approximately 43 per cent of the domain's economic impact, followed by suicide at 28 per cent and *violent crime* at 21 per cent.

FIGURE 3.5

### Composition of the Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence domain, 2023

Homicide accounts for nearly half of the economic impact of interpersonal and self-inflicted violence.



Source: IEP Calculations

### Violence Containment


*Violence Containment* is the largest component of the overall economic impact of violence model. It consists of all spending which aims to prevent and contain the spread of violence. Figure 3.6 shows the composition of the economic impact for this domain.

Military expenditure is the largest component of this domain, accounting for 56 per cent of the total, while internal security expenditure is the second largest component, at 35 per cent. Internal security expenditure encompasses all the expenses associated with the police and judicial system. Private security accounts for nine per cent of the economic impact of *Violence Containment*, while peacebuilding and peacekeeping combined account for less than one per cent.

FIGURE 3.6

### Composition of the economic impact of the Violence Containment domain

Peacebuilding and peacekeeping are only a tiny fraction of the economic impact of violence containment.



Source: IEP Calculations


The distribution of the economic impact of *Violence Containment* varies considerably from region to region. In North America, the cost of *Violence Containment* equated to \$5,344 per person in 2023. This is over twice as high as in Russia and Eurasia, as well as Europe, the regions with the second and third highest levels respectively, as shown in Figure 3.7. However, North America is the region with the highest level of per capita income.

Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Central America and the Caribbean have the lowest per capita cost. On average, the economic impact of *violence containment* is nearly 4 times higher in the Middle East and North Africa than sub-Saharan Africa.

FIGURE 3.7

### Per capita containment spending (military and internal security) by region, 2023

North America has by far the highest average level of spending on containing violence per capital.



Source: IEP Calculations

TABLE 3.3

**Military expenditure: total, per capita, and as a percentage of GDP, 2023**

Country	Military Expenditure (Total, \$US Billions)	Country	Military Expenditure (Per Capita, \$US)	Country	Military Expenditure (% of GDP)
United States	896.61	North Korea	9,073.28	Ukraine	39.62
China	488.62	Qatar	7,940.3	North Korea	36.32
India	291.05	Saudi Arabia	4,400.19	Afghanistan	11.03
North Korea	237.36	Ukraine	4,252.17	Palestine	9.69
Russia	202.95	United Arab Emirates	4,079.34	Saudi Arabia	8.77
Saudi Arabia	162.57	Singapore	3,535.43	Qatar	8.22
Ukraine	156.24	Kuwait	2644	Togo	6.43
United Kingdom	86.69	United States	2,637.13	Oman	6.1
Germany	77.13	Israel	2,351.95	Jordan	5.72
South Korea	72.71	Oman	2,156.89	Algeria	5.65

\* Estimated; Veterans affairs spending and interest on military-related debt is excluded.  
Source: IEP Calculations

Table 3.3 shows the ten countries with the highest military expenditure as a total, per capita, and as a percentage of GDP. The US spends the most of any country annually on its military. North Korea has the highest on per capita spending and Ukraine has the highest military spending as a percentage of its GDP.

**REGIONAL AND COUNTRY ANALYSIS**

There are noticeable regional differences in the economic impact of violence. In some regions, the *Violence Containment* domain, and in particular military expenditure accounts for


most of the economic impact, whilst in other regions crime and conflict are the largest components of the economic impact of violence.

The economic impact of violence deteriorated for most regions of the world in 2023. The regions with the largest percentage improvements were Russia and Eurasia and the Central America and Caribbean region, as shown in Figure 3.8. South Asia had the largest deterioration, while Russia and Eurasia saw the largest improvement. The deterioration in South Asia can be attributed to a rise in GDP losses and costs associated with conflict deaths in Pakistan.

FIGURE 3.8

**Total economic impact and change by region, 2023**

All but two regions experienced increases in the economic impact of violence last year.



Source: IEP Calculations

The region with the largest improvement was Russia and Eurasia, with a 12 per cent reduction in the overall economic impact of violence from the previous year. The biggest reduction came from a \$2.1 billion reduction in the impact of GDP losses from Ukraine. This is because the first year of the conflict with Russia had the greatest impact on Ukrainian GDP.

Central America and the Caribbean is the second region that experienced an improvement in the economic impact of violence. This is largely driven by a dramatic \$1 billion decrease in the economic impact of homicide in El Salvador.

The greatest variation between regions is in military expenditure. This represents 55.8 per cent of the economic impact for the MENA region, and 12.7 per cent in the Central America and the Caribbean region.

The proportions of internal and private security spending also varies between regions, fluctuating between just under 50 per cent in Europe, to just under 30 per cent in the South America region.

Table 3.4 shows the ten countries with the highest economic cost of violence as a percentage of GDP. The economic cost of violence for the ten most affected countries ranged from 21.3 to 68.6 per cent of their GDP. These countries have high levels of armed conflict, large numbers of internally displaced persons, high levels of interpersonal violence, or large militaries.

In the ten countries with the highest economic impact of violence, the economic cost of violence averaged 37.4 per cent of GDP in 2023. Among the ten most peaceful countries, the average economic cost of violence was equivalent to just under three per cent of GDP.

The countries suffering the highest cost of violence are Israel and Palestine, with the economic cost increasing by 61 and 69

per cent respectively. A large portion of this is made up of costs associated with conflict deaths and terrorism.

High-intensity conflict-affected countries suffer higher costs from conflict deaths, and losses from refugees and IDPs as well as homicide. These countries include Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, and Somalia. Afghanistan's high cost can be attributed to the high cost of small arms.

TABLE 3.4

### The ten countries with the highest economic cost of violence as a percentage of GDP, 2023

There are six countries where the cost of violence is equivalent to more than 30 per cent of GDP.


Country	Economic Cost of Violence as (% of GDP)
Ukraine	68.52
Afghanistan	53.19
North Korea	41.57
Somalia	39.78
Colombia	33.77
Central African Republic	33.76
Sudan	29.90
Cyprus	28.61
Burkina Faso	23.47
Palestine	21.27
<b>Average</b>	<b>37.38</b>

Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.9

### Composition of the regional economic cost of violence, 2023

The proportional regional cost of military expenditure ranges from 13 to 57 per cent.



Source: IEP Calculations

# Methodology at a Glance

The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effects related to containing, preventing, and dealing with the consequences of violence. The estimate includes the direct and indirect costs of violence, as well as an economic multiplier. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided.

Expenditure on containing violence is economically efficient when it effectively prevents violence for the least amount of spending. However, spending beyond an optimal level has the potential to constrain a nation's economic growth. Therefore, achieving the right levels of spending on public services such as the military, judicial, and security is important for the most productive use of capital.

This study includes two types of costs: direct and indirect. Examples of **direct costs** include medical costs for victims of violent crime, capital destruction from violence, and costs associated with security and judicial systems. **Indirect costs** include lost wages or productivity from crime due to physical and emotional trauma. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behaviour.

An important aspect of IEP's estimation is the international comparability of country estimates, thereby allowing cost/benefit analysis of country interventions. The methodology uses constant prices purchasing power parity (PPP) international dollars, which allows for the costs of various countries to be compared with one another. By using PPP estimates, the analysis takes into consideration the differences in the average level of prices between countries. For instance, if the US-dollar cost of a basket of goods in country A is higher than the US-dollar cost of the same basket of goods in country B, then one US dollar will have a lower purchasing power in country A than in B. Thus, an expense of a certain amount of US dollars in country B will be more meaningful than a similar expense in country A. IEP's use of PPP conversion rates means that the estimates of the economic impact of violence accurately captures the true significance of that impact or expense in each country.

IEP estimates the economic impact of violence by comprehensively aggregating the costs related to violence, armed conflict and spending on military and internal security services. The GPI is the initial point of reference for developing the estimates for most variables, however some variables are not in the GPI, such as suicide, and are calculated separately.

The 2023 version of the economic impact of violence includes 18 variables in three groups, shown in Table 3.5. The analysis presents conservative estimates of the global economic impact of violence.

The estimation only includes variables of violence for which reliable data could be obtained. The following elements are examples of some of the items not counted in the economic impact of violence:

- the cost of crime to business
- domestic violence
- household out-of-pocket spending on safety and security
- spillover effects from conflict and violence.

A unit cost approach was used to cost variables for which detailed expenditure was not available. The unit costs were obtained from a literature review and appropriately adjusted for all countries included. The study uses unit costs from McCollister, French and Fang for homicides, violent and sexual crimes. The McCollister, French and Fang cost of homicides is also used for battle deaths and deaths from terrorism. The unit cost for fear of crime is sourced from Dolan and Peasgood.

TABLE 3.5

## Economic impact of violence – domains and indicators

There are 18 indicators in the economic impact of violence model.

Violence Containment	Armed Conflict	Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence
Military expenditure	Direct costs of deaths from internal violent conflict	Homicide
Internal security expenditure	Direct costs of deaths from external violent conflict	Violent assault
Security agency	Indirect costs of violent conflict (GDP losses due to conflict)	Sexual assault
Private security	Losses from status as refugees and IDPs	Fear of crime
UN peacekeeping	Small arms imports	Indirect costs of incarceration
ODA peacebuilding expenditure*	Terrorism	Suicide

\* Official Development Assistance (ODA) for peacebuilding  
Source: IEP Calculations



The total economic impact of violence includes the following components:

- **Direct costs** are the cost of violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government. These include direct expenditures, such as the cost of policing, military and medical expenses. For example, in the calculation of homicides for a given country, the total number of homicides is computed and multiplied by the unit costs estimated by McCollister, French, and Fang. The result is updated and converted using country specific inflation and exchange rates.
- **Indirect costs** accrue after the violent event and include indirect economic losses, physical and physiological trauma to the victim, and lost productivity.

- **The multiplier effect** represents the flow-on effects of direct costs, such as the additional economic benefits that would come from investment in business development or education, instead of the less-productive costs of containing or dealing with violence. Box 3.1 provides a detailed explanation of the peace multiplier used.

The term **economic impact of violence** covers the combined effect of direct and indirect costs and the multiplier effect, while the **economic cost of violence** represents the direct and indirect cost of violence. When a country avoids the economic impact of violence, it realises a **peace dividend**.



The term **economic impact of violence** covers the combined effect of direct and indirect costs and the multiplier effect, while the **economic cost of violence** represents the direct and indirect cost of violence. When a country avoids the economic impact of violence, it realises a **peace dividend**.

#### BOX 3.1

### The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept, which describes the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Every time there is an injection of new income into the economy this will lead to more spending which will, in turn, create employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the “multiplier effect” and is the reason that a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals would spend less time and resources protecting themselves against violence. Because of this decrease in violence there are likely to be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education, and infrastructure.

When a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, could be spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the

lifetime income of the victim. The economic benefits from greater peace can therefore be significant. This was also noted by Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009), who argued that violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. More generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for business. For instance, analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that with higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence it is likely that we might expect lower levels of employment and economic productivity over the long-term, as the incentives faced discourage new employment creation and longer-term investment.

— “ —  
A dollar of  
expenditure can  
create more  
than a dollar  
of economic  
activity.  
— —

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every dollar saved on violence containment, there will be an additional dollar of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.

Battle deaths reached a 30 year high in 2022, with the number of active conflicts now higher than at any point since the end of World War II.



The number of conflicts resulting in a decisive victory to either side has fallen from 49 per cent in the 1970s to less than nine per cent in the 2010s.

# 92

Conflict is becoming more widespread, with more countries than ever involved in conflicts outside their own borders. Ninety-two countries were involved in an external conflict in 2022. This is the most since the inception of the index in 2008.



The number of conflicts that end through a peace agreement has also fallen significantly, from just under 23 per cent in the 1970s to just over four per cent in the 2010s.

The nature of these conflicts has changed over time. Conflicts are now more likely to involve multiple internal and external actors.

The increase in the number of smaller conflicts, as well as the increasing number of internal and external actors involved is making it harder to successfully end these conflicts.



Technology and the rise of asymmetric warfare is making it much easier for smaller non-state groups, as well as smaller or less powerful states, to engage in conflict with larger states or governments.



# 1,000%

The usage of drones by non-state groups has surged in the past five years, and the number of drone strikes has increased by over a thousand per cent since 2018.

# 58

In 2022 there were 58 conflicts involving at least one state.

# 2,000

There have been more than 2,000 fatalities in the Russia-Ukraine conflict almost every month for the past two years.



Negative sentiment between Israelis and Palestinians has been steadily rising since 2007.

# 4 War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century



# Introduction

The last decade has seen a surge in both the number of conflicts and the number of conflict-related deaths. 2022 was the first year that over 200,000 battle deaths were recorded in a single year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The number of conflicts has also risen sharply in the past decade. In 2022 there were 56 conflicts involving at least one state.

There is a growing perception that a number of these conflicts are not only unacceptably devastating, but also unwinnable. The most prominent current examples are the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has resulted in over 2,000 battle deaths a month for almost every month since February 2022, as shown in Figure 4.1. The conflict is now entering its third year with neither side making significant gains. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is likely to seek a negotiated resolution before the US presidential election in November 2024. For Ukraine, the future of military support from Western powers, particularly from the United States, is crucial yet uncertain. With the bulk of military aid coming from the US, the results of the US election could be pivotal for the conflict.

The conflict in Gaza has resulted in over 35,000 deaths since October 2023, with some estimates suggesting over 100,000 people have been injured or killed. As of May 2024, the future of the conflict remains uncertain. The Israeli ground offensive has resulted in a humanitarian disaster, including a shortage of food and water. The situation is approaching famine.

The continued presence of Hamas in northern Gaza, where the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were thought to be in control, casts doubt on Israel's ability to secure the region or defeat Hamas in

the near future. Support for Hamas amongst Palestinians has remained high, and the conflict has resulted in the isolation of Israel from the international community, with anti-Semitic attacks rising in many countries. There is also no clear plan for reconstruction or how the territory will be governed after the conflict, with claims that the amount of unexploded ordnance will take decades to clear.<sup>1</sup>


There is also the prospect of the war spreading. Israel and Iran have attacked each other directly. More than 100,000 Israelis have been displaced because of skirmishes with Hezbollah, and with Hezbollah possessing 100,000 to 150,000 rockets, a full-blown conflict would have disastrous consequences.<sup>2</sup> The Houthis in Yemen have attacked shipping in the Red Sea, resulting in the disruption of supply chains. There are risks of increased hostilities between Israel and other countries in the region, including Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The humanitarian and economic effects of this would be profound. Additionally, with the global economy struggling and inflation remaining stubbornly high, a major shock could substantially increase inflation and run the risk of creating a global recession.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the intractability of this conflict, showing the tensions between Israel and Palestine from 1995 to 2023.

FIGURE 4.1

## Monthly conflict deaths, Ukraine, February 2022–February 2024

Ukraine has recorded more than 2,000 conflict deaths for almost every month over the past two years.



Source: ACLED; IEP Calculations

The chart highlights the percentage of stories from one country about the other that were deemed to have a negative tone. There was a significant spike in tensions after the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000, and although there was some improvement to 2007, tensions have remained high and have become increasingly worse for nearly two decades.

Israeli media stories with a negative sentiment towards Palestinians have increased from just over 30 per cent in late 1999 to 92 per cent in early 2023, while stories with negative sentiments by Palestinians towards Israelis have increased from just under 30 per cent in 1999 to 85 per cent in 2023.

The conflicts in both Ukraine and Gaza reflect historical and material grievances that stretch back many decades. They are examples of ‘forever wars’, meaning prolonged conflicts that become seemingly endless owing to the continuous cycle of violence that perpetuates instability without a clear resolution.<sup>3</sup>

Several factors are contributing to the trend of enduring global conflicts. The transition from a unipolar world dominated by a

single superpower to a multipolar one that is intensifying competition has led to more instances of conflict. Rivalries between competing powers often result in significant military support for opposing factions, escalating the risk of severe violence and atrocities.<sup>4</sup>


Additionally, traditional powers like the US and the EU are stretched thin, struggling to engage in multiple conflict zones as they once may have. Internal pressures and focus on a few strategic areas further limit their ability to manage global tensions and smaller conflicts effectively.

The use of new technologies in asymmetric warfare is also changing the way in which conflict is fought, allowing smaller and less powerful states and non-state groups to compete with much larger states. As weak governments have found it difficult to control territory, more international efforts from regional bodies or groups of countries have attempted to support weak or failing governments against internal insurgencies, however, many of these conflicts are becoming intractable.

FIGURE 4.2

### Tensions between Israel and Palestine in the media, 1995–2023

Tension between Israel and Palestine has been steadily climbing since about 2007.



Source: ICEWS; IEP Calculations

# The Changing Nature of Conflict

Although the number of deaths from armed conflict is now at a 30 year high, the total number of conflict deaths remains considerably lower than at many points in the post-World War II era, as shown in Figure 4.3. The steep decline in battle deaths coincided with the end of the Cold War in 1991. There were more than 200,000 battle deaths in 24 of the years between 1946 and 1999, compared to just one year so far in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The average number of deaths per year between 1946 and 1999 was almost 210,000, compared to just under 69,000 per year between 2000 and 2022. However, the trend is on the rise again and given the increasing big power rivalries there is a real risk of a return to the level of fatalities seen in the Cold War era.

Although the average number of deaths so far in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is much lower than in the preceding 50 years, the total number of conflicts is now higher than at any point since World War II. This implies that there is more potential for major conflicts to erupt.

As examples, the Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, and subnational conflicts in Ethiopia wars were minor conflicts in 2019. There were 56 conflicts in 2022 where at least one actor involved was a state, as shown in Figure 4.4. This number rises even higher when including non-state conflicts and instances of one-sided violence, with a further 84 and 49 conflicts respectively.


The total number of conflicts involving a state has increased by over 51 per cent since 2010. However, as can be seen in Figure 4.4, the increase has not been constant across the four different types of state-based conflicts. A short summary of each of these types of conflicts is as follows:

- **Extrasystemic Conflict:** This involves a state battling a non-state group outside its own territory, usually to maintain control over a territory not recognised as part of the international state system.
- **Interstate Conflict:** Both conflicting parties are recognised sovereign states.
- **Intrastate Conflict:** This type of conflict occurs within a single country, where the government is fighting against one or more domestic rebel groups without any foreign military intervention.
- **Internationalised Intrastate Conflict:** Similar to intrastate conflict, but with the significant distinction of foreign governments participating with troops, supporting either the government or the rebels.

There was very little change in the number of interstate and intrastate conflicts between 2010 and 2022. However, over the same period the number of internationalised intrastate conflicts

FIGURE 4.3  
**Total battle deaths, 1946–2022**

Battle deaths are at a 30 year high, but still well below the levels seen in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.




Source: PRIO; UCDP

FIGURE 4.4

**Number of conflicts by type, 1946–2020**

The total number of conflicts is now higher than at any point since World War II.



Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset

increased by 175 per cent. Many of these conflicts involve large regional or international coalitions involved in peacekeeping or stabilisation operations. In 2022, there were 92 countries that were involved in at least one internationalised intrastate conflict, up from 59 in 2008. There were 33 instances where countries were involved in a small coalition of less than ten countries, and 84 instances where countries were involved in a large coalition of ten or more countries.

There has also been a considerable shift by region, with more and more middle-power nations across multiple regions becoming involved in external conflicts. The most striking example of this is in sub-Saharan Africa, where 36 of the 42 countries in the region were involved in at least one external conflict between 2018 and 2022, compared to just seven countries for the period from 2002 to 2006.


In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the overall number of conflicts has increased, but the number of fatalities and intensity of these conflicts has not increased at the same rate. There are a larger number of conflicts, many of which now involve some form of external intervention.

As shown in Figure 4.5, the average number of conflict dyads per conflict has almost doubled. A conflict dyad is defined as a pair of opposing armed actors, such as a government and a rebel group, that are engaged in armed conflict. To count as an armed conflict, there must be at least 25 deaths in a calendar year.

FIGURE 4.5

**Number of conflict dyads per conflict, 1950–2019**

In the last decade the average number of conflict dyads per conflict was more than four.



Source: UCDP ACD; IEP Calculations

The increase in the number of dyads per conflict reflects a shift in the nature of conflict, wherein more armed groups are involved in a single conflict event. This takes the form of not only external combatants becoming involved in a civil conflict, but also multiple rebel groups opposing a government, or even fighting against each other, all within the same conflict. As one rebel group is defeated or merges with other groups, new groups might emerge to continue fighting and prolong the conflict. This makes solving conflicts much more difficult.

As more groups have become involved in armed conflicts there has also been a significant shift in the way conflicts end. Figure 4.6 shows how conflicts have ended for every decade from the 1950s to the 2010s.

The biggest shift that has occurred over this period is the increase in the percentage of conflicts that end through being classified as low activity but with no negotiated outcome, leaving the possibility of further escalation. The number of conflicts ending in ceasefire has remained steady, which points towards many conflicts being left unresolved. Coinciding with this is a decrease in the percentage of conflicts that end through a clear victory to either the government or the non-state side. This holds true for both major and minor conflicts, where a major conflict is defined as one where at least one year of the conflict had over one thousand deaths.

The change in the way conflicts end can partially be explained by changes in the geopolitical landscape. During the Cold War, conflicts, especially civil wars, more often concluded with decisive military victories, frequently influenced by the support of either the US or the USSR. However, the post-Cold War era marked a significant shift. This period was dominated by the US as a singular global power. The strong influence of a single

power saw a rise in peace agreements and a fall in decisive victories, as negotiations became more common for ending conflicts throughout the 1990s.


In the last decade, the dynamics of global power have shifted again, echoing some Cold War patterns. As the US has shown a reduced inclination to intervene, and with rising competition for global influence, conflicts have become more protracted and complex, increasingly supported by external actors. This trend is exemplified by the growing number of internationalised intrastate conflicts. Nations like Russia, Türkiye, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia have emerged as significant players, influencing various conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine, Libya, Mali, Ethiopia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Sahel.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of these shifts, the percentage of conflicts that end due to being classified as low activity has risen from around 20 per cent in the 1970s, to nearly 70 per cent in the 2010s. A conflict ends due to low activity when there are fewer than 25 deaths in a calendar year, but no peace agreement or ceasefire is reached, and no side has a clear victory. These conflicts may become ‘frozen conflicts’ which are likely to erupt in future years. Similarly, the percentage of conflicts that end with either a government or rebel group victory has fallen from just under 50 per cent in the 1970 to less than nine per cent in the 2010s.

Even in conflicts where one side wins a decisive victory, the aftermath often brings little peace. With negotiated settlements or peace agreements becoming less common, clear victories are often only obtained after the use of extremely destructive or brutal approaches to conflict. This is evident in contemporary conflicts such as Syria and Sri Lanka, where military victories have been achieved through severe tactics, leading to highly securitised post-war periods and substantial risks of recurrent conflict.

FIGURE 4.6  
**How conflicts end, 1950–2019**

Conflicts are now far less likely to end with either some of kind of formal agreement or with one side being clearly victorious.



Source: UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset; IEP Calculations



In Syria at least 400,000 people have died since the onset of the civil war, with violence now largely contained to northern Syria. The northeast remains the most tumultuous region, with groups linked to Islamic State controlling territory and clashing with the Syrian Army.<sup>6</sup> Despite regaining much of its territory, the Syrian government's victory has come at a devastating human and economic cost, decimating the country and displacing millions of people, many of whom have sought refuge in Europe. Much of the devastation came about because of the activity of foreign powers seeking to support a multitude of actors in the civil war. The economic impact is also profound, with much of the infrastructure destroyed and the country's GDP dropping by 96.5 per cent from \$252 billion in 2010 to \$8.9 billion in 2020, according to the World Bank.<sup>7</sup>



## Geopolitical Shifts

Three key geopolitical trends help explain why the nature of conflict is changing in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Firstly, there has been a diffusion of power, with the world becoming increasingly multipolar, particularly over the last decade.

With the resurgence of great power competitions reminiscent of the Cold War, wars have become more entrenched due to the internationalisation of conflicts and diffusion of power from a unipolar world to one with multiple shifting alliances. Secondly, the steep increase in the total number of conflicts has led to the problem of distraction, where larger and more powerful countries that would have historically intervened in smaller conflicts are spread too thin and unable to effectively deal with multiple conflicts at once. Thirdly, there has been an emphasis on military solutions, rather than addressing the underlying grievances that have fuelled the conflict.

Although the US remains a preeminent force in global politics, its dominance over conflict management has noticeably declined over the past two decades. This shift can be attributed to its prolonged military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have sapped resources and focus, alongside related power struggles in Syria and the broader Middle East. US foreign policy has continuously shifted over the past three decades, from the interventionist approaches under President Bill Clinton to the War on Terror under George W. Bush dominated by Middle Eastern interventions. President Obama's tenure saw a mix of interventions and pragmatic realpolitik which reduced unilateral actions, while President Trump embraced an 'America First' policy, scaling back many diplomatic endeavours. The

In Sri Lanka, the government's 2009 victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) marked the end of prolonged civil strife that started in the 1980s. This final chapter, known as Eelam War IV, culminated in a large-scale military campaign that cornered approximately 300,000 Tamil civilians into a space as small as New York's Central Park. The subsequent weeks of intense aerial and mortar bombardments led to the LTTE's defeat but at the cost of an estimated 40,000 to 70,000 civilian lives. The aftermath saw hundreds of thousands of Tamils detained in internment camps.<sup>8</sup>

Biden administration has maintained a form of interventionism but focused on providing military assistance over direct involvement and only in specific conflicts like those in Ukraine and Gaza.

US power is declining relative to other great powers such as China and Russia, which are expanding their global influence, aiming to match US influence and power. China is seeking to establish itself as the foremost global superpower through strategic investments and partnerships worldwide, especially in the Pacific. The European Union is struggling to agree on a coherent foreign policy. This is epitomised by the conflicting views of Germany and France on how to deal with Russia in relation to its invasion of Ukraine.<sup>9</sup>

Emerging powers such as India are shaping security dynamics in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, often in competition with China. India will likely become more influential in the future. India's economy grew by 7.7 per cent in 2023 and 6.5 per cent in 2022. India's population is roughly the size of China's and will substantially pass it over the next decade, while Western countries are moving manufacturing from China to India due to perceived political risk. India is also well educated, containing a substantial middle class whose per capita income is rising. The rising relative economic might of India can be leveraged into geopolitical influence.

Furthermore, a host of middle powers, including Türkiye, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Israel, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria, are more actively engaging in global affairs. The Global South is increasingly reluctant to align strictly with great powers, choosing instead to assert their own interests. This growing multipolarity means that small and middle-power states often engage with multiple great and regional powers.

In regions like the Sahel, the influence of traditional powers is waning. France has withdrawn from Mali and Niger, while its influence in Burkina Faso is also diminishing.<sup>10</sup> The US is also leaving its military bases in Niger and Chad. In their wake, Russian and Turkish private military and security companies have deployed, with Türkiye using Syrian fighters to secure its interests.<sup>11</sup> This diffusion of power indicates that no single nation is likely to dominate global policy on conflict

management as the US once did, marking an unpredictable significant shift in international relations.

Western great powers are finding themselves increasingly limited in their capacity and inclination to intervene in foreign conflicts. This trend has been shaped by numerous unsuccessful interventions and peacebuilding attempts. The US and European powers are also focused on the conflicts in the Ukraine and Gaza which is consuming them both politically and militarily. Additionally, the looming threats of major conflict in East Asia pull away what little attention remains for managing global peace and security.

The conflict in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023, highlights the internationalisation of contemporary warfare, where both diffusion and distraction have hindered international resolution efforts. Stemming from decades of civil war, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have divided the country, fighting for control, and supported by other ethno-political militias and factions.

Sudan is now facing the world's worst refugee crisis with over 10 million people displaced and credible reports of atrocities by both SAF and RSF. UN estimates of up to 15,000 killed in two RSF massacres in El Geneina in Darfur suggest catastrophically large death tolls, with some estimating up to 150,000 killed.<sup>12</sup>

External actors are having a significant impact by supporting competing sides, with the SAF backed by China, Russia, Iran, and regionally by Egypt, while the RSF has nearly matched military capabilities by capturing SAF bases and receiving support from the UAE, Chad, Russian PMSC Africa Corps, (formerly known as the Wagner Group) and the Libyan general Khalifa Haftar.<sup>13</sup> The RSF's access to weapons and logistics, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) that challenge SAF's air superiority, further complicates the conflict. The focus of the US and EU on other regions like Ukraine and

Gaza has limited their capacity to influence the Sudanese conflict.<sup>14</sup>


Figure 4.7 highlights how the increasing number of active conflicts may be limiting the ability of great powers to effectively intervene in conflict. It shows the one year moving average for conflicts with more and less than 25 deaths per month for the period 2000 to 2023. There are now an average of 25 active major conflicts a month, and a further 20 or so minor conflicts, compared to a decade ago when the average was less than 15 major active conflicts a month, and 17 minor conflicts.

Since the October 7<sup>th</sup> attacks in Israel, Western focus has pivoted sharply towards the war in Gaza, marking a significant shift from the sustained attention on Ukraine throughout 2022 and 2023. The attention paid to these two conflicts is understandable, as one is the largest war in Europe since World War II and the other a longstanding Middle Eastern conflict with potential for regional escalation.<sup>15</sup> However, the focus on these two conflicts has meant many other conflicts go relatively unnoticed, including in Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>16</sup>

The conflict in Myanmar has evolved dramatically, from mass protests against the February 2021 coup to an armed resistance encompassing a coalition of groups. These include long-established ethnic armed groups and a network of people's defence forces. In late 2023, a large-scale offensive dubbed Operation 1027 by three ethnic armed groups captured significant territories from government forces, including areas bordering India and China. China interceded, negotiating an agreement, keeping the border open and resulting in a lessening of hostilities in the area. The government is struggling to control parts of the country which are effectively under the control of various ethnic factions or the armed wing of the National Unity Government opposition.<sup>17</sup>

FIGURE 4.7  
**Countries in conflict by month, 2000–2023**

For the past three years there have been more than 20 countries with a serious conflict every month on average.



Source: UCDP GED; IEP Calculations

The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been mired in conflict for decades, involving national armed forces, rebel groups, local militias, and foreign troops. However, recent events have received relatively little attention, despite the displacement of at least 5.6 million people across multiple conflicts and the associated humanitarian crisis.<sup>18</sup> In 2023, the M23 rebel group increased its control in North Kivu and, as of May 2024, is close to the regional capital, Goma. M23 controls many mining activities including one of the world's largest coltan mines which is a crucial resource for modern electronics, receiving substantial support from Rwanda, including troops and arms.<sup>19</sup> The conflict in the DRC receives scant international attention. After 14 years MONUSCO, the world's largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission, will be leaving the DRC. The mandate was cancelled by the DRC government due to perceived ineffectiveness. It will be replaced by troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC).<sup>20</sup>

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which had been ongoing since at least 1991, culminated swiftly in September 2023. Azerbaijan launched a successful military offensive that resulted in about 200 deaths before the unilateral surrender declaration by the leaders of Artsakh, the Armenian name for Karabakh. The roughly 100,000 Karabakh Armenians residing in the territory promptly fled to Armenia.<sup>21</sup> The conflict received minimal attention as Russia, traditionally active in managing this dispute, showed a disinclination to enforce peace agreements despite having peacekeepers on the ground. Russia's focus has

shifted toward fostering closer ties with Azerbaijan, which has helped it evade sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine.<sup>22</sup> Meanwhile, European powers, seeking oil and gas alternatives to Russian supplies from Azerbaijan, and a preoccupied US have been unable to provide effective intervention.<sup>23</sup>

Elsewhere, ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Haiti persist with minimal prospects for resolution and potential for significant escalation. These lower-profile conflicts suffer from a global lack of appetite for intervention or significant measures to end them. Additionally, diplomatic attention is limited, with efforts being diverted elsewhere. These limitations mean that conflicts may last longer, with increased costs in lives and economic damage. Furthermore, humanitarian aid is particularly strained as governments, grappling with inflationary pressures, are reluctant to commit additional funds to foreign aid despite the growing needs.

These shifts in the geopolitical landscape, the increased number of unresolved conflicts, combined with the limited bandwidth of the international community means that some well-known conflicts are likely to receive the bulk of aid and attention, while less publicised crises receive much less attention and aid than is required. The potential implications of these limitations are profound, as the global conflict management capacity continues to be tested by the immediate urgencies of crises in Europe and the Middle East.



# Technology and Asymmetric Warfare

Another key factor that is reshaping conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the impact of technology on asymmetric warfare. While asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon, it has evolved significantly over the last 30 years, driven by technological advancements, globalisation, and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Asymmetric warfare generally involves weaker parties employing unconventional strategies to avoid conventional military engagements with a superior force that would likely lead to defeat. Instead, tactics such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, cyber-attacks, and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are utilised to deadly effect, making it more costly and difficult for the stronger power to win.


There have been many conflicts in the past 25 years where asymmetric warfare has been prominent. Notable examples include the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, where groups like the Taliban and ISIL have leveraged asymmetric tactics against conventional forces. Similar strategies are evident in civil wars in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where rebel groups use challenging terrain to their advantage. Additionally, the rise of cyber warfare has seen state and non-state actors engage in hacking and information operations to influence elections, steal intellectual property, and disrupt critical infrastructure.

The biggest change in asymmetric warfare in the past few years has been the increasing prominence of new technologies. While many advanced weapons systems remain the domain of state actors, there is a growing proliferation of technologies like drones that can be used for both lethal purposes and intelligence gathering. Notable recent instances include both Russian and Ukrainian use, and Houthi use against shipping.

The growth in the use of drones by both state and non-state actors is shown in Figure 4.8. Between 2018 and 2023 the number of states using drones rose from 16 to 40, a 150 per cent increase. However, over the same period the number of non-state groups who committed at least one drone attack rose from six to 91, an increase of over 1,400 per cent. The most prominent use of drones by non-state groups has been in Myanmar, where a large number of small rebel groups have used cheap drones in combat against the far better equipped military junta.<sup>24</sup> Many of these rebel groups had little formal technological training, instead relying on instructions found or crowdsourced online and parts ordered from neighbouring China.<sup>25</sup>

FIGURE 4.8  
**Use of drones by group type, 2018–2023**

Use of drones by both states and non-state groups has expanded dramatically.




Source: ACLED; IEP Calculations

The increase in the usage of drones by both state and non-state actors is reflected in the increase in the number of drone strikes and fatalities from drone strikes, shown in Figure 4.9. In 2023 there were over 3,000 deaths from drone strikes, or just under two per cent of all battle deaths, an increase of 168 per cent since 2018. The rise in the number of drone strikes has been even more dramatic, with 4,957 strikes recorded in 2023, up from just 421 in 2018.

FIGURE 4.9

### Drone strikes and fatalities, 2018–2023

Drone strikes have increased by over 1,000 per cent over the past five years.



Source: ACLED; IEP Calculations

The most striking example of the use of drones by a state actor in the last year occurred in the conflict in Ukraine. In 2023 just under eight per cent of all deaths from drone strikes and 30 per cent of total strikes occurred in the conflict in Ukraine. Drones have also been used in non-combat roles, with some estimates suggesting that Ukraine loses about 10,000 drones a month.<sup>26</sup> It is currently on track to produce over a million drones this year and pioneered a drone warfare military branch in 2024.<sup>27</sup> The primary use of drones has been in surveillance, reconnaissance, and documentation, with a significant role in psychological warfare, seen in Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure which demonstrate Ukraine's capacity to target Russian territory directly.

Naval drones have also played a distinct role, particularly in offensive operations against Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. For instance, naval drones were reported to have damaged military vessels in Sevastopol's port in October 2022 and struck the Kerch bridge in July 2023.<sup>28</sup> Further attacks in 2024 saw the sinking of the Russian missile ship *Ivanovets* and the patrol ship *Sergey Kotov* by naval drones.<sup>29</sup> These actions highlight the strategic use of naval drones to counter Russian naval superiority and pose risks to Russian assets in operational zones like Crimea.

Despite the clear role of drones in the conflict in Ukraine, the overall impact should be put into perspective. Less than 400 deaths in the conflict have been attributed to drone strikes. While drones are increasingly playing a significant role in conflicts like Ukraine and Myanmar, they are not yet at the point where they can decisively shift the balance in the conflict. Current air defence systems largely remain effective at detecting and neutralising drone threats, tempering the potential military advantage they might otherwise offer.<sup>30</sup> However, as both technology and tactics involving drones are evolving rapidly, it is highly likely that the usage of drones in conflict will continue to increase in the near future. In the medium term, their intelligence-gathering and surveillance value may reduce information asymmetries previously dominated by more powerful conflict actors.

# 5

## The Halo framework: A systems-based approach to analysing societies

One of the emerging areas of research in IEP is the application of systems thinking to help explain the way societies function. Halo is the term used to describe this body of work. Positive Peace fits within this body of work.

As with other social phenomena, peace arises out of the dynamic interaction of a wide array of societal forces and patterns of collective behaviour. Both measuring and building peace necessitate an approach that explains the complex interplay of these social dynamics. Because of this, IEP is increasingly engaged in advancing its analytic work in the domain of systems thinking, specifically through the Halo framework.

IEP's work on Halo flows from its longstanding work in Positive Peace and systems thinking. Positive Peace is a concept that originated in the quantitative analysis of the factors that create peaceful societies and then developed into a broader framework for societal advancement. Positive Peace contrasts with negative peace, which focuses on the outward manifestations of violence.

Positive Peace and Halo are complementary but have different uses for understanding and applying systems thinking to societal challenges. Positive Peace provides a practical approach to measuring and understanding the strength and resilience of a system, its momentum, as well as providing an actionable approach to systemic change. Halo provides the theoretical understanding of how societal systems operate and how to map and model system dynamics over time and under different conditions. For a more complete understanding of the relationship between Positive Peace and Halo, refer to IEP's *Halo, Positive Peace and Systems Thinking* report.



# What is Systems Thinking?

Systems thinking represents a potent framework for analysing complex phenomena, offering a means to understand the networks of relationships within systems. Derived from the study of biological, ecological, and mechanical systems, the approach has been employed in fields ranging from business management to public health, from manufacturing logistics to urban planning, though for social systems, systems thinking is still in its early stages of development.

The strength of systems thinking lies in its capacity to reveal patterns, interdependencies, and feedback loops, and thereby model outcomes based on systemic interactions. It offers a particularly useful approach for understanding how changes in one part of a system can have flow-on effects throughout the system, allowing for better decision-making and policymaking.

This is facilitated by understanding that such systems have momentum and direction. They can be described as moving in virtuous or vicious cycles, with stimuli and shocks having cascading effects, and social feedback loops amplifying the drivers of either progression or deterioration. By recognising the dynamics that lock systems into such cycles, the cycles can be redirected, either through small-scale nudges or larger-scale reforms, to produce better social outcomes.

Systems thinking is central to IEP's conception of Halo and Positive Peace. It represents a holistic approach to understanding and solving complex problems by assessing them in terms of interconnected wholes, rather than breaking them down into isolated components. It is a way of analysing the world which entails focusing on the connections between the relationships, and flows of the components of the system, to understand the dynamics of the whole.

## WHAT IS HALO?

Recognising the great promise of systems thinking, IEP is dedicated to advancing this approach in the analysis of societal systems. IEP employs the term Halo in reference to its efforts to apply systems thinking across a wide range of projects and analyses. The term Halo is used to capture the ways in which a systems-based approach encircles and illuminates IEP's body of work on the functioning of societies, particularly in relation to the analysis of peacefulness, development, and societal resilience. Central to the Halo approach is the mapping of human systems, with the view of discovering their dynamic evolution and developing a practical approach to defining change.

Much in the same way that the operations of the human body cannot be perceived directly, but rather through measurements such as heart rate, temperature, and blood pressure, the operations of societies also cannot be perceived directly. Therefore, the word Halo was selected to indicate that the data and values that emanate from a societal system shed light on its underlying functioning.

To date, there are few holistic frameworks that explain how societal systems operate, and fewer that can be implemented. Halo helps fill this gap, providing a unique and practical theory of social change. With Halo, IEP draws on its robust experience in employing data to measure multifaceted social dynamics to bolster the evidence base for social systems analysis.

## THE HALO PROCESS

In addition to this broad conception of Halo, IEP has also developed the *Halo process* as a methodology to map and assess the functioning of specific systems within societies. Drawing on the direct knowledge of stakeholders from within these systems, as well as available quantitative data on the systems, the Halo process combines workshopping and computer-based modelling to evaluate system dynamics, with the view of testing assumptions, potential interventions, and resilience to changes.

The Halo process has been designed to be both practicable and comprehensive, allowing for the modelling and analysis of the behaviours and processes of specific components and subsystems, while ultimately focusing on the overarching dynamics of the totality of a system. The process takes a building block approach, which enables users to mix and match different steps depending on their preferences, the type of analysis being undertaken, and the level of detail it requires.

One of the challenges with most approaches to analysing systems, is that they are resource intensive, and present difficulties in rendering actionable insights. Therefore, rather than studying complex systems in their entirety, researchers and stakeholders often seek to assess or address the dynamics of specific components. While breaking down and evaluating systems based on their parts can make analysis more manageable and exact, such an approach can also result in a fragmented perspective. This approach may obscure the true drivers and outcomes as well as unintended flow-on effects of potential interventions. The Halo approach, combined with Positive Peace, therefore aims to produce insights and relevant interventions that consider of the entirety of a system.

The process involves mapping and gathering data, through which a system's interactions and flows are captured, simulated, and probed using a combination of stakeholder analysis and systems dynamics software. This process allows for the identification of the factors that create stability, or instability, within societal systems.

The strength of the Halo process is that it brings together and harmonises five key pathways to achieving a better understanding of social systems and to finding solutions to problems within them:

- 1. Identification:** The process begins by clearly defining the question that the analysis will aim to answer, without which the process can become too wide ranging, leading to over-complication and the inability to produce practical outcomes.
- 2. Deliberation:** Drawing on stakeholders' direct knowledge of a system, the process is grounded in a structured exercise of collective reflection and mapping of the boundaries, key

components, and connections within the system. This includes the identification of subsystems within it.

3. **Theory:** Deliberations are guided by the Halo conceptualisation of how societal systems function and operate.
4. **Numbers:** Before and during the deliberative process, hard data and informed best estimates are generated about the stocks, flows, and conditional relationships within a system.
5. **Modelling:** Based on the system mapping and figures settled on during theory-guided deliberations, the techniques of system dynamics modelling are employed to test assumptions, refine understanding of the relationships within the system, and simulate the impacts of potential interventions and unforeseen shocks.

In view of the depth of complexity and inherent unpredictability of human societies, IEP understands the limitations in extracting hard or immutable *facts* from social analysis of this kind. Therefore, its principal objective with Halo is to understand the key relationships that foster societal wellbeing, and to glean actionable *insights* for the construction of more prosperous, resilient and peaceful societies.

## CONCEPTUAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

This section represents a summary of the key conceptual building blocks for engaging in the Halo process. It provides short definitions and explanations of constructs and ideas from systems thinking necessary to develop a schematic representation or model of a societal system within the Halo framework. For examples of how to use Halo to perform a systems mapping exercise, refer to the *Halo, Positive Peace and Systems Thinking* report.

### System Bounds

Systems have boundaries that define their scope and limits. These boundaries can be physical, as in the case of countries or ecosystems, or non-physical, as in the case of social systems like education or healthcare systems. Clearly defining boundaries facilitates an understanding of what the system includes and what it excludes, clarifying the scope of the analysis.

### Subsystems

Subsystems are integral parts of larger systems, contributing to their overall functioning and stability. For example, states within a nation and education systems within states, are subsystems. Identifying a system's core subsystems is essential for understanding the larger system's dynamics. Evaluating subsystems involves assessing their composition, purposes, and frameworks.

### Interrelated Systems

Systems interact with other systems in various ways, creating complex networks of dependencies. For instance, a country's military, police, and judiciary work together to maintain order. Similarly, educational institutions interact with families and government bodies to achieve goals. Recognising these interactions is crucial for understanding overall system dynamics. Effective analysis must account for these interdependencies.

## Direction or Momentum within a System

Momentum in a system refers to the direction and pace of changes within it, influenced by factors like growth and feedback loops. Assessing momentum involves analysing trends over time to predict future states. Comparing a system's momentum with neighbouring or comparable systems can give insight into a system's particular trajectory. Understanding momentum is crucial for forecasting developments and designing interventions.

### Path Dependencies

Path dependency means that a system's future is influenced by its past decisions, actions, and cultural values. This concept highlights how historical events shape current structures and limit future options, at times even locking a system into particular trajectories. Understanding path dependency helps in the identification of constraints and opportunities within a system. It underscores the importance of considering long-term impacts when making decisions.

### Encoded Norms

Encoded norms are formal and informal rules governing behaviour within a system, establishing tolerance thresholds for different internal and external stimuli. Encoded norms may be codified in laws or regulations, or they may be expressed through prevailing social practices. Understanding encoded norms is crucial for identifying mechanisms that maintain system stability. They guide responses to deviations, helping the system return to a steady state.

### Homeostasis States

Homeostasis refers to a system's ability to maintain stability despite external changes. This steady state involves minimal fluctuations in components, stocks, and flows. Encoded norms play a key role by defining acceptable boundaries and corrective actions. Systems can experience growth or stagnation within their homeostasis states. Understanding these states is essential for managing stability and promoting sustainable development.

### Feedback Loops

Feedback loops are mechanisms where the output of a process feeds back into the system as an input, influencing future behaviour. There are two types: reinforcing loops, which amplify changes and lead to exponential growth or decline, and balancing loops, which counteract changes to maintain stability. Understanding feedback loops is essential for analysing system behaviour and designing effective interventions.

### Tipping Points

Tipping points are thresholds where small changes can lead to significant, often irreversible shifts in a system's state. These points can result in rapid and dramatic changes. Identifying tipping points helps anticipate potential crises or opportunities for transformation. Predicting when a system will reach a tipping point is challenging, but understanding past tipping points provides insights. Tipping points can lead to positive or negative outcomes, influencing resilience and stability.



## System Resilience and Adaptability

System resilience is the ability to absorb shocks and maintain function, while adaptability is the capacity to proactively adjust to changing conditions. Resilient systems feature redundancy, flexibility, and self-organisation, allowing them to recover from disruptions. Adaptable systems continuously evolve, using changes as opportunities for improvement. Measuring resilience and adaptability involves analysing past recoveries and current flexibility. Both concepts are crucial for ensuring sustainability and effective response to challenges.

## Efficiency and Redundancy

Efficiency means achieving maximum output with minimal resources, while redundancy involves having extra capacity or back-up components. Efficient systems are cost-effective but may be vulnerable to disruptions. Systems with redundant elements, though less efficient, are more resilient to shocks and failures. Balancing efficiency and redundancy are essential for maintaining stability and competitiveness.

## Money Flows

Money flows refer to the movement of financial resources within a system, shaping behaviours and power dynamics. Analysing money flows helps identify key decision-makers, relationships, and potential imbalances within the system, including how financial resources are distributed and controlled. In a national economy, money flows between households, businesses, and government sectors are crucial, revealing the system's economic health and highlighting areas for intervention.

## Functioning and Potential

System functioning refers to the dynamic processes, interactions, and behaviours shaping a system's operation. It captures how components work together to achieve common goals, emphasising interdependencies and feedback loops. System potential describes how functioning could be altered with a change of inputs or a modification of goals. As such, it expresses a system's capacity for either future enhancement or future degradation. Recognising both functioning and potential helps identify areas for enhancement or risk, supporting strategic planning and effective intervention design.

## System Purpose and Intent

System purpose refers to what a system is meant to achieve, often outlined explicitly, such as a business's goal to be profitable. System intent refers to the underlying motivations, objectives, or values that may not be explicitly stated, but are inferred from the system's observed behaviour and patterns of action. The two often overlap substantially, and in highly congruent systems it can be difficult to distinguish one from the other. Understanding both helps reveal true priorities and potential tensions within a system. Analysing purpose and intent provides a comprehensive view of system dynamics and guides decision-making.

## Non-Linearity

Non-linearity in systems refers to the idea that small changes can lead to disproportionately large effects, or vice versa, making the system's behaviour unpredictable and complex. This characteristic is often due to feedback loops, where the output

of a process influences the input in a way that amplifies or dampens effects. Non-linearity means that simple cause-and-effect analysis is insufficient, and understanding the system requires considering the interactions and feedback within the whole system.

## Causality in Systems

Identifying causality in systems involves understanding how influences and feedback loops bring about complex and sometimes unexpected reactions. Unlike linear cause-and-effect, the causes of behaviours in systems can usually be traced to multiple drivers and complex internal dynamics. This approach helps reveal key points for intervention and areas of mutual reinforcement. Understanding causality in systems provides deeper insights into agency, relationships, and feedback mechanisms. It supports more effective and holistic problem-solving and system improvement.

## Stocks, Flows, and Transformations

Stocks are the elements within a system that can be seen, counted, or measured, such as water in a reservoir, money in a bank account, or the population of a city. Flows are the rates at which stocks change over time, representing the movement of resources into or out of the stocks, like water flowing into or out of a reservoir or money being deposited or withdrawn. Transformations refer to the processes that convert inputs into outputs, altering the state of stocks or flows within the system, such as chemical reactions, production processes, or the conversion of raw materials into finished goods. These components interact dynamically, influencing the behaviour and outcomes of the entire system. Analysing stocks, flows, and transformations helps understand system dynamics, stability, and potential for growth or decline.

## Emergent Properties

Emergent properties are characteristics or behaviours that arise from the interactions and relationships between the components of a system, rather than from the individual components themselves. These properties are not predictable by analysing the parts in isolation, and only become apparent when viewing the system as a whole. For example, the behaviour of an ant colony or city traffic patterns cannot be understood by looking at an individual ant or car. Emergent properties demonstrate the complexity and interconnectedness of systems, highlighting that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

## Attractor Planes

Attractor planes are stable states toward which systems naturally gravitate. They represent the states or patterns towards which a system tends to evolve over time. They can be points, cycles, or more complex structures, reflecting stable configurations or recurring patterns. As conceptual models, they help reveal how systems can settle into particular behaviours, revealing recurring trends amid apparent unpredictability. They illustrate how, despite variability and initial differences, systems often converge towards certain typical behaviours or outcomes. In social contexts, attractor planes may reflect virtuous or vicious cycles into which societies can become trapped.

## Archetypes

Archetypes are patterns of behaviour that recur across different systems due to their underlying structures. These archetypes help in understanding and diagnosing common systemic issues, providing insight into how and why certain behaviours emerge. Examples include "limits to growth", where exponential growth is halted by constraints, and "shifting the burden", where short-term fixes undermine long-term solutions. By recognising these archetypes, one can better predict potential problems and design more effective interventions.

## Static and Dynamic Modelling

Static modelling provides a snapshot of a system at a specific point in time, useful for initial analysis. Dynamic modelling examines changes and interactions over time, offering deeper insights into behaviour. Dynamic models require time-series data and often use simulation software for analysis. Both types of modelling are valuable, with dynamic models providing comprehensive understanding and scenario planning. Effective system analysis often involves using both approaches.

## Analysis through Positive Peace

Positive Peace offers a holistic framework for analysing system health, focusing on factors contributing to long-term stability and resilience. It includes aspects like good governance, equitable resource distribution, and social cohesion. Using Positive Peace in system analysis helps identify strengths and weaknesses across dimensions. This approach supports comprehensive interventions and promotes sustainable development. Positive Peace provides a robust method for assessing and enhancing resilience and adaptability.

## Gathering the Relevant Data on the System

Gathering relevant data is crucial for understanding and analysing a system, particularly in carrying out dynamic modelling of a system. The availability and quality of data determine the depth and accuracy of the analysis. In some cases, data may be abundant and easily accessible, while in others, it may be sparse or require estimation through proxies or expert assessments. Identifying data-rich areas can highlight important subsystems and guide further investigation. A thorough and iterative process of data collection ensures gaps are addressed and insights are comprehensive.

## SAMPLE APPLICATION OF THE HALO PROCESS

This section sets out a practical application of the Halo process: the analysis of the criminal justice system of an Australian state. The framing question that the group posed was whether the criminal justice system was adequately resourced.

The project began with a multi-day pre-modelling workshop. In anticipation of the workshop, available crime, criminal court, and criminal detention statistics were collected and used to inform discussions on the stocks and flows of the system. In cases in which data was unavailable, estimations were made, particularly for values associated with some of the flows, tolerance thresholds, and encoded norms within the system. The steps of the Halo process were followed to build a representation of the central components of the criminal justice system and the conditional relationships within it.

The outcome was a sophisticated dynamic computed-based model focused on mapping the flows of individuals engaged in crime through the criminal justice system and provided a robust decision-making platform to model the flow-on effects of changes in crime rates, the stocks of police officers and prosecutors, and recidivism rates.

A wide array of institutions and actors were discussed, including judges, defence attorneys, prison staff, the media, politicians, police academies, and law schools. While the incorporation of a multitude of actors and subsystems into a model can potentially increase its accuracy and comparability to real-world systems, additional components can also exponentially increase the number of connections and dependencies, making the dynamics of a model much more complex and difficult to interpret. They can also be periphery to the central components of the system and the central research question. Therefore, focusing on the core subsystems within the system can provide a manageable level of complexity. The representation below consists of four interrelated but essential subsystems, comprised a total of 37 dynamic and non-dynamic elements, including stocks, flows, and rates:

- People in the community regularly engaging in crime ("criminals")
- Police officers
- Prosecutors
- Support services (including probation officers and social workers)
- Thirty-two dynamic elements
- Five non-dynamic elements


Following the steps in the Halo process, the workshop participants identified these elements and features of the system: the intent and bounds of the system; the system's key stocks, flows, and subsystems; and the subsystems' purpose and functioning. The movement of criminals through the system became the central focus of the model, while the police force, prosecutors, prison, and support services were treated as the main subsystems. Estimated tolerance thresholds – or encoded norms – were established for each to govern the dynamics of the movement of people in and out of the categories.

Following the workshop phase, the system representation was translated into a computer-based model using a simulation modelling tool. The graphical interface of the model is shown in Figure 5.1.

FIGURE 5.1

**Model of a criminal justice system developed for a simulation modelling tool**

The model contains 32 dynamic variables and five non-dynamic variables.



Source: IEP

The bottom half of Figure 5.1, starting on the right side, shows the movement of criminals through a potential journey of apprehension, prosecution, incarceration, probation, release, and successful reintegration into society, or back to the initial stock of active criminals. The recidivism rate was a dynamic element and adjustments could be made to the components representing the support services, which would impact recidivism rates in the model.


The top half of the model shows the three subsystems of police, prosecutors, and support services, including these subsystems' relationships with criminals on their journey and the dynamics of recruitment and retention within these professions. In the case of police, for example, the model assumes that a larger stock of officers results in a higher rate of criminal apprehension, while a greater prevalence of crime increases the rate at which officers leave the force, based on the idea that the job becomes more stressful. These were dynamic elements of the model.

After the construction of the computer-based model, various scenarios were tested and three were presented during the post-modelling workshop.

**Scenario 1:** First, the model was left to run as initially created, and data on the values of the stocks, flows, and rates across the system were recorded and exported. Depicting the uninterrupted life of the model over several decades (15,000 days), the left side of Figure 5.2 shows the crime rate initially increasing and then steadily declining until bottoming out at around 1,250 crimes per day. This change was largely, though not entirely, driven by changes depicted on the right side of the figure: the stock of police officers climbs from 12,000 to a temporary plateau of 14,000, before rising again and topping out at 16,000 officers, when the rates of entry into and departure from the police force become the same.

FIGURE 5.2

**Crimes per day and stock of police officers under Scenario 1**



Source: IEP

**Scenario 2:** The second scenario introduced a change. In this change, when the stock of active criminals in the community surpassed 100,000, the rate at which people entered the criminal pool jumped up by ten per cent. This greater flow into the stock of criminals drove increases in the prevalence of crime, which in turn drove down police retention. A feedback loop was thus created whereby lower police stocks led to higher criminal stocks, which further drove down police stocks. As a result, the established bounds, or encoded norms, of the model were overwhelmed and the stock of police eventually plummeted, effectively ‘breaking’ the system.

**Scenario 3:** To correct for this issue, another change was introduced in the third scenario: the police retention rate was increased by ten per cent. In this scenario, the higher crime rate was never able to overwhelm the police retention rate. The system was thus able to bring the crime rate down moderately and achieve a new state of stability under the changed conditions.

The real-life implication of a simulation of this kind is that increasing the desirability of continued membership in the police force could ensure that the system is not overwhelmed, even as a heightened crime rate works against police retention. Examples of how this could be achieved include: investment in better working conditions, higher salaries, and stress leave.

# 6 Appendices

## APPENDIX A

# GPI Methodology

Peace is notoriously difficult to define. The simplest way of approaching it is in terms of the harmony achieved by the absence of violence or the fear of violence, which has been described as Negative Peace. Negative Peace is a complement to Positive Peace which is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.

**The GPI was founded by Steve Killelea, an Australian technology entrepreneur and philanthropist. It is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace, a global think tank dedicated to developing metrics to analyse peace and to quantify its economic benefits.**

The GPI measures a country's level of Negative Peace using three domains of peacefulness. The first domain, *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict*, uses six statistical indicators to investigate the extent to which countries are involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as their role and duration of involvement in conflicts.

The second domain evaluates the level of harmony or discord within a nation; eleven indicators broadly assess what might be described as *Societal Safety and Security*. The assertion is that low crime rates, minimal terrorist activity and violent demonstrations, harmonious relations with neighbouring countries, a stable political scene and a small proportion of the population being internally displaced or made refugees can be equated with peacefulness.

Six further indicators are related to a country's *Militarisation*—reflecting the link between a country's level of military build-up and access to weapons and its level of peacefulness, both domestically and internationally. Comparable data on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the number of armed service officers per head are gauged, as are financial contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

## The expert panel

An international panel of independent experts played a key role in establishing the GPI in 2007—in selecting the indicators that best assess a nation's level of peace and in assigning their weightings. The panel has overseen each edition of the GPI; this year, it included:

### **Professor Kevin P. Clements, chairperson**

Foundation Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand

### **Dr. Sabina Alkire**

Director, Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI), University of Oxford, United Kingdom

### **Dr. Ian Anthony**

Research Analyst, Swedish Defence Research Agency

### **Dr. Manuela Mesa**

Director, Centre for Education and Peace Research (CEIPAZ) and President, Spanish Association for Peace Research (AIPAZ), Madrid, Spain

### **Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova**

Head, Unit on Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

# The Indicators

The GPI comprises 23 indicators of the absence of violence or fear of violence. The indicators were originally selected with the assistance of the expert panel in 2007 and have been reviewed by the expert panel on an annual basis. All scores for each indicator are normalised on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones are scored from 1 to 5, to the third decimal point.

## ONGOING DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT



- ▶ **Number and duration of internal conflicts**  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
- ▶ **Number of deaths from external organised conflict**  
UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
- ▶ **Number of deaths from internal organised conflict**  
UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
- ▶ **Number, duration and role in external conflicts**  
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; IEP
- ▶ **Intensity of organised internal conflict**  
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
- ▶ **Relations with neighbouring countries**  
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

## SOCIETAL SAFETY & SECURITY



- ▶ **Level of perceived criminality in society**  
Gallup World Poll, IEP estimates
- ▶ **Number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population**  
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)
- ▶ **Political instability**  
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
- ▶ **Political Terror Scale**  
Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisanò. 2021. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2019. Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: <http://www.politicalerrorscale.org>.
- ▶ **Impact of terrorism**  
IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)
- ▶ **Number of homicides per 100,000 people**  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates
- ▶ **Level of violent crime**  
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
- ▶ **Violent demonstrations**  
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED); IEP
- ▶ **Number of jailed population per 100,000 people**  
World Prison Brief, Institute for Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck, University of London
- ▶ **Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people**  
UNODC CTS
- ▶ **Ease of access to small arms and light weapons**  
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

## MILITARISATION



- ▶ **Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP**  
The Military Balance, IISS, EIU Estimates
- ▶ **Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people**  
The Military Balance, IISS
- ▶ **Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people**  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database
- ▶ **Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people**  
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
- ▶ **Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions**  
United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP
- ▶ **Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities**  
Military Balance+, IISS; IEP

# Methodological Notes

## WEIGHTING THE INDEX

When the GPI was launched in 2007 the advisory panel of independent experts apportioned scores based on the relative importance of each of the indicators on a scale of 1-5. Two sub-component weighted indices were then calculated from the GPI group of indicators:

1. A measure of how internally peaceful a country is;
2. A measure of how externally peaceful a country is (its state of peace beyond its borders).

The overall composite score and index was then formulated by applying a weight of 60 per cent to the measure of internal peace and 40 per cent to external peace. The heavier weight applied to internal peace was agreed upon by the advisory panel, following robust debate. The decision was based on the notion that a greater level of internal peace is likely to lead to, or at least correlate with, lower external conflict. The weights have been reviewed by the advisory panel prior to the compilation of each edition of the GPI.

## MEASURING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE INDEX

- ▶ Robustness is an important concept in composite index analysis. It is a measure of how often rank comparisons from a composite index are still true if the index is calculated using

different weightings. For example, if the GPI is recalculated using a large number of different weighting schemes and Country A ranks higher than Country B in 60 per cent of these recalculations, the statement “Country A is more peaceful than Country B” is considered to be 60 per cent robust.

- ▶ IEP finds that the Global Peace Index (GPI) is at the same level of absolute robustness as the Human Development Index (HDI), a leading measure of development since it was first constructed by the United Nations Development Programme in 1990.
- ▶ Technically, the robustness of the GPI is measured by the fact that 70 per cent of pairwise country comparisons are independent of the weighting scheme chosen. In other words, regardless of the weights attributed to each component of the index, 70 per cent of the time the pairwise comparisons between countries are the same.

The GPI is a composite index of 23 indicators weighted and combined into one overall score. The weighting scheme within any composite index represents the relative importance of each indicator to the overall aim of the measure, in the GPI's case, global peace. To fully understand the representative nature or accuracy of any measure it is necessary to understand how sensitive the results of the index are to the specific weighting scheme used. If the analysis holds true for a large subset of all possible weighting schemes then the results can be called robust. While it is expected that ranks will be

TABLE A.1

## Indicator weights in the GPI

Internal Peace 60% / External Peace 40%

INTERNAL PEACE (Weight 1 to 5)		EXTERNAL PEACE (Weight 1 to 5)	
Perceptions of criminality	3	Military expenditure (% of GDP)	2
Security officers and police rate	3	Armed services personnel rate	2
Homicide rate	4	UN peacekeeping funding	2
Incarceration rate	3	Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities	3
Access to small arms	3	Weapons exports	3
Intensity of internal conflict	5	Refugees and IDPs	4
Violent demonstrations	3	Neighbouring countries relations	5
Violent crime	4	External conflicts fought	2.28
Political instability	4	Deaths from external conflict	5
Political terror	4		
Weapons imports	2		
Terrorism impact	2		
Deaths from internal conflict	5		
Internal conflicts fought	2.56		



sensitive to changes in the weights of any composite index, what is more important in a practical sense is the robustness of country comparisons. One of the core aims of the GPI is to allow for Country A to be compared to Country B. This raises the question that for any two countries, how often is the first ranked more peaceful than the second across the spectrum of weights. The more times that the first country is ranked more peaceful than the second, the more confidence can be invested in the statement “Country A is more peaceful than Country B”.

To avoid the computational issue of evaluating every possible combination of 23 indicators, the robustness of pairwise country comparisons has been estimated using the three GPI domains militarisation, societal safety and security and ongoing conflict. Implementing an accepted methodology for robustness, the GPI is calculated for every weighting combination of three weights from 0 to 1 at 0.01 intervals. For computational expedience only weighting schemes that sum to one are selected, resulting in over 5100 recalculated GPI's. Applying this, it is found that around 70 per cent of all pairwise country comparisons in the GPI are independent of the weighting scheme, i.e. 100 per cent robust. This is a similar level of absolute robustness as the Human Development Index.

#### **QUALITATIVE SCORING: THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT APPROACH**

The EIU's Country Analysis team plays an important role in producing the GPI by scoring five qualitative indicators and filling in data gaps on quantitative indicators when official data is missing. The EIU employs more than 100 full-time country experts and economists, supported by 650 in-country contributors. Analysts generally focus on two or three countries and, in conjunction with local contributors, develop a deep knowledge of a nation's political scene, the performance of its economy and the society in general. Scoring follows a strict process to ensure reliability, consistency and comparability:

1. Individual country analysts score qualitative indicators based on a scoring methodology and using a digital platform;
2. Regional directors use the digital platform to check scores across the region; through the platform they can see how individual countries fare against each other and evaluate qualitative assessments behind proposed score revisions;
3. Indicator scores are checked by the EIU's Custom Research team (which has responsibility for the GPI) to ensure global comparability;
4. If an indicator score is found to be questionable, the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional director and country analyst discuss and make a judgment on the score;
5. Scores are assessed by the external advisory panel before finalising the GPI;
6. If the expert panel finds an indicator score to be questionable, the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional director and country analyst discuss and make a final judgment on the score, which is then discussed in turn with the advisory panel.

Because of the large scope of the GPI, occasionally data for quantitative indicators do not extend to all nations. In this case, country analysts are asked to suggest an alternative data source or provide an estimate to fill any gap. This score is checked by Regional Directors to ensure reliability and consistency within the region, and by the Custom Research team to ensure global comparability. Again, indicators are assessed by the external advisory panel before finalisation.

## APPENDIX B

# GPI Indicator Sources, Definitions & Scoring Criteria

The information below details the sources, definitions, and scoring criteria of the 23 indicators that form the Global Peace Index. All scores for each indicator are banded or normalised on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones scored continuously from 1 to 5 at the third decimal place. The Economist Intelligence Unit has provided imputed estimates in the rare event there are gaps in the quantitative data.

## INTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

### Level of Perceived Criminality in Society

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	Gallup World Poll
Measurement period	2023

**Definition:** This indicator uses a question from the Gallup World Poll as the basis for perceptions of criminality. The exact wording of the question is: "Do you feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where you live?" IEP calculates the indicator score based on the percentage of people who answer 'no' to this question.

Where data is not available, IEP uses multivariate imputation by chained equations to create country-level estimates.

#### Scoring Bands:

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-19.9%	20-39.9%	40-59.9%	60-79.9%	> 80%

### Number of Internal Security Officers and Police per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
Measurement period	2018-2019

**Alternative Source:** EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU's analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set bands of the actual data.

**Definition:** This indicator is sourced from the UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and refers to the civil police force. Police refers to personnel in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders. It is distinct from national guards or local militia.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-199.8	199.9-399.8	399.9-599.8	599.9-799.8	> 799.9

### Number of Homicides per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
Measurement period	2022

**Alternative Source:** EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU's analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set bands of the actual data.

**Definition:** This indicator comes from the UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. Intentional homicide refers to death deliberately inflicted on a person by another person, including infanticide. The figures refer to the total number of penal code offences or their equivalent, but exclude minor road traffic and other petty offences, brought to the attention of the police or other law enforcement agencies and recorded by one of those agencies.

## Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-1.99	2-5.99	6-9.99	10-19.99	> 20

## Number of Jailed Population per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	Institute for Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck, University of London, World Prison Brief
Measurement period	2023

**Definition:** Figures are from the Institute for Criminal Policy Research and are compiled from a variety of sources. In almost all cases the original source is the national prison administration of the country concerned, or else the Ministry responsible for the prison administration. Prison population rates per 100,000 people are based on estimates of the national population. In order to compare prison population rates, and to estimate the number of persons held in prison in the countries for which information is not available, median rates have been used by the Institute for Criminal Policy Research to minimise the effect of countries with rates that are untypically high or low. Indeed, comparability can be compromised by different practice in different countries, for example with regard to pre-trial detainees and juveniles, but also psychiatrically ill offenders and offenders being detained for treatment for alcoholism and drug addiction.

## Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-126.405	126.406-252.811	252.812-379.217	379.218-505.624	>505.625

**Additional Notes:** The data provided by the Institute for Criminal Policy Research are not annual averages but indicate the number of jailed population per 100,000 inhabitants in a particular month during the year. The year and month may differ from country to country.

## Ease of Access to Small Arms and Light Weapons

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	March 2023 to March 2024

**Definition:** Assessment of the accessibility of small arms and light weapons (SALW), ranked from 1-5 (very limited access to very easy access) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period from March to March.

## Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = Very limited access:** The country has developed policy instruments and best practices, such as firearm licences, strengthening of export controls, codes of conduct, firearms or ammunition marking.
- 2 = Limited access:** The regulation implies that it is difficult, time-consuming and costly to obtain firearms; domestic firearms regulation also reduces the ease with which legal arms are diverted to illicit markets.
- 3 = Moderate access:** There are regulations and commitment to ensure controls on civilian possession of firearms, although inadequate controls are not sufficient to stem the flow of illegal weapons.
- 4 = Easy access:** There are basic regulations, but they are not effectively enforced; obtaining firearms is straightforward.
- 5 = Very easy access:** There is no regulation of civilian possession, ownership, storage, carriage and use of firearms.

## Intensity of Organised Internal Conflict

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	6.3%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	March 2023 to March 2024

**Definition:** Assessment of the intensity of conflicts within the country, ranked from 1-5 (no conflict to severe crisis) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

## Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = No conflict.**
- 2 = Latent conflict:** Positional differences over definable values of national importance.
- 3 = Manifest conflict:** Explicit threats of violence; imposition of economic sanctions by other countries.
- 4 = Crisis:** A tense situation across most of the country; at least one group uses violent force in sporadic incidents.
- 5 = Severe crisis:** Civil war; violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organised and systematic way throughout the country.

## Violent Demonstrations

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	ACLED
Measurement period	March 2023 to March 2024

**Definition:** The indicator reflects the number and severity of violent demonstrations in a country for a given year. Scores vary from 1 to 5, with values close to 1 representing infrequent violent demonstrations and scores close to 5 representing frequent demonstrations with high numbers of fatalities. The data includes four types of events as classified by ACLED: "Protest with intervention" (weighted at 1), "Excessive force against protesters" (weight 2), "Violent demonstration" (weight 3), and "Mob violence" (weight 4). Note that this set of event types means that the indicator includes violent

protests, riots etc, but also protests that were originally peaceful but were repressed violently by security forces. For each type of event the number of incidents and the number of fatalities are calculated. Fatalities are weighted more heavily than the number of incidents, as a gauge of incident severity. Where ACLED data are not available a transformation was used to adapt raw data from the Cross National Time Series (CNTS) data for imputation.

**Score interpretation guidance**

1/5	Very rare incidents of violent demonstrations, protests are almost all peaceful.
2/5	A few violent protests, mostly without fatalities.
3/5	A few violent protests or protests repressed violently by security forces. Some fatalities.
4/5	Frequent protests with violence, with a material number of fatalities.
5/5	Large number of protests with large number of fatalities. Number of incidents and fatalities are large by international and historical standards.

**Level of Violent Crime**

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	March 2023 to March 2024

**Definition:** Assessment of the likelihood of violent crime ranked from 1 to 5 (very low to very high) by the EIU’s Country Analysis team based on the question, “Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem for government and/or business over the next two years?” Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis.

**Scoring Criteria**

*“Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem for government and/or business over the next two years?”*

1/5	Strongly no
2/5	No
3/5	Somewhat of a problem
4/5	Yes
5/5	Strongly yes

**Political Instability**

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	March 2023 to March 2024

**Definition:** Assessment of political instability ranked from 0 to 100 (very low to very high instability) by the EIU’s Country

Analysis team, based on five questions. This indicator aggregates five other questions on social unrest, orderly transfers, opposition stance, excessive executive authority and an international tension sub-index. Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis.

**Specific Questions:**

- What is the risk of significant social unrest during the next two years?
- How clear, established and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?
- How likely is it that an opposition party or group will come to power and cause a significant deterioration in business operating conditions?
- Is excessive power concentrated or likely to be concentrated in the executive so that executive authority lacks accountability and possesses excessive discretion?
- Is there a risk that international disputes/tensions will negatively affect the economy and/or polity?

**Scoring Bands**

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–20.4	20.5–40.4	40.5–60.4	60.5–80.4	80.5–100

**Political Terror Scale**

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisanò. 2018. The Political Terror Scale 2022. Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: <a href="http://www.politicalterror scale.org">http://www.politicalterror scale.org</a> .
Measurement period	2022

**Definition:** The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a given year based on a 5-level “terror scale” originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The average of the two scores is taken.

**Scoring Criteria**

- 1 = Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
- 2 = There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
- 3 = There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
- 4 = Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large

numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

- 5 = Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

### Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons, as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people

Indicator type	
Quantitative	
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.5%
Data source	SIPRI Arms Transfers
Database	
Measurement period	2019–2023

**Definition:** Measures the total volume of major conventional weapons imported by a country between 2019 and 2023, divided by the average population in this time period at the 100,000 people level (population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts of major conventional weapons and the technology necessary for their production. The transfer equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force or international organisation to another country, rebel force or international organisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships, engines. SIPRI uses a unique pricing system, the Trend Indicator Value (TIV) that measures military capability. The indicator raw value is measured as TIV per 100,000 population.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-7.233	7.234-14.468	14.469-21.702	21.703-28.936	>28.937

### Impact of Terrorism

Indicator type	
Quantitative	
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.5%
Data source	IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)
Measurement period	2019–2024

**Definition:** Terrorist incidents are defined as “intentional acts of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.” This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

- The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence, including property violence as well as violence against people.
- The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national

actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

For all incidents listed, at least two of the following three criteria must be present:

- The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
- There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
- The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

**Methodology:** Using the comprehensive, event-based Terrorism Tracker, the GTI combines four variables to develop a composite score: the number of terrorist incidents in a given year, the total number of fatalities in a given year, the total number of injuries caused in a given year and the approximate level of property damage in a given year. The composite score captures the direct effects of terrorist-related violence, in terms of its physical effect, but also attempts to reflect the residual effects of terrorism in terms of emotional wounds and fear by attributing a weighted average to the damage inflicted in previous years. To assess the impact of terrorism between this date and March 2022 cutoff, IEP uses data from publicly available third party sources to estimate terrorist activity in that period.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-13.479	13.48-181.699	181.7-2,449.309	2,449.31-33,015.949	>33,015.95

### Number Of Deaths From Organised Internal Conflict

Indicator type	
Quantitative	
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	6.3%
Data source	UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
Measurement period	2023

**Definition:** This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict. UCDP defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.”

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–23 deaths	24–998 deaths	999–4,998 deaths	4,999–9,998 deaths	> 9,999 deaths

### Internal Conflicts Fought

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2.56
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.2%
Data sources	IEP; UCDP Battle-UCDP Georeferenced Events Dataset
Measurement period	2019–2023

**Definition:** This indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a specific country’s legal boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding the scores for all individual conflicts which have occurred within that country’s legal boundaries over the last five years.

Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:

**Number:**

- The number of interstate armed conflicts, internal armed conflict (civil conflicts), internationalised internal armed conflicts, one-sided conflict and non-state conflict located within a country’s legal boundaries.
- If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths) it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25-999 battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.

**Duration:**

- A score is assigned based on the number of years out of the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will receive a score of one out of five.

The cumulative conflict scores are then added and banded to establish a country’s score. This indicator is two years lagging due to when the UCDP data is released.

**Scoring Bands**

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
No internal conflict	Combined conflict score of up to 4.75	Combined conflict score of up to 9.5	Combined conflict score of up to 14.25	A combined conflict score of 19 or above. This shows very high levels of internal conflict.

## EXTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

### Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance+
Measurement period	2023

**Alternative Source:** When no data was provided, several alternative sources were used: National Public Expenditure Accounts, SIPRI information and the Military Balance.

**Definition:** Cash outlays of central or federal government to meet the costs of national armed forces—including strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces as well as paramilitary forces, customs forces and border guards if these are trained and equipped as a military force. Published EIU data on nominal GDP (or the World Bank when unavailable) was used to arrive at the value of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

**Scoring Criteria:** This indicator is scored using a min-max normalisation. Applying this method, a country’s score is based on the distance of its military expenditure as a share of GDP from the benchmarks of 0% (for a score of 1) and 8.37% or above (for a score of 5). The bands, while linear, approximately conform as follows:

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-2.092	2.093-4.184	4.185-6.277	6.278-8.37	>8.371

### Number of Armed Services Personnel per 100,000 people

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance+
Measurement period	2023

**Alternative Source:** World Bank population data used if unavailable from the EIU.

**Definition:** Active armed services personnel comprise all service men and women on full-time duty in the army, navy, air force and joint forces (including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves). Population data provided by the EIU.

**Scoring Bands**

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-657.744	657.745-1,315.489	1,315.49-1,973.234	1,973.235-2,630.98	>2,630.981

**Additional Notes:** The Israeli reservist force is used to calculate Israel’s number of armed services personnel.

### Financial Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	IEP; United Nations Committee on Contributions
Measurement period	2020–2022

**Methodology:** The UNFU indicator measures whether UN member countries meet their UN peacekeeping funding

commitments. Although countries may fund other programs in development or peacebuilding, the records on peacekeeping are easy to obtain and understand and provide an instructive measure of a country's commitment to peace. The indicator calculates the percentage of countries' "outstanding payments versus their annual assessment to the budget of the current peacekeeping missions" over an average of three years. This ratio is derived from data provided by the United Nations Committee on Contributions Status reports. The indicator is compiled as follows:

1. The status of contributions by UN member states is obtained.
2. For the relevant peacekeeping missions, the assessments (for that year only) and the collections (for that year only) are recorded. From this, the outstanding amount is calculated for that year.
3. The ratio of outstanding payments to assessments is calculated. By doing so a score between 0 and 1 is obtained. Zero indicates no money is owed; a country has met their funding commitments. A score of 1 indicates that a country has not paid any of their assessed contributions. Given that the scores already fall between 0 and 1, they are easily banded into a score between 1 and 5. The final banded score is a weighted sum of the current year and the previous two years. The weightings are 0.5 for the current year, 0.3 for the previous year and 0.2 for two years prior. Hence it is a three-year weighted average.
4. Outstanding payments from previous years and credits are not included. The scoring is linear to one decimal place.

#### Scoring Criteria

1/5	0–25% of stated contributions owed
2/5	26–50% of stated contributions owed
3/5	51–75% of stated contributions owed
4/5	75–99% of stated contributions owed
5/5	100% of stated contributions owed (no contributions made in past three years)

**Additional Notes:** All United Nations member states share the costs of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative economic wealth of member states, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	4.2%
Data source	IISS Military Balance+
Measurement period	2023

**Methodology:** This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups.

The scoring system incorporates armoured vehicles, artillery, tanks, combat aircraft and combat helicopters, warships, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. It takes into account military sophistication, weapons technology, and combat readiness.

Countries with nuclear capabilities automatically receive the maximum score of five. Other scores are expressed to the second decimal point, adopting a min-max normalisation that sets the max at two standard deviations above the average raw score.

1/5	Nil–18,185
2/5	18,185–36,368
3/5	36,368–54,553
4/5	54,553–72,737
5/5	States with nuclear capability receive a 5, or states with heavy weapons capability of 72,738 or in the top 2% of heavy weapons receive a 5.

#### Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons as Supplier (Exports) per 100,000 people

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	4.2%
Data source	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Measurement period	2019–2023

**Definition:** Measures the total volume of major conventional weapons exported by a country between 2019 and 2023 divided by the average population during this time period (population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts of major conventional weapons and the technology necessary for the production of them. The transfer equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force or international organisation to another country, rebel force or international organisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships and engines. SIPRI uses a unique pricing system, the Trend Indicator Value (TIV) that measures military capability. The indicator raw value is measured as TIV per 100,000 population.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-3.681	3.682-7.364	7.365-11.046	11.047-14.729	>14.73

## Number of Refugees and Internally Displaced People as a Percentage of the Population

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5.7%
Data source	UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2023; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)
Measurement period	2023

**Definition:** Refugee population by country or territory of origin plus the number of a country's internally displaced people (IDPs), as a percentage of the country's total population.

### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-3.034	3.035-6.069	6.07-9.104	9.105-12.139	>12.14

## Relations with Neighbouring Countries

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	7.1%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	March 2023 to March 2024

**Definition:** Assessment of the intensity of contentiousness of neighbours, ranked from 1-5 (peaceful to very aggressive) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

### Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = Peaceful:** None of the neighbours has attacked the country since 1950.
- 2 = Low:** The relationship with neighbours is generally good, but aggressiveness is manifest in politicians' speeches or in protectionist measures.
- 3 = Moderate:** There are serious tensions and consequent economic and diplomatic restrictions from other countries.
- 4 = Aggressive:** Open conflicts with violence and protests.
- 5 = Very aggressive:** Frequent invasions by neighbouring countries.

## External Conflicts Fought

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2.28
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.2%
Data source	IEP; UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset
Measurement period	2018–2022

**Definition:** This indicator measures the number and duration of extraterritorial conflicts a country is involved in. Information for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding all individual conflict scores where that country is involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries. Conflicts are not counted against a country if they have already been counted against that country in the number and duration of internal conflicts indicator.

*Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:*

Number:

- Number of internationalised internal armed conflicts and interstate armed conflicts.
- If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths) it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25-999 battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.

Duration:

- A score is assigned based on the number of years out of the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will receive a score of one out of five.

Role:

- If the country is a primary party to the conflict, that conflict receives a score of one; if it is a secondary party (supporting the primary party), that conflict receives a score of 0.25.
- If a country is a party to a force covered by a relevant United Nations Security Council Resolution, then the entire conflict score is multiplied by a quarter; if not, it receives a full score.

The different conflict scores are then added and banded to establish a country's score.

### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
No external conflict	Combined conflict score of up to 1.5	Combined conflict score of up to 3	Combined conflict score of up to 4.5	A combined conflict score of 6 or above. This shows very high levels of external conflict.

## Number Of Deaths From Organised External Conflict

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	7.1%
Data source	UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
Measurement period	2023

**Alternate Source:** Where applicable, IEP also uses several other open-source datasets to construct this indicator.

**Definition:** This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year".

### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–24 deaths	25–998 deaths	999–4,998 deaths	4,999–9,998 deaths	> 9,999 deaths



## APPENDIX C

## GPI Domain Scores

TABLE C.1

## Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict domain, most peaceful to least

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Iceland	1	Madagascar	1.63	Nicaragua	2.26
Mauritius	1	The Gambia	1.685	Kyrgyz Republic	2.274
Malaysia	1	Romania	1.685	Tajikistan	2.274
Singapore	1	France	1.747	Mozambique	2.281
Uruguay	1	Cyprus	1.756	Moldova	2.283
New Zealand	1.011	Dominican Republic	1.756	Benin	2.287
Ireland	1.034	Equatorial Guinea	1.756	Azerbaijan	2.289
Botswana	1.046	Guyana	1.756	Zimbabwe	2.293
Canada	1.066	Slovakia	1.756	Bahrain	2.295
Switzerland	1.066	Turkmenistan	1.756	Ecuador	2.332
Germany	1.066	Taiwan	1.756	Uganda	2.346
Italy	1.066	Zambia	1.76	India	2.383
Austria	1.093	Saudi Arabia	1.766	Gabon	2.385
Netherlands	1.095	Nepal	1.777	Brazil	2.396
Belgium	1.113	Kazakhstan	1.779	Egypt	2.473
United Kingdom	1.117	Poland	1.783	Belarus	2.512
Spain	1.181	Guinea-Bissau	1.796	Bangladesh	2.515
Portugal	1.181	Angola	1.812	Philippines	2.538
Bulgaria	1.252	Senegal	1.887	Guinea	2.539
Costa Rica	1.252	Eswatini	1.904	Venezuela	2.557
Croatia	1.252	Sweden	1.917	Colombia	2.587
Jamaica	1.252	Guatemala	1.926	Togo	2.587
Mongolia	1.252	Cambodia	1.937	Libya	2.658
Trinidad and Tobago	1.252	Jordan	1.943	Kenya	2.692
Namibia	1.262	Eritrea	1.966	Haiti	2.906
Argentina	1.275	Tunisia	1.967	Chad	2.911
Australia	1.295	Sri Lanka	1.974	Burundi	2.954
Denmark	1.328	Tanzania	1.979	North Korea	3.016
Czechia	1.341	Mauritania	1.998	Central African Republic	3.02
Albania	1.504	Cuba	2.008	Lebanon	3.08
Chile	1.504	South Korea	2.008	Mexico	3.117
Japan	1.504	Uzbekistan	2.008	Iraq	3.152
Kuwait	1.504	Malawi	2.009	Afghanistan	3.24
Laos	1.504	Peru	2.019	Pakistan	3.242
North Macedonia	1.504	Georgia	2.025	Iran	3.289
Montenegro	1.504	Papua New Guinea	2.039	Türkiye	3.357
Oman	1.504	Indonesia	2.043	Myanmar	3.364
Panama	1.504	Thailand	2.043	Russia	3.371
Qatar	1.504	Honduras	2.048	South Sudan	3.392
Slovenia	1.504	Lesotho	2.054	Cameroon	3.42
Timor-Leste	1.504	Algeria	2.055	Israel	3.497
Greece	1.516	Kosovo	2.058	Niger	3.529
Hungary	1.516	Ghana	2.063	Nigeria	3.538
Paraguay	1.527	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.064	Mali	3.699
Bolivia	1.551	Serbia	2.123	Yemen	3.701
Latvia	1.564	China	2.149	Ethiopia	3.702
United Arab Emirates	1.567	South Africa	2.149	Somalia	3.76
Estonia	1.57	Republic of the Congo	2.152	Palestine	3.928
Finland	1.57	Sierra Leone	2.159	Burkina Faso	3.959
Lithuania	1.57	Armenia	2.177	Democratic Republic of the Congo	4.07
Norway	1.57	Morocco	2.191	Syria	4.117
El Salvador	1.577	Djibouti	2.195	Ukraine	4.22
Liberia	1.59	United States of America	2.219	Sudan	4.345
Bhutan	1.593	Côte d'Ivoire	2.227		
Vietnam	1.618	Rwanda	2.247		

TABLE C.2

## Societal Safety and Security domain, most to least peaceful

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Singapore	1.213	Ghana	2.149	Guinea	2.722
Iceland	1.238	Uzbekistan	2.167	Peru	2.724
Norway	1.267	Cyprus	2.174	Kenya	2.74
Switzerland	1.303	Morocco	2.202	Mozambique	2.749
Finland	1.308	Madagascar	2.204	Iran	2.759
Denmark	1.315	Cambodia	2.208	Dominican Republic	2.76
Japan	1.336	Moldova	2.209	Republic of the Congo	2.763
Slovenia	1.403	Kyrgyz Republic	2.234	Lebanon	2.765
Qatar	1.46	Algeria	2.237	Pakistan	2.77
South Korea	1.468	Laos	2.244	El Salvador	2.792
Austria	1.471	Tajikistan	2.249	Papua New Guinea	2.794
Netherlands	1.482	Tanzania	2.257	Nicaragua	2.818
Ireland	1.488	Malawi	2.262	Zimbabwe	2.872
New Zealand	1.502	Timor-Leste	2.268	Burundi	2.878
Australia	1.513	India	2.312	Eswatini	2.882
Kuwait	1.519	Bangladesh	2.322	Ukraine	2.893
Sweden	1.535	Sierra Leone	2.323	Uganda	2.919
Czechia	1.559	Kazakhstan	2.334	Niger	2.925
Portugal	1.561	Egypt	2.346	Trinidad and Tobago	2.93
United Kingdom	1.569	Azerbaijan	2.358	Panama	2.942
Croatia	1.577	Turkmenistan	2.361	Türkiye	2.943
Estonia	1.579	Rwanda	2.368	Russia	2.954
Germany	1.581	Mauritania	2.37	Libya	2.999
Poland	1.622	Guinea-Bissau	2.371	North Korea	3.002
Lithuania	1.626	Zambia	2.385	Cameroon	3.017
Slovakia	1.641	Bolivia	2.408	Guatemala	3.024
Hungary	1.642	Sri Lanka	2.416	Burkina Faso	3.026
Canada	1.66	Tunisia	2.424	Chad	3.027
Spain	1.691	Nepal	2.437	Jamaica	3.06
Belgium	1.697	Chile	2.439	Lesotho	3.099
Italy	1.737	Georgia	2.465	Ethiopia	3.107
Oman	1.745	Liberia	2.471	Guyana	3.114
Bhutan	1.751	Belarus	2.472	Honduras	3.195
Greece	1.762	Angola	2.486	Ecuador	3.231
United Arab Emirates	1.764	Philippines	2.494	Myanmar	3.235
Latvia	1.769	Israel	2.501	Syria	3.289
Romania	1.777	Thailand	2.515	South Africa	3.316
Taiwan	1.807	United States of America	2.518	Mexico	3.357
North Macedonia	1.814	Mongolia	2.526	Nigeria	3.408
Malaysia	1.818	The Gambia	2.542	Sudan	3.417
Serbia	1.82	Equatorial Guinea	2.542	Brazil	3.434
France	1.826	Argentina	2.559	Somalia	3.513
Bulgaria	1.901	Botswana	2.572	Haiti	3.527
Armenia	1.964	Costa Rica	2.59	Venezuela	3.568
China	2.011	Senegal	2.593	Mali	3.586
Indonesia	2.016	Djibouti	2.614	Iraq	3.61
Vietnam	2.021	Paraguay	2.615	Central African Republic	3.649
Albania	2.046	Côte d'Ivoire	2.656	Eritrea	3.682
Saudi Arabia	2.06	Palestine	2.697	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.737
Bahrain	2.066	Gabon	2.703	Colombia	3.755
Montenegro	2.072	Namibia	2.704	Afghanistan	3.794
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.081	Benin	2.706	Yemen	3.878
Jordan	2.095	Cuba	2.706	South Sudan	3.903
Mauritius	2.139	Togo	2.711		
Kosovo	2.147	Uruguay	2.714		

TABLE C.3

**Militarisation domain, most peaceful to least**

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Iceland	1.022	Jamaica	1.693	Germany	1.96
Portugal	1.224	Honduras	1.695	Cambodia	1.961
Malaysia	1.229	Uzbekistan	1.697	Ecuador	1.963
Bhutan	1.234	South Africa	1.709	Serbia	1.966
Slovenia	1.256	Kyrgyz Republic	1.713	Sweden	1.968
Moldova	1.259	Belgium	1.719	Azerbaijan	1.97
Hungary	1.264	Timor-Leste	1.72	Mali	1.985
Mauritius	1.309	Kazakhstan	1.721	Singapore	1.989
Austria	1.323	Costa Rica	1.722	Niger	1.998
Ireland	1.328	Switzerland	1.724	Central African Republic	2.013
Czechia	1.34	Cyprus	1.725	Guinea	2.013
Mongolia	1.352	Japan	1.725	Mauritania	2.019
New Zealand	1.409	Philippines	1.737	Papua New Guinea	2.02
Slovakia	1.424	Kenya	1.738	Algeria	2.036
Sierra Leone	1.436	Romania	1.747	China	2.058
Thailand	1.441	The Gambia	1.759	Kuwait	2.058
Indonesia	1.452	Republic of the Congo	1.767	Syria	2.059
Cuba	1.453	Togo	1.767	North Macedonia	2.06
Argentina	1.459	Taiwan	1.77	Burkina Faso	2.066
Zambia	1.473	Nepal	1.788	Venezuela	2.074
Rwanda	1.484	Libya	1.79	Netherlands	2.103
Bangladesh	1.506	Brazil	1.799	El Salvador	2.112
Madagascar	1.521	Colombia	1.8	Armenia	2.117
Denmark	1.526	Ethiopia	1.8	Guinea-Bissau	2.138
Canada	1.529	Trinidad and Tobago	1.8	Turkmenistan	2.142
Latvia	1.534	Guatemala	1.803	South Korea	2.159
Guyana	1.541	Cameroon	1.811	Chad	2.162
Senegal	1.554	Somalia	1.811	Qatar	2.171
Montenegro	1.555	Australia	1.818	Sri Lanka	2.172
Tanzania	1.566	Côte d'Ivoire	1.819	Oman	2.176
Finland	1.571	Nigeria	1.826	Iraq	2.214
Uruguay	1.584	Lithuania	1.828	Greece	2.234
Panama	1.585	Egypt	1.829	Myanmar	2.247
Eswatini	1.594	Jordan	1.831	Djibouti	2.258
Peru	1.598	Georgia	1.837	Yemen	2.258
Eritrea	1.602	Albania	1.845	Sudan	2.265
Ghana	1.604	Spain	1.851	Palestine	2.266
Tunisia	1.609	Liberia	1.862	Lebanon	2.284
Burundi	1.61	Belarus	1.864	South Sudan	2.294
Bulgaria	1.613	Equatorial Guinea	1.867	Italy	2.3
Kosovo	1.619	Benin	1.871	Norway	2.323
Dominican Republic	1.626	Paraguay	1.874	India	2.421
Tajikistan	1.626	Haiti	1.879	United Arab Emirates	2.473
Vietnam	1.63	Mexico	1.885	Afghanistan	2.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.632	Zimbabwe	1.895	United Kingdom	2.504
Mozambique	1.634	Chile	1.902	Pakistan	2.576
Botswana	1.655	Gabon	1.913	France	2.776
Namibia	1.656	Malawi	1.913	Saudi Arabia	2.969
Poland	1.657	Uganda	1.916	Ukraine	3.009
Nicaragua	1.659	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.92	Russia	3.09
Estonia	1.66	Türkiye	1.937	United States of America	3.142
Morocco	1.665	Iran	1.938	North Korea	3.146
Croatia	1.678	Bahrain	1.941	Israel	3.773
Angola	1.684	Lesotho	1.954		
Laos	1.686	Bolivia	1.958		

## APPENDIX D

# Economic Cost of Violence

The economic impact of violence includes the direct and indirect costs of violence as well as an economic multiplier applied to the direct costs. The economic cost of violence includes only the direct and indirect costs. Per capita and percentage of GDP results are calculated using the economic cost of violence.

TABLE D.1

## Economic cost of violence

Economic Cost of Violence as % of GDP, Rank	Country	Economic Impact of Violence (Millions, US\$ 2023 PPP)	Per Capita Impact (2023, US\$ PPP)	Economic Cost of Violence as a Percentage of GDP	Economic Cost of Violence (Millions, US\$ 2023 PPP)
1	Ukraine	459,884,230,455	12,515.68	68.52%	270,200,365,375
2	Afghanistan	47,822,085,259	1,132.16	53.19%	34,063,584,193
3	North Korea	534,414,364,726	20,428.04	41.57%	271,686,094,813
4	Somalia	12,195,165,032	672.15515	39.78%	10,454,412,027
5	Colombia	340,705,923,066	6,541.32	33.77%	274,664,643,970
6	Central African Republic	1,931,598,182	336.3797	33.76%	1,597,233,564
7	Sudan	63,591,579,870	1,321.82	29.90%	51,361,728,762
8	Cyprus	18,961,645,385	15,047.28	28.61%	16,223,078,955
9	Burkina Faso	15,885,062,204	683.18485	23.47%	11,781,270,125
10	Palestine	11,428,013,804	2,127.63	21.27%	6,536,688,816
11	Myanmar (Burma)	49,417,503,990	905.44737	16.51%	38,291,501,006
12	South Africa	187,986,534,036	3,111.61	15.38%	125,219,463,171
13	Mali	10,911,431,898	468.4285	15.26%	7,579,449,755
14	Georgia	13,191,286,252	3,538.17	15.14%	9,637,251,673
15	Azerbaijan	35,913,305,153	3,449.01	14.84%	23,318,148,617
16	Jamaica	5,765,813,528	2,040.60	14.77%	4,216,971,188
17	Israel	91,814,113,008	10,007.51	14.50%	59,076,942,006
18	Lesotho	961,984,752	412.81265	14.46%	755,112,861
19	Honduras	11,463,907,567	1,082.13	14.07%	8,509,801,190
20	South Sudan	8,108,288,705	731.21453	13.93%	7,145,661,122
21	Congo - Kinshasa	18,005,862,771	176.0744	13.89%	16,086,061,590
22	Eritrea	3,080,050,723	821.58764	13.77%	2,388,212,863
23	Nigeria	156,149,299,236	697.70361	11.99%	133,174,219,869
24	Saudi Arabia	433,560,947,644	11,734.66	11.91%	220,908,037,427
25	Russia	838,894,057,529	5,807.73	11.82%	468,680,913,397
26	Bahrain	16,680,214,976	11,228.62	11.40%	8,784,754,830
27	United States	4,388,050,653,750	12,906.16	11.19%	2,459,259,188,296
28	Mexico	378,744,707,715	2,948.45	11.19%	291,053,179,656
29	Brazil	474,220,780,373	2,191.18	11.08%	361,837,727,288
30	Trinidad & Tobago	4,986,094,139	3,248.40	10.59%	3,787,050,527
31	Iraq	67,503,909,174	1,483.45	10.57%	44,254,219,265
32	El Salvador	9,977,223,171	1,567.53	10.45%	6,252,241,528
33	Chad	4,199,696,800	229.76071	10.35%	2,673,489,660
34	Pakistan	205,204,772,239	853.29318	10.29%	133,122,766,719
35	Botswana	6,584,334,726	2,461.11	10.24%	4,250,409,087
36	Togo	3,580,808,889	395.50347	10.21%	2,036,833,353
37	Ecuador	29,027,507,452	1,595.75	10.00%	19,758,040,050
38	Mauritania	4,778,329,784	982.59112	9.94%	2,577,408,882
39	Burundi	1,423,243,853	107.50746	9.91%	929,549,583
40	Qatar	50,737,395,274	18,678.24	9.88%	25,919,041,240
41	United Arab Emirates	136,026,431,978	14,293.19	9.75%	69,532,523,435
42	Namibia	4,015,500,683	1,541.95	9.50%	2,414,617,382
43	United Kingdom	505,000,302,383	7,455.33	9.46%	304,972,373,291
44	Guyana	3,888,209,399	4,777.64	9.18%	2,663,704,545
45	Armenia	7,629,003,082	2,746.25	9.10%	4,057,820,516

TABLE D.1

## Economic cost of violence (continued)

Economic Cost of Violence as % of GDP, Rank	Country	Economic Impact of Violence (Millions, US\$ 2023 PPP)	Per Capita Impact (2023, US\$ PPP)	Economic Cost of Violence as a Percentage of GDP	Economic Cost of Violence (Millions, US\$ 2023 PPP)
46	Bosnia & Herzegovina	7,070,043,470	2,201.92	9.03%	4,851,226,712
47	Montenegro	2,264,494,796	3,614.60	8.97%	1,243,037,151
48	Latvia	9,774,943,048	5,340.88	8.95%	5,404,197,956
49	Oman	28,749,328,816	6,190.13	8.93%	14,658,776,355
50	Guatemala	22,685,380,067	1,253.89	8.88%	14,717,803,330
51	Ethiopia	33,597,454,391	265.53572	8.85%	26,672,652,186
52	Costa Rica	16,113,568,348	3,091.53	8.81%	10,131,839,560
53	Panama	22,042,614,642	4,933.35	8.76%	13,023,703,303
54	Greece	54,002,411,332	5,222.03	8.51%	27,896,577,117
55	Serbia	23,114,653,716	3,233.24	8.48%	12,659,070,010
56	Cuba	27,431,640,829	2,450.47	8.40%	15,478,116,545
57	Bulgaria	28,267,509,156	4,226.78	8.25%	14,874,778,273
58	Croatia	20,377,621,774	5,083.45	8.19%	11,260,033,804
59	Mozambique	4,925,560,458	145.30811	8.18%	3,466,669,971
60	Uruguay	10,985,864,659	3,209.32	8.17%	6,828,927,400
61	Poland	237,154,094,268	5,780.57	8.05%	124,501,197,427
62	Djibouti	784,859,805	690.6211	7.98%	452,601,341
63	Romania	96,113,721,901	4,831.58	7.82%	50,556,582,865
64	Cameroon	9,786,041,967	341.60442	7.75%	8,262,613,549
65	Hungary	50,427,689,995	4,965.19	7.66%	27,523,182,850
66	Eswatini	1,255,314,612	1,036.75	7.66%	840,530,380
67	Niger	4,215,909,498	154.98047	7.65%	2,652,506,731
68	Lithuania	14,617,886,314	5,377.48	7.59%	8,246,747,148
69	Timor-Leste	750,215,788	551.38762	7.50%	402,477,412
70	Sri Lanka	33,236,894,559	1,518.11	7.46%	19,912,793,181
71	Gambia	698,740,500	251.96472	7.40%	433,655,679
72	Australia	174,000,771,228	6,581.19	7.30%	98,631,983,115
73	Uzbekistan	39,381,419,911	1,119.94	7.28%	20,680,600,168
74	Libya	13,243,271,337	1,922.55	7.28%	9,922,682,129
75	Jordan	14,841,256,904	1,309.09	7.26%	7,814,254,957
76	Morocco	40,049,768,349	1,058.40	7.20%	22,035,855,100
77	Algeria	69,316,834,757	1,519.89	7.17%	36,627,557,676
78	Estonia	6,472,858,937	4,893.43	7.06%	3,521,599,758
79	Albania	5,538,691,186	1,955.45	6.99%	3,065,527,331
80	France	360,514,190,872	5,567.22	6.98%	207,428,046,187
81	Norway	47,010,582,483	8,587.41	6.95%	25,617,643,473
82	Tunisia	16,316,472,669	1,309.70	6.90%	9,082,453,156
83	Kosovo	6,308,400,451	3,792.03	6.85%	4,075,336,447
84	Slovakia	24,434,943,760	4,216.41	6.79%	13,053,822,172
85	India	1,233,393,763,259	863.34165	6.68%	678,916,896,483
86	Venezuela	42,583,095,751	1,476.61	6.67%	31,659,574,600
87	Belgium	67,468,855,163	5,773.41	6.61%	41,172,087,268
88	Kuwait	27,241,066,112	6,320.27	6.56%	13,977,502,421
89	Lebanon	8,359,898,438	1,561.45	6.55%	4,552,241,668
90	North Macedonia	4,382,154,322	2,101.07	6.52%	2,329,278,466
91	Haiti	2,714,874,300	231.55046	6.45%	2,118,048,734
92	Argentina	109,433,828,524	2,390.75	6.28%	64,516,228,625
93	Bhutan	959,455,598	1,218.47	6.19%	565,001,570
94	Czechia	49,364,902,395	4,703.53	6.18%	26,638,057,179
95	New Zealand	23,758,222,570	4,544.33	6.12%	14,467,835,974
96	Nicaragua	3,652,476,956	518.35315	6.06%	2,485,972,261
97	South Korea	241,717,245,253	4,667.79	6.05%	142,815,752,303
98	Congo - Brazzaville	2,127,530,782	348.38324	6.04%	1,352,803,066
99	Belarus	18,870,845,675	1,986.77	6.02%	10,922,519,513
100	Paraguay	9,486,171,300	1,382.52	6.00%	5,574,706,980
101	Canada	197,914,353,307	5,103.35	5.99%	114,546,004,607
102	Gabon	3,245,404,472	1,331.96	5.96%	2,023,802,284
103	Cambodia	8,574,625,237	506.03206	5.95%	4,569,158,997
104	Dominican Republic	20,232,486,168	1,785.28	5.95%	13,030,294,543
105	Iran	144,510,008,813	1,620.56	5.88%	81,034,564,501
106	Vietnam	124,376,108,623	1,258.12	5.88%	66,210,477,715
107	Liberia	783,274,182	144.55882	5.71%	452,209,952
108	Chile	47,589,392,157	2,424.37	5.71%	29,006,018,506
109	Netherlands	109,063,175,385	6,190.34	5.67%	59,145,523,156
110	Kyrgyzstan	3,437,777,728	510.40841	5.58%	1,904,237,244

TABLE D.1

**Economic cost of violence (continued)**

Economic Cost of Violence as % of GDP, Rank	Country	Economic Impact of Violence (Millions, US\$ 2023 PPP)	Per Capita Impact (2023, US\$ PPP)	Economic Cost of Violence as a Percentage of GDP	Economic Cost of Violence (Millions, US\$ 2023 PPP)
111	Benin	4,431,436,376	323.15992	5.57%	2,623,430,866
112	Slovenia	8,563,269,309	4,039.90	5.56%	4,835,642,883
113	Germany	442,112,242,745	5,307.81	5.53%	248,779,488,012
114	Portugal	37,481,781,109	3,657.61	5.52%	20,231,188,338
115	Guinea	3,322,419,262	234.12798	5.51%	2,111,958,833
116	Italy	268,812,768,485	4,566.15	5.51%	143,644,150,780
117	Türkiye	278,178,925,849	3,241.57	5.51%	156,648,076,468
118	Uganda	9,948,971,219	204.78578	5.47%	6,061,497,252
119	Sweden	53,985,267,368	5,087.15	5.46%	32,102,730,741
120	Singapore	66,324,353,077	11,027.00	5.45%	35,430,671,103
121	Rwanda	2,528,694,341	179.40768	5.41%	1,802,860,525
122	Senegal	5,708,200,843	321.35047	5.39%	3,412,096,294
123	Moldova	4,236,162,097	1,232.90	5.35%	2,447,324,094
124	Sierra Leone	1,312,597,417	149.30994	5.33%	766,217,238
125	Spain	189,689,740,853	3,991.82	5.29%	101,196,146,871
126	Guinea-Bissau	379,445,929	176.41739	5.27%	210,171,710
127	Bolivia	9,346,195,782	754.42081	5.24%	5,347,796,606
128	Mongolia	3,462,323,781	1,004.40	5.21%	2,167,116,153
129	Finland	25,071,218,024	4,521.02	5.20%	14,205,108,699
130	Peru	38,061,018,409	1,107.95	5.14%	22,481,753,613
131	Côte d'Ivoire	12,122,059,411	419.84017	5.09%	8,139,508,058
132	Laos	4,939,362,973	647.04034	4.98%	3,022,172,499
133	Tajikistan	3,946,816,036	389.0964	4.97%	2,084,480,099
134	Taiwan	51,459,030,652	2,151.00	4.85%	28,964,148,262
135	Kenya	22,276,085,752	404.28038	4.81%	12,929,150,715
136	Syria	35,079,277,535	1,510.28	4.80%	32,377,704,513
137	Angola	17,664,598,254	481.53148	4.76%	10,321,881,567
138	China	2,283,205,524,392	1,601.49	4.68%	1,213,182,065,363
139	Equatorial Guinea	1,894,007,767	1,104.59	4.51%	1,154,445,331
140	Mauritius	2,328,574,283	1,790.44	4.47%	1,327,065,535
141	Denmark	27,644,958,751	4,676.94	4.44%	15,733,545,977
142	Thailand	94,765,365,875	1,319.83	4.43%	55,661,472,817
143	Zimbabwe	2,164,994,339	129.90946	4.30%	1,580,572,275
144	Turkmenistan	7,616,642,230	1,168.90	4.24%	4,075,808,122
145	Austria	36,657,808,226	4,091.75	4.23%	21,172,788,352
146	Switzerland	46,695,669,877	5,308.34	4.13%	26,290,013,816
147	Nepal	9,012,852,013	291.71025	4.11%	5,085,697,080
148	Egypt	111,928,667,887	993.00964	4.10%	59,050,642,261
149	Japan	370,455,978,722	3,004.64	4.02%	207,449,469,108
150	Zambia	4,228,878,393	205.58738	3.99%	2,765,755,552
151	Iceland	1,271,994,276	3,389.11	3.72%	774,971,152
152	Papua New Guinea	1,803,064,471	174.54758	3.67%	1,421,313,939
153	Ghana	10,998,215,375	322.3205	3.58%	6,700,016,024
154	Malaysia	60,380,014,359	1,759.91	3.40%	33,086,280,884
155	Philippines	55,864,816,568	476.10422	3.28%	33,061,036,825
156	Kazakhstan	25,844,585,920	1,318.16	3.27%	16,754,863,864
157	Yemen	36,050,585,144	1,046.47	3.09%	30,932,639,771
158	Tanzania	8,884,813,182	131.74767	2.95%	5,224,427,846
159	Ireland	26,505,131,552	5,241.34	2.86%	16,243,911,942
160	Malawi	1,313,466,111	62.74994	2.76%	846,634,124
161	Bangladesh	47,641,402,952	275.45657	2.53%	27,446,699,965
162	Indonesia	159,044,867,148	573.06419	2.44%	84,203,400,673
163	Madagascar	1,519,550,113	50.10762	1.92%	873,234,391

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
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